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Inter-War Period (between WW 1 and II), Stalin’s 5 Year Plan for Economic Mass Murder | BETWEEN 2 WARS I 1932 Part 1 of 4 - YouTube (1)

Stalin's 5 Year Plan for Economic Mass Murder | BETWEEN 2 WARS I 1932 Part 1 of 4 - YouTube (1)

So what do you do when you've ostensibly created the dictatorship of the proletariat,

but you hardly have any proletarians? You build factories, lots of them, because where

there are factories there are workers. But if most of the peasants become workers, who

will provide the workers with bread? And now that we've abolished commerce, what will

the workers do with their wages? These are some of the questions facing Stalin in 1932

as his first five year plan for state controlled industrialization goes into its chaotic last year

Welcome to Between-2-Wars a chronological summary of the interwar years, covering all

facets of life, the uncertainty, hedonism, and euphoria, and ultimately humanity's

descent into the darkness of the Second World War. I'm Indy Neidell.

As the twenties progress, the USSR comes under increasing pressure from within to evolve.

The country faces constant food shortages, despite that the former lands of the Russian

Tsar are mainly agricultural. Industry is underdeveloped and infrastructure is far behind

the western world. Stalin and the rest of the soviet Central Committee also perceive

themselves to be under imminent threat from both within and abroad, so they want more

military power.

During the years of the civil war and the ensuing wars, this had been solved with what

became known as “War Communism”. Pretty much a euphemism for systematic plunder and

robbery through war-spoils, expropriation, and forced requisitioning of agricultural

produce. Coupled with the abolition of free commerce and trade, by 1921 this is having

disastrous effects on the economy, with widespread starvation and unemployment crippling Bolshevik

Russia and its dominions.

Vladimir Lenin, then leader of the Soviet sees no other way out than to implement his

New Economic Policy, the NEP. It's an attempt to solve the immediate economic problems by

reintroducing elements of free market economics, such as profit-seeking and private trade.

Yet several features, including banking and large industries, remain under state control.

It solves the immediate pains somewhat, most significantly it leads to less starvation,

but doesn't create much progress, especially not in manufacturing and infrastructure.

See, the central problem for what has now become the USSR is that going back to the

old ways won't solve that it's in large parts still stuck in a pre-industrialized

economic structure, which is perhaps paradoxical for a country that has now gone through a

revolution meant to liberate the industrial working class masses. In reality, this means

that it is everything but well suited for Karl Marx predicted worker's revolution

that he foresaw in the industrialized countries of western Europe, not the agrarian East.

Marx posited that the establishment of socialism would come organically as a result of a majority

working class in an industrialized society creating social change from the grass roots.

It's the belief that once freed of its shackles, and once class has been abolished by revolution,

the proletariat will magically rule itself in a blissful dictatorship of the proletariat.

But in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, if you feel that this Marxist vision is even possible

and a must, such industrialization will have to be carried out to create this working class,

and until then the application of state power will need to be top-down. Obviously, it's

quite a bit more complicated that that, but vastly simplified: although the Bolsheviks

claim a revolution in the name of the proletariat and the peasants, their relationship to the

peasant class is at best ambivalent, and at times downright murderous, as we shall see

here and in a later episode.

Anyway, when Lenin dies in 1924, the other Communist leaders spend a few years infighting

about who is going to be the new boss, instead of addressing this elephant in the room. It

is mainly Josef Stalin and Leon Trotsky who vie for power. To make a long story short;

in 1928 Stalin emerges victorious as he expels Trotsky from the party and forces him into

exile.

Stalin now feels an urgent need to take the Russian dominated Soviet Union forward at

any price.

He feels that the USSR is under imminent threat of either falling apart, or being dissembled

from external forces, or as he will ask rhetorically in 1931, “Do you want our socialist fatherland

to be beaten and to lose its independence? If you do not want this, you must put an end

to its backwardness in the shortest possible time.”

With fresh memories of the First World War, the Russian Civil War, the attempts at independence

of the former western lands of the Russian Empire that resulted in millions of deaths,

military needs are seen as fundamental. Beginning in 1926, the Soviet government undergoes a

war scare that intensifies in 1927. While an imminent threat does not necessarily exist,

the fear is not baseless. Just in January 1927, senior figures such as the Editor-in-Chief

of Pravda Nikolai Bukharin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet

Union Alexei Rykov, and People's Commissar for Defense of the Soviet Union Kliment Voroshilov

all warn of the imminence of war.

In the East they fear that Japan or even the US might renew activities on the Russian Western

Pacific Rim that ended after the Civil War. They worry that Great Britain, who had also

been involved in the civil war, might encourage encroachment eastward by Poland. This worry

is made particularly strong by Poland's policy of ‘Prometheanism', a program by

Józef Piłsudski, who is now dictator of Poland, to weaken the Soviet Union by supporting

nationalist and separatist movements.

To counter this they need more arms, but they can no longer rely on ‘War Communism'.

There simply isn't enough left to plunder. And despite a secret military exchange between

the Red Army and the German Reichswehr starting already in 1921, they have few international

allies that will support them. They can and do purchase arms from abroad, but lack the

cash or credit worthiness needed to do so at scale, not to mention that it makes them

dependent on foreign relations.

Faced with all these urgencies Stalin, with his deep-seated hatred of capitalism sees

only one way out - a strict military style plan for rapid state-controlled industrialization.

And rapid is an understatement, in the same speech as earlier in 1931 he says, “We are

fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance

in ten years. Either we do it or we go under.” So, as much as ten times faster than the west

developed. His instrument for that will be his Five Year Plans, with goals set not on

realism and opportunity, but ideology and necessity. Rather than permitting the market

to determine cost, production, and consumption, the Five Year Plan is dictated by the government.

Quotas are established for various products with the goal of increasing production significantly.

All while the Soviet economy has barely recovered to its 1914 levels by 1928. It will be a brutal

plan built knowingly on the suffering, starvation, and death of millions of Soviet citizens.

In fact, the targets are more than ambitious, they are simply unrealistic. The most dramatic

effect on the people will come out of how they plan to feed the masses executing their

plan. We will cover that in a separate episode in detail, but for now it's enough to say

that the agrarian part of the plan has two parts; forced collectivization of all farms,

and ‘the liquidation of the kulaks as a class,' with the latter turning into downright

mass murder. It is, in short, a catastrophic failure. Between 1928 and 1933, agricultural

output diminishes by 18.5% with livestock products falling by a stunning 56%.

Not only does this create food shortages, even starvation, it has serious knock on effects.

For instance; the sudden drop in cattle, which were needed for draft power to plow the fields,

results in a rise of the number of tractors needed. Instead of adjusting the plan, they

simply raise the quota of new tractors. Decline in food production leads to the implementation

of rationing in peacetime, decreasing productivity of the hungering workers. When they can't

fulfill the quotas, they're just moved to the next deadline. Other materials, such as

various metals, have to be imported. To finance that, they export food products like grain

that are already not sufficient to feed the population. Even for an isolated economy like

the USSR, starting in October 1929 the global depression further exacerbates import and

export goals, but the plan still doesn't change.

As Stalin tightens his dictatorial grip, and his goals are not met, he uses radicalization

to try to force to goals through.

More cautious engineers are denounced as undermining the Soviet Union's advancement and labelled

bourgeois saboteurs. The plan become more and more divorced from the reality on the

ground. And yet, in 1931, Stalin confidently claims “There are no fortresses Bolsheviks

cannot capture!” Economic planners with more limited visions are marginalized while

ideologues are promoted in their place in an increasingly out of control system.

But, as the economic historian Eugène Zaleski notes, the goals may have been largely immaterial.

“Stalin was a man of action, and industrialization meant for him the intensified construction

of factories, the development of new branches of industry and new regions, the improvement

of labor skills, and the reduction of economic dependence on the outside world. His vision

of industrial development was of a vast program of large works, but works carried out under

the impetus of a drive imbued with ideological fanaticism. Under these conditions, what would

it matter whether these immense works were completed in three, four, or ten years?”

But the optimism that took hold of the planners had some justification. Following the end

of the Russian Civil War, the Soviet economy, and the industrial sector in particular, saw

a high growth rate. Experience in the First World War also contributed to the belief that

resources were underutilized. For example, the Russian Empire had greater economic output

in 1916 than in 1913 despite the effects of the war, including territorial losses. And

as mentioned earlier, the ongoing war scare helped produce an existential fear in which

rapid industrialization was less of a choice but more of an urgent and unavoidable necessity.

And, believe it or not- in terms of industrial output, although it doesn't meet Stalin's

insane goals, it is undoubtedly effective. Industrial output skyrockets, taking the Soviet

Union from being the fifth nation in absolute terms of industrial capacity in 1928 to being

the second by 1932, trailing only the United States. Not only that, many of the goals are

achieved ahead of time. With the statistics on the first two years in hand, Stalin proclaims

that the plan could be achieved in four years, partially due to what he calls “the enthusiasm

of the workers”. This is embodied in posters that read “2+2=5”.

And it isn't a transformation that just focuses on putting out product. Prior to the

Five Year Plan, the Soviet Union lacks even the basic industries, which are needed for

industrial development in the first place. So they depend on tools and machinery from

abroad, or as the Soviet foreign trade theoretician D. D. Mishustin will note in 1938, the country's

development depended on “capitalist technology” and that “equipment of the very latest design

and construction” was required “in order to free the country from the need of importing

this machinery and equipment once the goal had been reached.”

But now in 1932, the Soviets are still in desperate need of western machinery so that

they continue exporting their badly needed goods, such as grain while the population

starves.

And it isn't just food that is scarce, living standards overall suffer considerably. While

urban housing increases by 12%, it doesn't keep up with massive urban population growth.

And this is a slap in the face of the workers, who now go into newly built modern factories

only to return home to pre-war era housing units without any kind of sanitation. Health

care can't keep up with urbanization and so on. But even if all that is solved, it's


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So what do you do when you've ostensibly created the dictatorship of the proletariat, So what do you do when you've ostensibly created the dictatorship of the proletariat, 그렇다면 표면적으로 프롤레타리아 독재 체제를 만들었을 때 어떻게 해야 할까요? Так что ты делаешь, когда якобы создал диктатуру пролетариата,

but you hardly have any proletarians? You build factories, lots of them, because where 프롤레타리아는 거의 없나요? 공장을 많이 지었으니까요. а у тебя вряд ли есть пролетарии? Вы строить заводы, их много, потому что где

there are factories there are workers. But if most of the peasants become workers, who 공장이 있고 노동자가 있습니다. 그러나 대부분의 농민이 노동자가된다면 누가 Есть заводы, есть рабочие. Но если большинство крестьян становятся рабочими, кто

will provide the workers with bread? And now that we've abolished commerce, what will 노동자들에게 빵을 제공할 수 있을까요? 이제 상거래가 폐지되었으니 обеспечит рабочих хлебом? И сейчас что мы отменили коммерцию, что будет

the workers do with their wages? These are some of the questions facing Stalin in 1932 рабочие делают со своей зарплатой? Это некоторые вопросы, стоящие перед Сталиным в 1932 году

as his first five year plan for state controlled industrialization goes into its chaotic last year 국가 통제 산업화를 위한 첫 번째 5개년 계획이 작년에 혼란에 빠지면서 как его первый пятилетний план под контролем государства индустриализация идет в хаос в прошлом году

Welcome to Between-2-Wars a chronological summary of the interwar years, covering all 전후 시기를 연대기 순으로 요약한 '비트윈투워즈'에 오신 것을 환영합니다. Добро пожаловать в период между двумя войнами в хронологическом порядке Резюме межвоенных лет, охватывающих все

facets of life, the uncertainty, hedonism, and euphoria, and ultimately humanity's aspekte života, neizvjesnost, hedonizam i euforiju, i naposljetku čovječanstvo 삶의 측면, 불확실성, 쾌락주의, 행복감, 그리고 궁극적으로 인류의 грани жизни, неуверенность, гедонизм, и эйфория, и в конечном итоге человечество

descent into the darkness of the Second World War. I'm Indy Neidell. 제2차 세계대전의 어둠 속으로 내려갑니다. 저는 인디 네이델입니다. погружение во тьму Второй Мировой Война. Я Инди Нейделл.

As the twenties progress, the USSR comes under increasing pressure from within to evolve. Kako dvadesete napreduju, SSSR dolazi pod sve veći pritisak iznutra da se razvija. 20세기가 진행됨에 따라 소련은 내부로부터 진화해야 한다는 압박을 받게 됩니다. По мере развития двадцатых годов СССР подвергается увеличивая давление изнутри, чтобы развиваться.

The country faces constant food shortages, despite that the former lands of the Russian 이 나라는 이전 러시아 땅이었음에도 불구하고 지속적인 식량 부족에 직면 해 있습니다. Страна сталкивается с постоянной нехваткой продовольствия, несмотря на то что бывшие русские земли

Tsar are mainly agricultural. Industry is underdeveloped and infrastructure is far behind 차르는 주로 농업을 영위합니다. 산업이 낙후되어 있고 인프라가 낙후되어 있습니다. Царь в основном сельскохозяйственный. Промышленность слаборазвитый и инфраструктура далеко позади

the western world. Stalin and the rest of the soviet Central Committee also perceive западный мир. Сталин и остальные Советский Центральный Комитет также воспринимает

themselves to be under imminent threat from both within and abroad, so they want more 국내외에서 임박한 위협을 받고 있다고 생각하기 때문에 더 많은 것을 원합니다. сами быть под непосредственной угрозой как внутри, так и за рубежом, поэтому они хотят больше

military power. военная власть.

During the years of the civil war and the ensuing wars, this had been solved with what Tijekom godina građanskog rata i ratova koji su uslijedili, to je riješeno čime В годы гражданской войны и последовавшие войны, это было решено с помощью чего

became known as “War Communism”. Pretty much a euphemism for systematic plunder and postao poznat kao “ratni komunizam”. Poprilično eufemizam za sustavnu pljačku i "전쟁 공산주의"로 알려지게 되었습니다. 조직적인 약탈과 약탈에 대한 완곡한 표현입니다. стал известен как «военный коммунизм». милая много эвфемизма для систематического грабежа и

robbery through war-spoils, expropriation, and forced requisitioning of agricultural pljačka kroz ratni plijen, izvlaštenje i prisilna rekvizicija poljoprivredne 전쟁 전리품, 수용 및 농업 강제 징집을 통한 강도 행위 грабеж через военные трофеи, экспроприацию, и принудительная реквизиция сельскохозяйственных

produce. Coupled with the abolition of free commerce and trade, by 1921 this is having proizvoditi. Zajedno s ukidanjem slobodne trgovine i trgovine, do 1921. ovo se događa производить. В сочетании с отменой свободных коммерция и торговля, к 1921 году

disastrous effects on the economy, with widespread starvation and unemployment crippling Bolshevik katastrofalne učinke na gospodarstvo, s raširenom gladi i nezaposlenošću koji su osakatili boljševike катастрофические последствия для экономики, с голод и безработица наносят вред большевикам

Russia and its dominions. Rusija i njezina gospodstva. Россия и ее владения.

Vladimir Lenin, then leader of the Soviet sees no other way out than to implement his Владимир Ленин, тогдашний лидер Совета не видит другого выхода, кроме как реализовать его

New Economic Policy, the NEP. It's an attempt to solve the immediate economic problems by Новая экономическая политика, нэп. Это попытка решить насущные экономические проблемы путем

reintroducing elements of free market economics, such as profit-seeking and private trade. ponovno uvođenje elemenata slobodnog tržišnog gospodarstva, poput težnje za profitom i privatne trgovine. восстановление элементов экономики свободного рынка, такие как поиск прибыли и частная торговля.

Yet several features, including banking and large industries, remain under state control. Ipak, nekoliko značajki, uključujući bankarstvo i velike industrije, i dalje su pod kontrolom države. Еще несколько функций, в том числе банковские и крупные отрасли, остаются под контролем государства.

It solves the immediate pains somewhat, most significantly it leads to less starvation, Это решает непосредственные боли несколько, большинство значительно это приводит к меньшему голоду,

but doesn't create much progress, especially not in manufacturing and infrastructure. но не создает большого прогресса, особенно не в производстве и инфраструктуре.

See, the central problem for what has now become the USSR is that going back to the Видите, центральная проблема для того, что сейчас стать СССР, что вернуться к

old ways won't solve that it's in large parts still stuck in a pre-industrialized старые способы не решат, что это в целом части все еще застряли в доиндустриализированном

economic structure, which is perhaps paradoxical for a country that has now gone through a экономическая структура, что, возможно, парадоксально для страны, которая сейчас прошла через

revolution meant to liberate the industrial working class masses. In reality, this means революция означала освобождение промышленного массы рабочего класса. На самом деле это означает

that it is everything but well suited for Karl Marx predicted worker's revolution что это все, но хорошо подходит для Карл Маркс предсказал рабочую революцию

that he foresaw in the industrialized countries of western Europe, not the agrarian East. что он предвидел в промышленно развитых странах Западной Европы, а не аграрного Востока.

Marx posited that the establishment of socialism would come organically as a result of a majority Маркс утверждал, что установление социализма придет органически в результате большинства

working class in an industrialized society creating social change from the grass roots. рабочий класс в индустриальном обществе создание социальных изменений на низовом уровне.

It's the belief that once freed of its shackles, and once class has been abolished by revolution, Это вера, которая когда-то освободилась от своих оков, и когда класс был отменен революцией,

the proletariat will magically rule itself in a blissful dictatorship of the proletariat. пролетариат волшебным образом правит собой в блаженной диктатуре пролетариата.

But in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, if you feel that this Marxist vision is even possible Но в Советском Союзе в 1920-е годы, если вы чувствую, что это марксистское видение даже возможно

and a must, such industrialization will have to be carried out to create this working class, и обязательно, такая индустриализация будет иметь чтобы создать этот рабочий класс,

and until then the application of state power will need to be top-down. Obviously, it's и до тех пор применение государственной власти нужно будет сверху вниз. Очевидно, это

quite a bit more complicated that that, but vastly simplified: although the Bolsheviks немного сложнее, что это, но значительно упрощен: хотя большевики

claim a revolution in the name of the proletariat and the peasants, their relationship to the требовать революции во имя пролетариата и крестьяне, их отношение к

peasant class is at best ambivalent, and at times downright murderous, as we shall see крестьянский класс в лучшем случае амбивалентен, а в времена прямо убийственные, как мы увидим

here and in a later episode. здесь и в более позднем эпизоде.

Anyway, when Lenin dies in 1924, the other Communist leaders spend a few years infighting Во всяком случае, когда Ленин умирает в 1924 году, другой Коммунистические лидеры проводят несколько лет в борьбе

about who is going to be the new boss, instead of addressing this elephant in the room. It о том, кто будет новым боссом, вместо решения этого слона в комнате. Это

is mainly Josef Stalin and Leon Trotsky who vie for power. To make a long story short; В основном это Иосиф Сталин и Леон Троцкий, которые соперничать за власть. Короче говоря;

in 1928 Stalin emerges victorious as he expels Trotsky from the party and forces him into в 1928 году Сталин выходит победителем, когда он изгоняет Троцкий из партии и заставляет его в

exile. изгнанник.

Stalin now feels an urgent need to take the Russian dominated Soviet Union forward at Сталин сейчас чувствует острую необходимость принять Русские доминировали в Советском Союзе вперед в

any price. любой ценой.

He feels that the USSR is under imminent threat of either falling apart, or being dissembled Он чувствует, что СССР находится под непосредственной угрозой или разваливается, или быть разобранным

from external forces, or as he will ask rhetorically in 1931, “Do you want our socialist fatherland от внешних сил, или как он будет риторически спрашивать в 1931 году «Вы хотите нашего социалистического отечества

to be beaten and to lose its independence? If you do not want this, you must put an end быть побежденным и потерять свою независимость? Если вы не хотите этого, вы должны положить конец

to its backwardness in the shortest possible time.” в его отсталости в кратчайшие сроки время."

With fresh memories of the First World War, the Russian Civil War, the attempts at independence Со свежими воспоминаниями о Первой мировой войне, Гражданская война в России, попытки независимости

of the former western lands of the Russian Empire that resulted in millions of deaths, из бывших западных земель русских Империя, которая привела к миллионам смертей,

military needs are seen as fundamental. Beginning in 1926, the Soviet government undergoes a военные потребности рассматриваются как фундаментальные. начало в 1926 году советское правительство подвергается

war scare that intensifies in 1927. While an imminent threat does not necessarily exist, страшная война, которая усиливается в 1927 году. неизбежная угроза не обязательно существует,

the fear is not baseless. Just in January 1927, senior figures such as the Editor-in-Chief страх не беспочвенен. Только в январе 1927, старшие фигуры, такие как главный редактор

of Pravda Nikolai Bukharin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Правды Николай Бухарин, председатель Совет Народных Комиссаров Совета

Union Alexei Rykov, and People's Commissar for Defense of the Soviet Union Kliment Voroshilov Союз Алексея Рыкова и наркома За оборону Советского Союза Климент Ворошилов

all warn of the imminence of war. все предупреждают о неизбежности войны.

In the East they fear that Japan or even the US might renew activities on the Russian Western На Востоке они боятся, что Япония или даже США могут возобновить деятельность на российском Западе

Pacific Rim that ended after the Civil War. They worry that Great Britain, who had also Тихоокеанский край, закончившийся после гражданской войны. Они волнуются, что Великобритания, которая также

been involved in the civil war, might encourage encroachment eastward by Poland. This worry был вовлечен в гражданскую войну, может способствовать вторжение на восток со стороны Польши. Это беспокойство

is made particularly strong by Poland's policy of ‘Prometheanism', a program by сделан особенно сильным польскими политика "Прометеанизм", программа

Józef Piłsudski, who is now dictator of Poland, to weaken the Soviet Union by supporting Юзеф Пилсудский, который сейчас является диктатором Польша, чтобы ослабить Советский Союз, поддерживая

nationalist and separatist movements. националистические и сепаратистские движения.

To counter this they need more arms, but they can no longer rely on ‘War Communism'. Чтобы противостоять этому, им нужно больше оружия, но они больше не может полагаться на «военный коммунизм».

There simply isn't enough left to plunder. And despite a secret military exchange between Просто не хватит грабить. И несмотря на секретный военный обмен между

the Red Army and the German Reichswehr starting already in 1921, they have few international Красная Армия и немецкий рейхсвер стартуют уже в 1921 году у них мало международных

allies that will support them. They can and do purchase arms from abroad, but lack the союзники, которые будут их поддерживать. Они могут и делать покупки оружия из-за рубежа, но не хватает

cash or credit worthiness needed to do so at scale, not to mention that it makes them наличность или кредитоспособность, необходимые для этого в масштабе, не говоря уже о том, что это делает их

dependent on foreign relations. зависит от внешних связей.

Faced with all these urgencies Stalin, with his deep-seated hatred of capitalism sees Столкнувшись со всеми этими срочными обязанностями Сталина, с его глубоко укоренившаяся ненависть к капитализму видит

only one way out - a strict military style plan for rapid state-controlled industrialization. выход один - строгий военный стиль план быстрой контролируемой государством индустриализации.

And rapid is an understatement, in the same speech as earlier in 1931 he says, “We are И быстрое преуменьшение, в то же выступая в 1931 году, он говорит: «Мы

fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance пятьдесят или сто лет позади продвинутого страны. Мы должны сделать это расстояние

in ten years. Either we do it or we go under.” So, as much as ten times faster than the west в десять лет. Либо мы делаем это, либо мы идем под. » Итак, в десять раз быстрее, чем на западе

developed. His instrument for that will be his Five Year Plans, with goals set not on разработаны. Его инструмент для этого будет его пятилетние планы, с целями, поставленными не на

realism and opportunity, but ideology and necessity. Rather than permitting the market реализм и возможности, но идеология и необходимость. Вместо того, чтобы разрешить рынок

to determine cost, production, and consumption, the Five Year Plan is dictated by the government. определить стоимость, производство и потребление, Пятилетний план продиктован правительством.

Quotas are established for various products with the goal of increasing production significantly. Квоты установлены для различных продуктов. с целью увеличения производства значительно.

All while the Soviet economy has barely recovered to its 1914 levels by 1928. It will be a brutal Все время советская экономика едва оправилась к его уровням 1914 года к 1928 году. Это будет жестоким

plan built knowingly on the suffering, starvation, and death of millions of Soviet citizens. план, основанный сознательно на страданиях, голоде, и смерть миллионов советских граждан.

In fact, the targets are more than ambitious, they are simply unrealistic. The most dramatic На самом деле, цели более чем амбициозны, они просто нереальные. Самый драматичный

effect on the people will come out of how they plan to feed the masses executing their влияние на людей выйдет из того, как они планируют кормить массы, выполняя их

plan. We will cover that in a separate episode in detail, but for now it's enough to say строить планы. Мы рассмотрим это в отдельном эпизоде подробно, но пока достаточно сказать

that the agrarian part of the plan has two parts; forced collectivization of all farms, что аграрная часть плана имеет два части; принудительная коллективизация всех хозяйств,

and ‘the liquidation of the kulaks as a class,' with the latter turning into downright и «ликвидация кулачества как класс, 'с последним превращается в прямо

mass murder. It is, in short, a catastrophic failure. Between 1928 and 1933, agricultural массовое убийство. Короче говоря, это катастрофический отказ. С 1928 по 1933 год

output diminishes by 18.5% with livestock products falling by a stunning 56%. выпуск продукции уменьшается на 18,5% со скотом продукты падают на потрясающие 56%.

Not only does this create food shortages, even starvation, it has serious knock on effects. Это не только создает нехватку продовольствия, даже голод, у него есть серьезный удар по эффектам.

For instance; the sudden drop in cattle, which were needed for draft power to plow the fields, Например; внезапное падение крупного рогатого скота, которое были необходимы для тяги, чтобы пахать поля,

results in a rise of the number of tractors needed. Instead of adjusting the plan, they приводит к увеличению числа тракторов необходимо. Вместо корректировки плана они

simply raise the quota of new tractors. Decline in food production leads to the implementation просто поднять квоту новых тракторов. снижение в производстве продуктов питания приводит к реализации

of rationing in peacetime, decreasing productivity of the hungering workers. When they can't нормирование в мирное время, снижение производительности голодных рабочих. Когда они не могут

fulfill the quotas, they're just moved to the next deadline. Other materials, such as выполнить квоты, они просто переехали в следующий срок. Другие материалы, такие как

various metals, have to be imported. To finance that, they export food products like grain различные металлы, должны быть импортированы. Финансировать что они экспортируют продукты питания, такие как зерно

that are already not sufficient to feed the population. Even for an isolated economy like которых уже недостаточно, чтобы накормить численность населения. Даже для изолированной экономики, как

the USSR, starting in October 1929 the global depression further exacerbates import and СССР, начиная с октября 1929 года в мире депрессия еще более усугубляет импорт и

export goals, but the plan still doesn't change. экспортные цели, но план все еще не менять.

As Stalin tightens his dictatorial grip, and his goals are not met, he uses radicalization Как Сталин ужесточает свою диктаторскую хватку, так и его цели не достигнуты, он использует радикализацию

to try to force to goals through. пытаться пробиться к целям.

More cautious engineers are denounced as undermining the Soviet Union's advancement and labelled Более осторожные инженеры осуждаются как подрыв продвижение Советского Союза и помечены

bourgeois saboteurs. The plan become more and more divorced from the reality on the буржуазные диверсанты. План стал больше и более оторваны от реальности на

ground. And yet, in 1931, Stalin confidently claims “There are no fortresses Bolsheviks земля. И все же в 1931 году Сталин уверенно утверждает, что «нет никаких крепостей большевиков

cannot capture!” Economic planners with more limited visions are marginalized while не может захватить! »Экономические планировщики с более ограниченные видения маргинализированы в то время как

ideologues are promoted in their place in an increasingly out of control system. идеологи продвигаются на их месте в все более и более неконтролируемая система.

But, as the economic historian Eugène Zaleski notes, the goals may have been largely immaterial. Но, как экономист историк Эжен Залески отмечает, что цели, возможно, были в значительной степени несущественными.

“Stalin was a man of action, and industrialization meant for him the intensified construction «Сталин был человеком действия и индустриализации значило для него усиленное строительство

of factories, the development of new branches of industry and new regions, the improvement заводов, развитие новых отраслей промышленности и новых регионов, улучшение

of labor skills, and the reduction of economic dependence on the outside world. His vision трудовых навыков, и сокращение экономических зависимость от внешнего мира. Его видение

of industrial development was of a vast program of large works, but works carried out under промышленного развития было обширной программы крупных работ, но работы выполняются под

the impetus of a drive imbued with ideological fanaticism. Under these conditions, what would импульс драйва проникнут идеологическим фанатизм. В этих условиях, что бы

it matter whether these immense works were completed in three, four, or ten years?” Неважно, были ли эти огромные работы завершено через три, четыре или десять лет? »

But the optimism that took hold of the planners had some justification. Following the end Но оптимизм охватил планировщиков было какое-то оправдание. После окончания

of the Russian Civil War, the Soviet economy, and the industrial sector in particular, saw Гражданская война в России, советская экономика, и промышленный сектор, в частности, увидел

a high growth rate. Experience in the First World War also contributed to the belief that высокий темп роста. Опыт работы в первом Мировая война также способствовала убеждению, что

resources were underutilized. For example, the Russian Empire had greater economic output ресурсы были использованы недостаточно. Например, Российская империя имела большую экономическую отдачу

in 1916 than in 1913 despite the effects of the war, including territorial losses. And в 1916 году, чем в 1913 году, несмотря на последствия война, в том числе территориальные потери. А также

as mentioned earlier, the ongoing war scare helped produce an existential fear in which как уже упоминалось ранее, продолжающиеся войны пугают помог произвести экзистенциальный страх, в котором

rapid industrialization was less of a choice but more of an urgent and unavoidable necessity. быстрая индустриализация была меньше выбора но скорее насущная и неизбежная необходимость.

And, believe it or not- in terms of industrial output, although it doesn't meet Stalin's И, хотите верьте, хотите нет - с точки зрения промышленного выход, хотя и не соответствует сталинскому

insane goals, it is undoubtedly effective. Industrial output skyrockets, taking the Soviet Безумные цели, это, несомненно, эффективно. Промышленный выпуск взлетел до СССР

Union from being the fifth nation in absolute terms of industrial capacity in 1928 to being Союз из пятой нации в абсолюте условия промышленного потенциала в 1928 году, чтобы быть

the second by 1932, trailing only the United States. Not only that, many of the goals are второй к 1932 году, уступая только США Состояния. Мало того, многие из целей

achieved ahead of time. With the statistics on the first two years in hand, Stalin proclaims достигнуто раньше времени. Со статистикой в первые два года Сталин провозглашает

that the plan could be achieved in four years, partially due to what he calls “the enthusiasm что план может быть достигнут за четыре года, частично из-за того, что он называет «энтузиазмом

of the workers”. This is embodied in posters that read “2+2=5”. рабочих ». Это воплощено в постерах что гласит «2 + 2 = 5».

And it isn't a transformation that just focuses on putting out product. Prior to the И это не трансформация, которая просто фокусируется на выпуске продукта. До

Five Year Plan, the Soviet Union lacks even the basic industries, which are needed for Пятилетка, Советскому Союзу не хватает даже основные отрасли, которые необходимы для

industrial development in the first place. So they depend on tools and machinery from промышленное развитие в первую очередь. Таким образом, они зависят от инструментов и оборудования от

abroad, or as the Soviet foreign trade theoretician D. D. Mishustin will note in 1938, the country's за границей или как советский теоретик внешней торговли Д.Д. Мишустин отметит в 1938 г. страну

development depended on “capitalist technology” and that “equipment of the very latest design развитие зависело от «капиталистических технологий» и это «оборудование самого последнего дизайна

and construction” was required “in order to free the country from the need of importing и строительство "потребовалось" в порядке освободить страну от необходимости ввоза

this machinery and equipment once the goal had been reached.” эта техника и оборудование когда-то цель был достигнут ".

But now in 1932, the Soviets are still in desperate need of western machinery so that Но теперь, в 1932 году, Советы все еще находятся в отчаянно нуждаются в западной технике, чтобы

they continue exporting their badly needed goods, such as grain while the population они продолжают экспортировать свои крайне необходимые товары, такие как зерно в то время как население

starves. голодает.

And it isn't just food that is scarce, living standards overall suffer considerably. While И дело не только в еде стандарты в целом значительно страдают. Пока

urban housing increases by 12%, it doesn't keep up with massive urban population growth. городское жилье увеличивается на 12%, оно не идти в ногу с массовым ростом городского населения.

And this is a slap in the face of the workers, who now go into newly built modern factories И это пощечина рабочим, кто сейчас идет в недавно построенные современные заводы

only to return home to pre-war era housing units without any kind of sanitation. Health только чтобы вернуться домой в довоенное жилье агрегаты без каких-либо санитарных условий. Здоровье

care can't keep up with urbanization and so on. But even if all that is solved, it's уход не может идти в ногу с урбанизацией и скоро. Но даже если все это решено, это