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•TED TALKS•, Jared Diamond: Why do societies collapse?

Jared Diamond: Why do societies collapse?

I think all of us have been interested, at one time or another, in the romantic mysteries of all those societies that collapsed, such as the classic Maya in the Yucatan, the Easter Islanders, the Anasazi, Fertile Crescent society, Angor Wat, Great Zimbabwe and so on.

And within the last decade or two, archaeologists have shown us that there were environmental problems underlying many of these past collapses. But there were also plenty of places in the world where societies have been developing for thousands of years without any sign of a major collapse, such as Japan, Java, Tonga and Tikopea. So evidently, societies in some areas are more fragile than in other areas. How can we understand what makes some societies more fragile than other societies? The problem is obviously relevant to our situation today, because today as well, there are some societies that have already collapsed, such as Somalia and Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. There are also societies today that may be close to collapse, such as Nepal, Indonesia and Columbia. What about ourselves?

What is there that we can learn from the past that would help us avoid declining or collapsing in the way that so many past societies have? Obviously the answer to this question is not going to be a single factor. If anyone tells you that there is a single - factor explanation for societal collapses, you know right away that they're an idiot. This is a complex subject. But how can we make sense out of the complexities of this subject? In analyzing societal collapses, I've arrived at a five-point framework - a checklist of things that I go through to try and understand collapses. And I'll illustrate that five point framework by the extinction of the Greenland Norse society. This is a European society with literate records, so we know a good deal about the people and their motivation. In AD 984 Vikings went out to Greenland, settled Greenland, and around 1450 they died out - the society collapsed, and every one of them ended up dead. Why did they all end up dead?

Well, in my five-point framework, the first item on the framework is to look for human impacts on the environment: people inadvertently destroying the resource base on which they depend. And in the case of the Viking Norse, the Vikings inadvertently caused soil erosion and deforestation, which was a particular problem for them because they required forests to make charcoal, to make iron. So they ended up an Iron Age European society, virtually unable to make their own iron. A second item on my checklist is climate change. Climate can get warmer or colder or dryer or wetter. In the case of the Vikings -- in Greenland, the climate got colder in the late 1300s, and especially in the 1400s. But a cold climate isn't necessarily fatal, because the Inuit -- the Eskimos inhabiting Greenland at the same time -- did better, rather than worse, with cold climates. So why didn't the Greenland Norse as well? The third thing on my checklist is relations with neighboring friendly societies that may prop up a society.

And if that friendly support is pulled away, that may make a society more likely to collapse. In the case of the Greenland Norse, they had trade with the mother country -- Norway -- and that trade dwindled: partly because Norway got weaker, partly because of sea ice between Greenland and Norway. The fourth item on my checklist is relations with hostile societies.

In the case of Norse Greenland, the hostiles were the Inuit -- the Eskimos sharing Greenland -- with whom the Norse got off to bad relationships. And we know that the Inuit killed the Norse and, probably of greater importance, may have blocked access to the outer fjords, on which the Norse depended for seals at a critical time of the year. And then finally, the fifth item on my checklist is the political, economic, social and cultural factors in the society that make it more or less likely that the society will perceive and solve its environmental problems.

In the case of the Greenland Norse, cultural factors that made it difficult for them to solve their problems were: their commitments to a Christian society investing heavily in cathedrals; their being a competitive-ranked chiefly society; and their scorn for the Inuit, from whom they refused to learn. So that's how the five-part framework is relevant to the collapse and eventual extinction of the Greenland Norse. What about a society today?

For the past five years, I've been taking my wife and kids to Southwestern Montana, where I worked as a teenager on the hay harvest. And Montana, at first sight, seems like the most pristine environment in the United States. But scratch the surface, and Montana suffers from serious problems. Going through the same checklist: human environmental impacts? Yes, acute in Montana. Toxic problems from mine waste have caused damage of billions of dollars. Problems from weeds, weed control, cost Montana nearly 200 million dollars a year. Montana has lost agricultural areas from salinization, problems of forest management, problems of forest fires. Second item on my checklist: climate change. Yes -- the climate in Montana is getting warmer and drier, but Montana agriculture depends especially on irrigation from the snow pack, and as the snow is melting -- for example, as the glaciers in Glacier National Park are disappearing -- that's bad news for Montana irrigation agriculture. Third thing on my checklist: relations with friendlies that can sustain the society.

In Montana today, more than half of the income of Montana is not earned within Montana, but is derived from out of state: transfer payments from social security, investments and so on --which makes Montana vulnerable to the rest of the United States. Fourth: relations with hostiles.

Montanans have the same problems as do all Americans, in being sensitive to problems created by hostiles overseas affecting our oil supplies, and terrorist attacks. And finally, last item on my checklist: question of how political, economic, social, cultural attitudes play into this. Montanans have long-held values, which today seem to be getting in the way of their solving their own problems. Long-held devotion to logging and to mines and to agriculture, and to no government regulation; values that worked well in the past, but they don't seem to be working well today. So, I'm looking at these issues of collapses for a lot of past societies and for many present societies.

Are there any general conclusions that arise? In a way, just like Tolstoy's statement about every unhappy marriage being different, every collapsed or endangered society is different -- they all have different details. But nevertheless, there are certain common threads that emerge from these comparisons of past societies that did or did not collapse and threatened societies today. One interesting common thread has to do with, in many cases, the rapidity of collapse after a society reaches its peak. There are many societies that don't wind down gradually, but they build up -- get richer and more powerful -- and then within a short time, within a few decades after their peak, they collapse. For example, the classic lowland Maya of the Yucatan began to collapse in the early 800s -- literally a few decades after the Maya were building their biggest monuments, and Maya population was greatest. Or again, the collapse of the Soviet Union took place within a couple of decades, maybe within a decade, of the time when the Soviet Union was at its greatest power.

An analogue would be the growth of bacteria in a petri dish. These rapid collapses are especially likely where there's a mismatch between available resources and resource consumption, or a mismatch between economic outlays and economic potential. In a petri dish, bacteria grow. Say they double every generation, and five generations before the end the petri dish is 15/16ths empty, and then the next generation's 3/4ths empty, and the next generation half empty. Within one generation after the petri dish still being half empty, it is full. There's no more food and the bacteria have collapsed. So, this is a frequent theme: societies collapse very soon after reaching their peak in power. What it means to put it mathematically is that, if you're concerned about a society today, you should be looking not at the value of the mathematical function -- the wealth itself -- but you should be looking at the first derivative and the second derivatives of the function.

That's one general theme. A second general theme is that there are many, often subtle environmental factors that make some societies more fragile than others. Many of those factors are not well understood. For example, why is it that in the Pacific, of those hundreds of Pacific islands, why did Easter Island end up as the most devastating case of complete deforestation? It turns out that there were about nine different environmental factors -- some, rather subtle ones -- that were working against the Easter Islanders, and they involve fallout of volcanic tephra, latitude, rainfall. Perhaps the most subtle of them is that it turns out that a major input of nutrients which protects island environments in the Pacific is from the fallout of continental dust from central Asia. Easter, of all Pacific islands, has the least input of dust from Asia restoring the fertility of its soils. But that's a factor that we didn't even appreciate until 1999. So, some societies, for subtle environmental reasons, are more fragile than others.

And then finally, another generalization. I'm now teaching a course at UCLA, to UCLA undergraduates, on these collapses of societies. What really bugs my UCLA undergraduate students is, how on earth did these societies not see what they were doing? How could the Easter Islanders have deforested their environment? What did they say when they were cutting down the last palm tree? Didn't they see what they were doing? How could societies not perceive their impacts on the environments and stop in time? And I would expect that, if our human civilization carries on, then maybe in the next century people will be asking, why on earth did these people today in the year 2003 not see the obvious things that they were doing and take corrective action? It seems incredible in the past. In the future, it'll seem incredible what we are doing today. And so I've been trying to develop a hierarchical set of considerations about why societies fail to solve their problems -- why they fail to perceive the problems or, if they perceive them, why they fail to tackle them. Or, if they tackle them, why do they fail to succeed in solving them? I'll just mention two generalizations in this area.

One blueprint for trouble, making collapse likely, is where there is a conflict of interest between the short-term interest of the decision-making elites and the long-term interest of the society as a whole, especially if the elites are able to insulate themselves from the consequences of their actions. Where what's good in the short run for the elite is bad for the society as a whole, there's a real risk of the elite doing things that would bring the society down in the long run. For example, among the Greenland Norse -- a competitive rank society -- what the chiefs really wanted is more followers and more sheep and more resources to outcompete the neighboring chiefs. And that led the chiefs to do what's called flogging the land: overstocking the land, forcing tenant farmers into dependency. And that made the chiefs powerful in the short run, but led to the society's collapse in the long run. Those same issues of conflicts of interest are acute in the United States today.

Especially because the decision makers in the United States are frequently able to insulate themselves from consequences by living in gated compounds, by drinking bottled water and so on. And within the last couple of years, it's been obvious that the elite in the business world correctly perceive that they can advance their short-term interest by doing things that are good for them but bad for society as a whole, such as draining a few billion dollars out of Enron and other businesses. They are quite correct that these things are good for them in the short term, although bad for society in the long term. So, that's one general conclusion about why societies make bad decisions: conflicts of interest. And the other generalization that I want to mention is that it's particularly hard for a society to make quote-unquote good decisions when there is a conflict involving strongly held values that are good in many circumstances but are poor in other circumstances.

For example, the Greenland Norse, in this difficult environment, were held together for four-and-a-half centuries by their shared commitment to religion, and by their strong social cohesion. But those two things -- commitment to religion and strong social cohesion -- also made it difficult for them to change at the end and to learn from the Inuit. Or today -- Australia. One of the things that enabled Australia to survive in this remote outpost of European civilization for 250 years has been their British identity. But today, their commitment to a British identity is serving Australians poorly in their need to adapt to their situation in Asia. So it's particularly difficult to change course when the things that get you in trouble are the things that are also the source of your strength. What's going to be the outcome today?

Well, all of us know the dozen sorts of ticking time bombs going on in the modern world, time bombs that have fuses of a few decades to -- all of them, not more than 50 years, and any one of which can do us in; the time bombs of water, of soil, of climate change, invasive species, the photosynthetic ceiling, population problems, toxics, etc., etc. -- listing about 12 of them. And while these time bombs -- none of them has a fuse beyond 50 years, and most of them have fuses of a few decades -- some of them, in some places, have much shorter fuses. At the rate at which we're going now, the Philippines will lose all its accessible loggable forest within five years. And the Solomon Islands are only one year away from losing their loggable forest, which is their major export. And that's going to be spectacular for the economy of the Solomons. People often ask me,Jared, what's the most important thing that we need to do about the world's environmental problems? And my answer is, the most important thing we need to do is to forget about there being any single thing that is the most important thing we need to do. Instead, there are a dozen things, any one of which could do us in. And we've got to get them all right, because if we solve 11, we fail to solve the 12th -- we're in trouble. For example, if we solve our problems of water and soil and population, but don't solve our problems of toxics, then we are in trouble. The fact is that our present course is a non-sustainable course, which means, by definition, that it cannot be maintained.

And the outcome is going to get resolved within a few decades. That means that those of us in this room who are less than 50 or 60 years old will see how these paradoxes are resolved, and those of us who are over the age of 60 may not see the resolution, but our children and grandchildren certainly will. The resolution is going to achieve either of two forms: either we will resolve these non-sustainable time-fuses in pleasant ways of our own choice by taking remedial action, or else these conflicts are going to get settled in unpleasant ways not of our choice -- namely, by war, disease or starvation. But what's for sure is that our non-sustainable course will get resolved in one way or another in a few decades. In other words, since the theme of this session is choices, we have a choice. Does that mean that we should get pessimistic and overwhelmed? I draw the reverse conclusion. The big problems facing the world today are not at all things beyond our control.

Our biggest threat is not an asteroid about to crash into us, something we can do nothing about. Instead, all the major threats facing us today are problems entirely of our own making. And since we made the problems, we can also solve the problems. That then means that it's entirely in our power to deal with these problems. In particular, what can all of us do? For those of you who are interested in these choices, there are lots of things you can do. There's a lot that we don't understand, and that we need to understand. And there's a lot that we already do understand, but aren't doing, and that we need to be doing. Thank you. (Applause)

Jared Diamond: Why do societies collapse? Jared Diamond: Warum brechen Gesellschaften zusammen? Jared Diamond: Diamond: Γιατί καταρρέουν οι κοινωνίες; Jared Diamond: ¿Por qué se derrumban las sociedades? Jared Diamond : Pourquoi les sociétés s'effondrent-elles ? ジャレド・ダイアモンドなぜ社会は崩壊するのか? Jaredas Diamondas: Diamondas Diamondas: Kodėl žlunga visuomenės? Jared Diamond: Dlaczego społeczeństwa upadają? Jared Diamond: Porque é que as sociedades se desmoronam? Джаред Даймонд: Почему разрушаются общества? Jared Diamond: Toplumlar neden çöker? Джаред Даймонд: Чому розпадаються суспільства? 贾里德·戴蒙德:为什么社会会崩溃? 贾雷德-戴蒙德社会为何崩溃?

I think all of us have been interested, at one time or another, in the romantic mysteries of all those societies that collapsed, such as the classic Maya in the Yucatan, the Easter Islanders, the Anasazi, Fertile Crescent society, Angor Wat, Great Zimbabwe and so on. Ich glaube, wir alle haben uns irgendwann einmal für die romantischen Geheimnisse all jener Gesellschaften interessiert, die zusammengebrochen sind, wie die klassischen Maya in Yucatan, die Bewohner der Osterinseln, die Anasazi, die Gesellschaft des Fruchtbaren Halbmonds, Angor Wat, Groß-Simbabwe und so weiter. Yucatan'daki klasik Mayalar, Paskalya Adalıları, Anasaziler, Bereketli Hilal toplumu, Angor Wat, Büyük Zimbabve ve diğerleri gibi çökmüş olan tüm toplumların romantik gizemleri sanırım hepimizin ilgisini çekmiştir.

And within the last decade or two, archaeologists have shown us that there were environmental problems underlying many of these past collapses. And within the last decade or two, archaeologists have shown us that there were environmental problems underlying many of these past collapses. But there were also plenty of places in the world where societies have been developing for thousands of years without any sign of a major collapse, such as Japan, Java, Tonga and Tikopea. Но было множество мест в мире, где общества развивались тысячи лет без каких-либо признаков крупного краха, таких как Япония, Ява, Тонга и Тикопея. So evidently, societies in some areas are more fragile than in other areas. How can we understand what makes some societies more fragile than other societies? The problem is obviously relevant to our situation today, because today as well, there are some societies that have already collapsed, such as Somalia and Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. There are also societies today that may be close to collapse, such as Nepal, Indonesia and Columbia. What about ourselves?

What is there that we can learn from the past that would help us avoid declining or collapsing in the way that so many past societies have? Was können wir aus der Vergangenheit lernen, um zu vermeiden, dass wir so untergehen oder zusammenbrechen, wie es so viele Gesellschaften in der Vergangenheit getan haben? Что мы можем извлечь из прошлого, которые помогут нам избежать снижения или рушится так, как это происходит во многих прошлых обществах? Obviously the answer to this question is not going to be a single factor. Очевидно, что ответ на этот вопрос не будет одним из факторов. If anyone tells you that there is a single - factor explanation for societal collapses, you know right away that they’re an idiot. Wenn Ihnen jemand erzählt, dass es nur eine einzige Erklärung für gesellschaftliche Zusammenbrüche gibt, wissen Sie sofort, dass er ein Idiot ist. This is a complex subject. Это сложный вопрос. But how can we make sense out of the complexities of this subject? Но как мы можем понять смысл сложностей этого предмета? In analyzing societal collapses, I’ve arrived at a five-point framework - a checklist of things that I go through to try and understand collapses. Анализируя социальные срывы, я пришел к пятибалльной структуре - контрольный список вещей, которые я просматриваю, чтобы попытаться понять, что происходит крах. And I’ll illustrate that five point framework by the extinction of the Greenland Norse society. И я проиллюстрирую эту пятибалльную основу исчезновением гренландского норвежского общества. This is a European society with literate records, so we know a good deal about the people and their motivation. Это европейское общество с грамотными записями, поэтому мы хорошо знаем о людях и их мотивации. In AD 984 Vikings went out to Greenland, settled Greenland, and around 1450 they died out - the society collapsed, and every one of them ended up dead. В 984 г. н.э. викинги пришли в Гренландию, заселили ее, а около 1450 г. вымерли - общество распалось, и каждый из них погиб. Why did they all end up dead? Почему все они умерли?

Well, in my five-point framework, the first item on the framework is to look for human impacts on the environment: people inadvertently destroying the resource base on which they depend. And in the case of the Viking Norse, the Vikings inadvertently caused soil erosion and deforestation, which was a particular problem for them because they required forests to make charcoal, to make iron. バイキング ノース人の場合、バイキングは不注意に土壌侵食と森林伐採を引き起こしました。これは彼らにとって特に問題でした。木炭や鉄を作るために森林が必要だったからです。 So they ended up an Iron Age European society, virtually unable to make their own iron. そのため、彼らは事実上、独自の鉄を作ることができない鉄器時代のヨーロッパ社会に行き着きました。 A second item on my checklist is climate change. Climate can get warmer or colder or dryer or wetter. In the case of the Vikings -- in Greenland, the climate got colder in the late 1300s, and especially in the 1400s. Dans le cas des Vikings - au Groenland, le climat est devenu plus froid à la fin des années 1300, et en particulier dans les années 1400. But a cold climate isn’t necessarily fatal, because the Inuit -- the Eskimos inhabiting Greenland at the same time -- did better, rather than worse, with cold climates. Но холодный климат не обязательно фатальный, потому что инуиты - эскимосы, населяющие Гренландию в то же время, - лучше, а не хуже, с холодным климатом. So why didn’t the Greenland Norse as well? The third thing on my checklist is relations with neighboring friendly societies that may prop up a society. Der dritte Punkt auf meiner Checkliste sind die Beziehungen zu benachbarten befreundeten Gesellschaften, die eine Gesellschaft stützen können.

And if that friendly support is pulled away, that may make a society more likely to collapse. In the case of the Greenland Norse, they had trade with the mother country -- Norway -- and that trade dwindled: partly because Norway got weaker, partly because of sea ice between Greenland and Norway. Dans le cas des Scandinaves du Groenland, ils avaient des échanges avec la mère patrie - la Norvège - et ce commerce a diminué: en partie parce que la Norvège s'est affaiblie, en partie à cause de la glace de mer entre le Groenland et la Norvège. The fourth item on my checklist is relations with hostile societies.

In the case of Norse Greenland, the hostiles were the Inuit -- the Eskimos sharing Greenland -- with whom the Norse got off to bad relationships. En el caso de la Groenlandia nórdica, los hostiles eran los inuit -los esquimales que comparten Groenlandia-, con quienes los nórdicos entablaron malas relaciones. Dans le cas du Groenland nordique, les hostiles étaient les Inuits - les Esquimaux qui se partagent le Groenland - avec lesquels les Nordiques ont eu de mauvaises relations. And we know that the Inuit killed the Norse and, probably of greater importance, may have blocked access to the outer fjords, on which the Norse depended for seals at a critical time of the year. Nous savons également que les Inuits ont tué les Nordiques et, ce qui est probablement plus important, qu'ils ont bloqué l'accès aux fjords extérieurs, dont les Nordiques dépendaient pour l'approvisionnement en phoques à une période critique de l'année. And then finally, the fifth item on my checklist is the political, economic, social and cultural factors in the society that make it more or less likely that the society will perceive and solve its environmental problems. Enfin, le cinquième point de ma liste de contrôle concerne les facteurs politiques, économiques, sociaux et culturels de la société qui rendent plus ou moins probable la perception et la résolution des problèmes environnementaux par la société.

In the case of the Greenland Norse, cultural factors that made it difficult for them to solve their problems were: their commitments to a Christian society investing heavily in cathedrals; their being a competitive-ranked chiefly society; and their scorn for the Inuit, from whom they refused to learn. Dans le cas des Scandinaves du Groenland, les facteurs culturels qui ont rendu difficile pour eux de résoudre leurs problèmes étaient: leurs engagements envers une société chrétienne investissant massivement dans les cathédrales; leur être une société majoritairement compétitive; et leur mépris pour les Inuits, dont ils ont refusé d'apprendre. В случае с Гренландским скандинавским культурным фактором, затрудняющим решение их проблем, были: их обязательства перед христианским обществом, активно инвестирующим в соборы; их принадлежность к основному обществу в конкурентной борьбе; и их презрение к инуитам, от которых они отказались учиться. So that’s how the five-part framework is relevant to the collapse and eventual extinction of the Greenland Norse. What about a society today?

For the past five years, I’ve been taking my wife and kids to Southwestern Montana, where I worked as a teenager on the hay harvest. Desde hace cinco años, llevo a mi mujer y a mis hijos al suroeste de Montana, donde trabajé de adolescente en la siega del heno. Depuis cinq ans, j'emmène ma femme et mes enfants dans le sud-ouest du Montana, où j'ai travaillé adolescent à la récolte du foin. And Montana, at first sight, seems like the most pristine environment in the United States. Et le Montana, à première vue, semble être l'environnement le plus vierge des États-Unis. И Монтана, на первый взгляд, кажется самой нетронутой средой в Соединенных Штатах. But scratch the surface, and Montana suffers from serious problems. しかし、表面をなぞるだけで、モンタナは深刻な問題に苦しんでいます。 Going through the same checklist: human environmental impacts? Пройдя один и тот же контрольный список: воздействие человека на окружающую среду? Yes, acute in Montana. Oui, aiguë dans le Montana. Toxic problems from mine waste have caused damage of billions of dollars. Les problèmes toxiques des déchets miniers ont causé des dommages de plusieurs milliards de dollars. Problems from weeds, weed control, cost Montana nearly 200 million dollars a year. Les problèmes liés aux mauvaises herbes, au contrôle des mauvaises herbes, coûtent au Montana près de 200 millions de dollars par an. Montana has lost agricultural areas from salinization, problems of forest management, problems of forest fires. Монтана потеряла сельскохозяйственные угодья от засоления, проблемы лесопользования, проблемы лесных пожаров. Second item on my checklist: climate change. Yes -- the climate in Montana is getting warmer and drier, but Montana agriculture depends especially on irrigation from the snow pack, and as the snow is melting -- for example, as the glaciers in Glacier National Park are disappearing -- that’s bad news for Montana irrigation agriculture. Third thing on my checklist: relations with friendlies that can sustain the society. Troisième chose sur ma liste de contrôle: les relations avec des amis qui peuvent soutenir la société. Третья вещь в моем контрольном списке: отношения с товарищескими товарищами, которые могут поддерживать общество.

In Montana today, more than half of the income of Montana is not earned within Montana, but is derived from out of state: transfer payments from social security, investments and so on --which makes Montana vulnerable to the rest of the United States. Aujourd'hui, plus de la moitié des revenus du Montana ne sont pas gagnés dans le Montana, mais proviennent de l'extérieur de l'État : paiements de transfert de la sécurité sociale, investissements, etc. Fourth: relations with hostiles.

Montanans have the same problems as do all Americans, in being sensitive to problems created by hostiles overseas affecting our oil supplies, and terrorist attacks. Die Montanesen haben die gleichen Probleme wie alle Amerikaner, wenn es darum geht, auf Probleme zu reagieren, die durch Feinde im Ausland, die unsere Ölversorgung beeinträchtigen, und durch Terroranschläge entstehen. Les Montanais, comme tous les Américains, sont sensibles aux problèmes créés par les hostiles à l'étranger qui affectent nos approvisionnements en pétrole et les attaques terroristes. And finally, last item on my checklist: question of how political, economic, social, cultural attitudes play into this. И, наконец, последний пункт в моем контрольном списке: вопрос о том, как политические, экономические, социальные, культурные отношения играют в этом. Montanans have long-held values, which today seem to be getting in the way of their solving their own problems. Les Montanais ont des valeurs anciennes, qui semblent aujourd'hui les empêcher de résoudre leurs propres problèmes. Монтаны имеют давние ценности, которые сегодня, похоже, мешают решению их собственных проблем. Long-held devotion to logging and to mines and to agriculture, and to no government regulation; values that worked well in the past, but they don’t seem to be working well today. Una larga devoción a la tala de árboles, a las minas, a la agricultura y a la no regulación gubernamental; valores que funcionaron bien en el pasado, pero que no parecen funcionar bien hoy en día. Un dévouement de longue date à l'exploitation forestière, aux mines et à l'agriculture, et à l'absence de réglementation gouvernementale; des valeurs qui ont bien fonctionné dans le passé, mais qui ne semblent pas bien fonctionner aujourd'hui. So, I’m looking at these issues of collapses for a lot of past societies and for many present societies. J'étudie donc ces questions d'effondrement pour un grand nombre de sociétés passées et présentes. Итак, я рассматриваю эти проблемы краха для многих прошлых обществ и для многих современных обществ.

Are there any general conclusions that arise? Gibt es allgemeine Schlussfolgerungen, die sich daraus ergeben? Существуют ли какие-либо общие выводы? In a way, just like Tolstoy’s statement about every unhappy marriage being different, every collapsed or endangered society is different -- they all have different details. So wie Tolstoi sagte, dass jede unglückliche Ehe anders ist, ist auch jede zusammengebrochene oder gefährdete Gesellschaft anders - sie alle haben unterschiedliche Details. D'une certaine manière, à l'instar de la déclaration de Tolstoï selon laquelle chaque mariage malheureux est différent, chaque société effondrée ou en voie de disparition est différente - elles présentent toutes des détails différents. But nevertheless, there are certain common threads that emerge from these comparisons of past societies that did or did not collapse and threatened societies today. Dennoch gibt es bestimmte Gemeinsamkeiten, die sich aus diesen Vergleichen zwischen vergangenen Gesellschaften, die zusammengebrochen sind oder nicht, und bedrohten Gesellschaften heute ergeben. Néanmoins, certains points communs ressortent de ces comparaisons entre les sociétés du passé qui se sont effondrées ou non et les sociétés menacées d'aujourd'hui. Но, тем не менее, есть некоторые общие темы, которые вытекают из этих сравнений прошлых обществ, которые сегодня не разрушали и не угрожали обществам. One interesting common thread has to do with, in many cases, the rapidity of collapse after a society reaches its peak. Un point commun intéressant concerne, dans de nombreux cas, la rapidité de l'effondrement d'une société après son apogée. Один интересный общий поток связан, во многих случаях, с быстротой краха после того, как общество достигло своего пика. There are many societies that don’t wind down gradually, but they build up -- get richer and more powerful -- and then within a short time, within a few decades after their peak, they collapse. De nombreuses sociétés ne s'éteignent pas progressivement, mais se développent, deviennent plus riches et plus puissantes, puis s'effondrent en peu de temps, quelques décennies après leur apogée. Есть много обществ, которые не опускаются постепенно, но они растут - становятся все богаче и мощнее, а затем в течение короткого времени, в течение нескольких десятилетий после их пика, они рушатся. For example, the classic lowland Maya of the Yucatan began to collapse in the early 800s -- literally a few decades after the Maya were building their biggest monuments, and Maya population was greatest. Par exemple, les Mayas classiques des basses terres du Yucatan ont commencé à s'effondrer au début des années 800, soit quelques décennies après que les Mayas aient construit leurs plus grands monuments et que la population maya ait été la plus nombreuse. Or again, the collapse of the Soviet Union took place within a couple of decades, maybe within a decade, of the time when the Soviet Union was at its greatest power.

An analogue would be the growth of bacteria in a petri dish. Ein Analogon wäre das Wachstum von Bakterien in einer Petrischale. Une analogie serait la croissance de bactéries dans une boîte de Petri. Аналогом будет рост бактерий в чашке Петри. These rapid collapses are especially likely where there’s a mismatch between available resources and resource consumption, or a mismatch between economic outlays and economic potential. Ces effondrements rapides sont particulièrement probables lorsqu'il y a une inadéquation entre les ressources disponibles et la consommation des ressources, ou une inadéquation entre les dépenses économiques et le potentiel économique. In a petri dish, bacteria grow. Dans une boîte de Petri, des bactéries se développent. В чашке Петри бактерии растут. Say they double every generation, and five generations before the end the petri dish is 15/16ths empty, and then the next generation’s 3/4ths empty, and the next generation half empty. Supposons qu'ils doublent à chaque génération et que, cinq générations avant la fin, la boîte de Petri soit vide aux 15/16, puis aux 3/4 à la génération suivante et à la moitié à la génération suivante. Within one generation after the petri dish still being half empty, it is full. En l'espace d'une génération, après avoir été à moitié vide, la boîte de Petri est pleine. В течение одного поколения после того, как чашка Петри все еще наполовину пуста, она заполнена. There’s no more food and the bacteria have collapsed. Больше нет еды, и бактерии рухнули. So, this is a frequent theme: societies collapse very soon after reaching their peak in power. What it means to put it mathematically is that, if you’re concerned about a society today, you should be looking not at the value of the mathematical function -- the wealth itself -- but you should be looking at the first derivative and the second derivatives of the function. D'un point de vue mathématique, cela signifie que si l'on se préoccupe d'une société aujourd'hui, il faut s'intéresser non pas à la valeur de la fonction mathématique - la richesse elle-même - mais à la dérivée première et à la dérivée seconde de la fonction.

That’s one general theme. Это одна общая тема. A second general theme is that there are many, often subtle environmental factors that make some societies more fragile than others. Many of those factors are not well understood. Многие из этих факторов не совсем понятны. For example, why is it that in the Pacific, of those hundreds of Pacific islands, why did Easter Island end up as the most devastating case of complete deforestation? Par exemple, comment se fait-il que dans le Pacifique, parmi les centaines d'îles du Pacifique, l'île de Pâques soit devenue le cas le plus dévastateur de déforestation totale ? It turns out that there were about nine different environmental factors -- some, rather subtle ones -- that were working against the Easter Islanders, and they involve fallout of volcanic tephra, latitude, rainfall. Il s'avère qu'il y avait environ neuf facteurs environnementaux différents - certains, plutôt subtils - qui travaillaient contre les insulaires de Pâques, et ils impliquent des retombées de téphra volcanique, de latitude et de précipitations. Perhaps the most subtle of them is that it turns out that a major input of nutrients which protects island environments in the Pacific is from the fallout of continental dust from central Asia. Quizá la más sutil de ellas es que resulta que una importante aportación de nutrientes que protege los entornos insulares del Pacífico procede de la lluvia radiactiva de polvo continental procedente de Asia central. La plus subtile d'entre elles est peut-être qu'il s'avère qu'un apport majeur de nutriments protégeant les environnements insulaires du Pacifique provient des retombées de poussières continentales en provenance d'Asie centrale. Easter, of all Pacific islands, has the least input of dust from Asia restoring the fertility of its soils. Pâques, de toutes les îles du Pacifique, a le moins d'apport de poussière d'Asie pour restaurer la fertilité de ses sols. But that’s a factor that we didn’t even appreciate until 1999. So, some societies, for subtle environmental reasons, are more fragile than others. Таким образом, некоторые общества по тонким экологическим причинам более хрупкие, чем другие.

And then finally, another generalization. I’m now teaching a course at UCLA, to UCLA undergraduates, on these collapses of societies. What really bugs my UCLA undergraduate students is, how on earth did these societies not see what they were doing? Lo que realmente molesta a mis estudiantes de licenciatura de la UCLA es, ¿cómo demonios no se dieron cuenta estas sociedades de lo que estaban haciendo? Ce qui dérange vraiment mes étudiants de premier cycle de l'UCLA, c'est de savoir comment ces sociétés ont pu ne pas se rendre compte de ce qu'elles faisaient. Что действительно сказывается на моих студентах-студентах UCLA, как же эти общества не видели, что они делают? How could the Easter Islanders have deforested their environment? Как жители островов Пасхи обезобрадили свою среду? What did they say when they were cutting down the last palm tree? Didn’t they see what they were doing? How could societies not perceive their impacts on the environments and stop in time? And I would expect that, if our human civilization carries on, then maybe in the next century people will be asking, why on earth did these people today in the year 2003 not see the obvious things that they were doing and take corrective action? Et je m'attends à ce que, si notre civilisation humaine se poursuit, au cours du siècle prochain, les gens se demanderont peut-être pourquoi diable ces personnes, aujourd'hui en 2003, n'ont pas vu les choses évidentes qu'elles faisaient et n'ont pas pris de mesures correctives. It seems incredible in the past. In the future, it’ll seem incredible what we are doing today. And so I’ve been trying to develop a hierarchical set of considerations about why societies fail to solve their problems -- why they fail to perceive the problems or, if they perceive them, why they fail to tackle them. Or, if they tackle them, why do they fail to succeed in solving them? Ou, s'ils les abordent, pourquoi ne parviennent-ils pas à les résoudre? I’ll just mention two generalizations in this area. Я просто упомянул два обобщения в этой области.

One blueprint for trouble, making collapse likely, is where there is a conflict of interest between the short-term interest of the decision-making elites and the long-term interest of the society as a whole, especially if the elites are able to insulate themselves from the consequences of their actions. Un modèle de problème, qui rend l'effondrement probable, est celui où il y a un conflit d'intérêt entre l'intérêt à court terme des élites décisionnaires et l'intérêt à long terme de la société dans son ensemble, surtout si les élites sont capables de s'isoler. des conséquences de leurs actes. Один из проблем для беды, вероятный коллапс, заключается в том, что существует конфликт интересов между краткосрочными интересами элиты принятия решений и долгосрочными интересами общества в целом, особенно если элиты могут изолировать себя от последствий их действий. Where what’s good in the short run for the elite is bad for the society as a whole, there’s a real risk of the elite doing things that would bring the society down in the long run. Где то, что хорошо в краткосрочной перспективе для элиты, плохо для общества в целом, существует реальная опасность того, что элита будет делать то, что приведет общество в конечном итоге. For example, among the Greenland Norse -- a competitive rank society -- what the chiefs really wanted is more followers and more sheep and more resources to outcompete the neighboring chiefs. And that led the chiefs to do what’s called flogging the land: overstocking the land, forcing tenant farmers into dependency. Y eso llevó a los jefes a hacer lo que se llama azotar la tierra: repoblarla en exceso, obligando a los campesinos arrendatarios a depender de ella. Et cela a conduit les chefs à faire ce qu'on appelle fouetter la terre: surstocker la terre, obliger les fermiers à devenir dépendants. And that made the chiefs powerful in the short run, but led to the society’s collapse in the long run. Those same issues of conflicts of interest are acute in the United States today.

Especially because the decision makers in the United States are frequently able to insulate themselves from consequences by living in gated compounds, by drinking bottled water and so on. D'autant plus que les décideurs aux États-Unis sont souvent en mesure de s'isoler des conséquences en vivant dans des complexes fermés, en buvant de l'eau en bouteille, etc. And within the last couple of years, it’s been obvious that the elite in the business world correctly perceive that they can advance their short-term interest by doing things that are good for them but bad for society as a whole, such as draining a few billion dollars out of Enron and other businesses. Y en el último par de años, ha sido obvio que la élite del mundo empresarial percibe correctamente que puede promover sus intereses a corto plazo haciendo cosas que son buenas para ellos pero malas para la sociedad en su conjunto, como sacar unos cuantos miles de millones de dólares de Enron y otras empresas. Au cours des deux dernières années, il est apparu clairement que l'élite du monde des affaires perçoit à juste titre qu'elle peut promouvoir ses intérêts à court terme en faisant des choses qui sont bonnes pour elle mais mauvaises pour la société dans son ensemble, telles que l'extraction de quelques milliards de dollars d'Enron et d'autres entreprises. И в течение последних нескольких лет было очевидно, что элита в деловом мире правильно воспринимает, что они могут продвигать свой краткосрочный интерес, делая то, что хорошо для них, но плохо для общества в целом, например, миллиард долларов из Enron и других предприятий. They are quite correct that these things are good for them in the short term, although bad for society in the long term. Tienen toda la razón en que estas cosas son buenas para ellos a corto plazo, aunque malas para la sociedad a largo plazo. So, that’s one general conclusion about why societies make bad decisions: conflicts of interest. And the other generalization that I want to mention is that it’s particularly hard for a society to make quote-unquote good decisions when there is a conflict involving strongly held values that are good in many circumstances but are poor in other circumstances. Et l'autre généralisation que je veux mentionner est qu'il est particulièrement difficile pour une société de prendre de bonnes décisions entre guillemets quand il y a un conflit impliquant des valeurs fermement ancrées qui sont bonnes dans de nombreuses circonstances, mais médiocres dans d'autres circonstances. И другое обобщение, о котором я хочу упомянуть, состоит в том, что для общества особенно сложно сделать правильные решения с цитатами - безоговорочными, когда есть конфликт, в котором используются сильно удерживаемые ценности, которые хороши во многих обстоятельствах, но являются бедными в других обстоятельствах.

For example, the Greenland Norse, in this difficult environment, were held together for four-and-a-half centuries by their shared commitment to religion, and by their strong social cohesion. Par exemple, dans cet environnement difficile, les Nordiques du Groenland sont restés unis pendant quatre siècles et demi grâce à leur engagement commun envers la religion et à leur forte cohésion sociale. Например, гренландские норвежцы в этой сложной обстановке держались вместе в течение четырех с половиной веков благодаря своей общей приверженности религии и их сильной социальной сплоченности. But those two things -- commitment to religion and strong social cohesion -- also made it difficult for them to change at the end and to learn from the Inuit. Or today -- Australia. One of the things that enabled Australia to survive in this remote outpost of European civilization for 250 years has been their British identity. L'une des choses qui a permis à l'Australie de survivre dans cet avant-poste isolé de la civilisation européenne pendant 250 ans, c'est son identité britannique. But today, their commitment to a British identity is serving Australians poorly in their need to adapt to their situation in Asia. So it’s particularly difficult to change course when the things that get you in trouble are the things that are also the source of your strength. Il est donc particulièrement difficile de changer de cap lorsque les choses qui vous mettent en difficulté sont aussi celles qui font votre force. What’s going to be the outcome today? Quel sera le résultat aujourd'hui? Что будет сегодня результатом?

Well, all of us know the dozen sorts of ticking time bombs going on in the modern world, time bombs that have fuses of a few decades to -- all of them, not more than 50 years, and any one of which can do us in; the time bombs of water, of soil, of climate change, invasive species, the photosynthetic ceiling, population problems, toxics, etc., etc. Eh bien, nous connaissons tous les douzaines de sortes de bombes à retardement qui se déroulent dans le monde moderne, des bombes à retardement qui ont des fusibles de quelques décennies à - toutes, pas plus de 50 ans, et chacune d'entre elles peut nous faire. dans; les bombes à retardement de l'eau, du sol, du changement climatique, des espèces envahissantes, du plafond photosynthétique, des problèmes de population, des toxiques, etc., etc. -- listing about 12 of them. And while these time bombs -- none of them has a fuse beyond 50 years, and most of them have fuses of a few decades -- some of them, in some places, have much shorter fuses. Et si ces bombes à retardement - aucune d'entre elles n'a une durée de vie supérieure à 50 ans, et la plupart d'entre elles ont une durée de vie de quelques décennies - certaines d'entre elles, à certains endroits, ont des durées de vie beaucoup plus courtes. At the rate at which we’re going now, the Philippines will lose all its accessible loggable forest within five years. Au rythme auquel nous allons actuellement, les Philippines perdront toute leur forêt exploitable accessible d'ici cinq ans. And the Solomon Islands are only one year away from losing their loggable forest, which is their major export. And that’s going to be spectacular for the economy of the Solomons. People often ask me,Jared, what’s the most important thing that we need to do about the world’s environmental problems? And my answer is, the most important thing we need to do is to forget about there being any single thing that is the most important thing we need to do. Et ma réponse est que la chose la plus importante que nous devons faire est d'oublier qu'il y a une chose unique qui est la chose la plus importante que nous devons faire. И мой ответ: самое важное, что нам нужно сделать, это забыть о том, что есть какая-то одна вещь, которая является самой важной задачей, которую нам нужно сделать. Instead, there are a dozen things, any one of which could do us in. 代わりに、何十ものことがあり、そのどれかが私たちを助けることができます. Вместо этого есть дюжина вещей, и любой из нас может нас в этом завести. And we’ve got to get them all right, because if we solve 11, we fail to solve the 12th -- we’re in trouble. И мы должны их исправить, потому что, если мы разрешим 11, мы не сможем решить 12-е - у нас проблемы. For example, if we solve our problems of water and soil and population, but don’t solve our problems of toxics, then we are in trouble. The fact is that our present course is a non-sustainable course, which means, by definition, that it cannot be maintained. Le fait est que notre trajectoire actuelle n'est pas durable, ce qui signifie, par définition, qu'elle ne peut être maintenue. Дело в том, что наш нынешний курс - это не устойчивый курс, что означает, по определению, что его нельзя поддерживать.

And the outcome is going to get resolved within a few decades. И результат будет решен в течение нескольких десятилетий. That means that those of us in this room who are less than 50 or 60 years old will see how these paradoxes are resolved, and those of us who are over the age of 60 may not see the resolution, but our children and grandchildren certainly will. Cela signifie que ceux d'entre nous qui ont moins de 50 ou 60 ans verront comment ces paradoxes sont résolus, et ceux d'entre nous qui ont plus de 60 ans ne verront peut-être pas la résolution, mais nos enfants et petits-enfants la verront certainement. The resolution is going to achieve either of two forms: either we will resolve these non-sustainable time-fuses in pleasant ways of our own choice by taking remedial action, or else these conflicts are going to get settled in unpleasant ways not of our choice -- namely, by war, disease or starvation. La résolution se fera de deux manières : soit nous résoudrons ces fuseaux temporels non durables de manière agréable, selon notre choix, en prenant des mesures correctives, soit ces conflits seront réglés de manière désagréable, sans que nous l'ayons choisi, c'est-à-dire par la guerre, la maladie ou la famine. But what’s for sure is that our non-sustainable course will get resolved in one way or another in a few decades. In other words, since the theme of this session is choices, we have a choice. En d'autres termes, puisque le thème de cette session est le choix, nous avons le choix. Does that mean that we should get pessimistic and overwhelmed? Cela signifie-t-il que nous devrions être pessimistes et dépassés? Значит ли это, что мы должны стать пессимистами и подавленными? I draw the reverse conclusion. Я делаю обратный вывод. The big problems facing the world today are not at all things beyond our control. Большие проблемы, стоящие перед миром сегодня, вовсе не находятся вне нашего контроля.

Our biggest threat is not an asteroid about to crash into us, something we can do nothing about. Наша самая большая угроза - это не астероид, который должен врезаться в нас, о чем мы ничего не можем сделать. Instead, all the major threats facing us today are problems entirely of our own making. Вместо этого все основные угрозы, с которыми мы сталкиваемся сегодня, - это проблемы, которые мы делаем сами. And since we made the problems, we can also solve the problems. That then means that it’s entirely in our power to deal with these problems. In particular, what can all of us do? For those of you who are interested in these choices, there are lots of things you can do. There’s a lot that we don’t understand, and that we need to understand. And there’s a lot that we already do understand, but aren’t doing, and that we need to be doing. И есть многое, что мы уже понимаем, но не делаем, и что нам нужно делать. Thank you. (Applause)