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Justice: What's The Right Thing To Do?, Episode 02: "PUTTING A PRICE TAG ON LIFE"

Episode 02: "PUTTING A PRICE TAG ON LIFE"

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Last time, we argued about the case of the Queen versus Dudley and Stevens.

The lifeboat case, the case of cannibalism at sea.

And with the arguments about the lifeboat in mind, the arguments for and against what

Dudley and Stevens did in mind, let's turn back to the philosophy, the utilitarian philosophy

of Jeremy Bentham.

Bentham was born in England in 1748.

At the age of 12, he went to Oxford.

At 15, he went to law school.

He was admitted to the bar at age 19, but he never practiced law.

Instead, he devoted his life to jurisprudence and moral philosophy.

Last time, we began to consider Bentham's version of utilitarianism.

The main idea is simply stated, and it's this.

The highest principle of morality, whether personal or political morality, is to maximize

the general welfare, or the collective happiness, or the overall balance of pleasure over pain,

in a phrase, maximize utility.

Bentham arrives at this principle by the following line of reasoning.

We're all governed by pain and pleasure.

They are our sovereign masters, and so any moral system has to take account of them.

How best to take account?

By maximizing.

And this leads to the principle of the greatest good for the greatest number.

What exactly should we maximize?

Bentham tells us, happiness, or more precisely, utility.

Maximizing utility is a principle not only for individuals, but also for communities

and for legislators.

What after all is a community?

Bentham asks.

It's the sum of the individuals who comprise it.

And that's why, in deciding the best policy, in deciding what the law should be, in deciding

what's just, citizens and legislators should ask themselves the question, if we add up

all of the benefits of this policy, and subtract all of the costs, the right thing to do is

the one that maximizes the balance of happiness over suffering.

That's what it means to maximize utility.

Now today, I want to see whether you agree or disagree with it.

And it often goes, this utilitarian logic, under the name of cost-benefit analysis, which

is used by companies and by governments all the time.

And what it involves is placing a value, usually a dollar value, to stand for utility on the

costs and the benefits of various proposals.

Recently in the Czech Republic, there was a proposal to increase the excise tax on smoking.

Philip Morris, the tobacco company, does huge business in the Czech Republic.

They commissioned a study, a cost-benefit analysis of smoking in the Czech Republic.

And what their cost-benefit analysis found was the government gains by having Czech citizens smoke.

Now how do they gain?

It's true that there are negative effects to the public finance of the Czech government,

because there are increased health care costs for people who develop smoking-related diseases.

On the other hand, there were positive effects, and those were added up on the other side

of the ledger.

The positive effects included, for the most part, various tax revenues that the government

derives from the sale of cigarette products, but it also included health care savings to

the government when people die early, pension savings, you don't have to pay pensions for

as long, and also savings in housing costs for the elderly.

And when all of the costs and benefits were added up, the Philip Morris study found that

there is a net public finance gain in the Czech Republic of $147 million.

And given the savings in housing, in health care, and pension costs, the government enjoys

a savings of over $1,200 for each person who dies prematurely due to smoking.

Cost-benefit analysis.

Now, those among you who are defenders of utilitarianism may think that this is an unfair test.

Philip Morris was pilloried in the press, and they issued an apology for this heartless

calculation.

You may say that what's missing here is something that the utilitarian can easily incorporate,

namely, the value to the person and to the families of those who die from lung cancer.

What about the value of life?

Some cost-benefit analyses incorporate a measure for the value of life.

One of the most famous of these involved the Ford Pinto case.

Did any of you read about that?

This was back in the 1970s.

Do you remember what the Ford Pinto was, the kind of car?

Anybody?

It was a small car, subcompact car, very popular.

But it had one problem, which is the fuel tank was at the back of the car, and in rear

collisions the fuel tank exploded.

And some people were killed, and some severely injured.

Victims of these injuries took Ford to court to sue.

And in the court case it turned out that Ford had long since known about the vulnerable

fuel tank, and had done a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether it would be worth it

to put in a special shield that would protect the fuel tank and prevent it from exploding.

They did a cost-benefit analysis.

The cost per part to increase the safety of the Pinto, they calculated at $11 per part.

And this was the cost-benefit analysis that emerged in the trial.

$11 per part at 12.5 million cars and trucks came to a total cost of $137 million to improve

the safety.

But then they calculated the benefits of spending all this money on a safer car, and they counted

180 deaths, and they assigned a dollar value, $200,000 per death.

180 injuries, $67,000.

And then the cost to repair, the replacement cost for 2,000 vehicles that would be destroyed

without the safety device, $700 per vehicle.

So the benefits turned out to be only $49.5 million, and so they didn't install the device.

Needless to say, when this memo of the Ford Motor Company's cost-benefit analysis came

out in the trial, it appalled the jurors who awarded a huge settlement.

Is this a counterexample to the utilitarian idea of calculating?

Because Ford included a measure of the value of life.

Now who here wants to defend cost-benefit analysis from this apparent counterexample?

Who has a defense?

Or do you think this completely destroys the whole utilitarian calculus?

Yes.

Well, I think that once again they've made the same mistake the previous case did, that

they assigned a dollar value to human life, and once again they failed to take account

things like suffering and emotional losses by the families.

I mean, the families lost earnings, but they also lost a loved one, and that is more valued

than $200,000.

Right.

And wait, wait, wait.

That's good.

What's your name?

Julia Roto.

$200,000, Julie, is too low a figure, because it doesn't include the loss of a loved one

and the loss of those years of life.

What would be, what do you think would be a more accurate number?

I don't believe I could give a number.

I think that this sort of analysis shouldn't be applied to issues of human life.

I think it can't be used monetarily.

So they didn't just put too low a number, Julie says.

They were wrong to try to put any number at all.

All right, let's hear someone who...

You have to adjust for inflation.

All right, fair enough.

So what would the number be now?

This was 30, this was 35 years ago.

$2 million.

You would put $2 million.

And what's your name?

Wojtek.

Wojtek says, we have to allow for inflation.

We should be more generous.

Then would you be satisfied that this is the right way of thinking about the question?

I guess, unfortunately, it is.

There needs to be a number put somewhere.

I'm not sure what that number would be, but I do agree that there could possibly be a

number put on human life.

All right, so Wojtek says, and here he disagrees with Julie.

Julie says, we can't put a number on human life for the purpose of a cost-benefit analysis.

Wojtek says, we have to, because we have to make decisions somehow.

What do other people think about this?

Is there anyone prepared to defend cost-benefit analysis here?

As accurate, as desirable?

Yes?

Go ahead.

I think that if Ford and other car companies didn't use cost-benefit analysis, they'd eventually

go out of business because they wouldn't be able to be profitable, and millions of people

wouldn't be able to use their cars to get to jobs, to put food on the table, to feed

their children.

So I think that if cost-benefit analysis isn't employed, the greater good is sacrificed.

All right, let me ask, what's your name?

Raul.

Raul.

There was recently a study done about cell phone use by a driver when people are driving

a car, and there's a debate whether that should be banned.

And the figure was that some 2,000 people die as a result of accidents each year using

cell phones.

And yet, the cost-benefit analysis, which was done by the Center for Risk Analysis at

Harvard, found that if you look at the benefits of the cell phone use, and you put some value

on the life, it comes out about the same, because of the enormous economic benefit of

enabling people to take advantage of their time, not waste time, be able to make deals

and talk to friends and so on while they're driving.

Doesn't that suggest that it's a mistake to try to put monetary figures on questions

of human life?

Well, I think that if the great majority of people try to derive maximum utility out of

a service like using cell phones and the convenience that cell phones provide, that sacrifice is

necessary for satisfaction to occur.

You're an outright utilitarian.

Yes.

Okay.

All right, then one last question, Raul.

And I put this to Wojtek.

What dollar figure should be put on human life to decide whether to ban the use of cell

phones?

Well, I don't want to arbitrarily calculate a figure.

I mean, right now, I think that...

You want to take it under advisement?

Yeah, I'll take it under advisement.

But what, roughly speaking, would it be?

You've got 2300 deaths.

You've got to assign a dollar value to know whether you want to prevent those deaths by

banning the use of cell phones in cars.

So what would your hunch be?

How much?

A million?

Two million?

Two million was Wojtek's figure.

Yeah.

Is that about right?

Maybe a million.

A million?

Yeah.

You know, that's good.

Thank you.

So these are some of the controversies that arise these days from cost-benefit analysis,

especially those that involve placing a dollar value on everything to be added up.

Well, now I want to turn to your objections.

To your objections, not necessarily to cost-benefit analysis specifically, because that's just

one version of the utilitarian logic in practice today.

But to the theory as a whole, to the idea that the right thing to do, the just basis

for policy and law, is to maximize utility.

How many disagree with the utilitarian approach to law and to the common good?

How many agree with it?

So more agree than disagree.

So let's hear from the critics.

Yes.

My main issue with it is that I feel like you can't say that just because someone's

in the minority, what they want and need is less valuable than someone who's in the majority.

So I guess I have an issue with the idea that the greatest good for the greatest number

is okay because there's still, what about people who are in the lesser number, like

it's not fair to them, they didn't have any say in where they wanted to be.

That's an interesting objection.

You're worried about the effect on the minority.

Yes.

What's your name, by the way?

Anna.

Who has an answer to Anna's worry about the effect on the minority?

What do you say to Anna?

She said that the minorities value less.

I don't think that's the case because individually the minority's value is just the same as the

individual of the majority.

It's just that the numbers outweigh the minority.

And I mean at a certain point you have to make a decision and I'm sorry for the minority

but sometimes it's for the general, for the greater good.

For the greater good.

Anna, what do you say, what's your name?

Yangda.

What do you say to Yangda?

Yangda says you just have to add up people's preferences and those in the minority do have

their preferences weighed.

Can you give an example of the kind of thing you're worried about when you say you're worried

about utilitarianism violating the concern or respect due to the minority?

Can you give an example?

So well with any of the cases that we've talked about, like for the shipwreck one, I think

the boy who was eaten still had as much of a right to live as the other people and just

because he was the minority in that case, the one who maybe had less of a chance to

keep living, that doesn't mean that the others automatically have a right to eat him just

because it would give a greater amount of people a chance to live.

So there may be certain rights that the minority members have, that the individual has, that

shouldn't be traded off for the sake of utility?

Yes.

Yes, Anna?

Yangda, this would be a test for you.

Back in ancient Rome, they threw Christians to the lions in the Colosseum for sport.

If you think how the utilitarian calculus would go,

yes, the Christian thrown to the lion suffers enormous excruciating pain, but look at the

collective ecstasy of the Romans.

Yangda?

Well in that time, I don't, if in modern day of time, to value the, to give a number to

the happiness given to the people watching, I don't think any policymaker would say the

pain of one person, the suffering of one person is much, much, in comparison to the happiness

gained.

No, but you have to admit that if there were enough Romans delirious enough with happiness,

it would outweigh even the most excruciating pain of a handful of Christians thrown to

the lion.

So we really have here two different objections to utilitarianism.

One has to do with whether utilitarianism adequately respects individual rights or minority

rights, and the other has to do with the whole idea of aggregating utility or preferences

or values.

Is it possible to aggregate all values to translate them into dollar terms?

There was in the 1930s, a psychologist who tried to address this second question.

He tried to prove what utilitarianism assumes, that it is possible to translate all goods,

all values, all human concerns into a single uniform measure.

And he did this by conducting a survey of young recipients of relief.

This was in the 1930s.

And he asked them, he gave them a list of unpleasant experiences.

And he asked them, how much would you have to be paid to undergo the following experiences?

And he kept track.

For example, how much would you have to be paid to have one upper front tooth pulled out?

Or how much would you have to be paid to have one little toe cut off?

Or to eat a live earthworm six inches long?

Or to live the rest of your life on a farm in Kansas?

Or to choke a stray cat to death with your bare hands?

Now what do you suppose, what do you suppose was the most expensive item on that list?

Kansas?

You're right, it was Kansas.

For Kansas, people said they'd have to pay them, they'd have to be paid $300,000.

What do you think, what do you think was the next most expensive?

Not the cat.

Not the tooth.

Not the toe.

The worm.

People said you'd have to pay them $100,000 to eat the worm.

What do you think was the least expensive item?

Not the cat.

The tooth.

During the depression people were willing to have their tooth pulled

for only $4,500.

Now

here's what Thorndike

concluded from his study,

any want or satisfaction which exists, exists in some amount and is therefore measurable.

The life of a dog or a cat

or a chicken

consists

of appetites, cravings, desires and their gratifications.

So does the life

of human beings

though the appetites and desires

are more complicated.

But what about

Thorndike's study?

Does it support

Bentham's idea

that all

goods, all values can be captured according to a single uniform measure of value

or does the preposterous character of those different items on the list

suggest the opposite conclusion

that maybe whether we're talking about life

or Kansas

or the worm

maybe

the things we value

and cherish

can't be captured

according to a single uniform measure of value.

And if they can't

what are the consequences

for the utilitarian

theory

of morality?

That's a question we'll continue with next time.

Alright now let's take the other

part of the poll

which is the

the highest

experience or pleasure?

How many say

pleasure?

How many say

fear factor?

No you can't be serious. Really?

Last time

last time we began to consider some objections

to Jeremy Bentham's version

of utilitarianism.

People raised two objections in the discussion

we had.

The first

was the objection, the claim

that utilitarianism

by concerning itself

with the greatest good for the greatest number

fails adequately to respect

civil rights.

Today we have debates

about torture and terrorism.

Suppose

a suspected terrorist was apprehended on September 10th

and you had reason to believe

that the suspect

had crucial information about an impending terrorist attack that would kill over three thousand people

and you couldn't extract the information.

Would it be just

to torture

the suspect

to get the information?

Or, do you say no?

There is a categorical moral duty of respect for individual rights.

In a way we're back to the questions we started with

about trolley cars and organ transplants. So that's the first issue.

And you remember we considered

some examples of cost-benefit analysis

but a lot of people were unhappy with cost-benefit analysis

when it came to placing a dollar value on human life.

And so that led us to the

second objection.

It questioned whether it's possible to translate all values

into a single uniform measure of value.

It asks, in other words, whether all values are commensurable.

Let me give you one other

example

of an experience, this actually is a true story, it comes from personal experience,

that raises a question at least about whether all values can be translated without loss

into utilitarian terms.

Some years ago

when I was a graduate student, I was at Oxford in England and the men, they had men's and

women's colleges, they weren't yet mixed

and the women's colleges had rules against

overnight male guests.

By the 1970s these

rules were rarely enforced and easily violated

or so I was told.

By the late 1970s when I was there, pressure grew to relax these rules and it became the

subject of debate among the faculty at St. Anne's

College which was one of these all women's colleges.

The older women on the faculty

were traditionalists, they were opposed to change

on unconventional moral grounds.

But times had changed and they were embarrassed

to

give the true grounds for their objection

and so they translated their arguments

into utilitarian terms.

If men stay overnight,

they argued the costs to the college will increase.

How, you might wonder?

Well, they'll want to take baths and that'll use up hot water, they said.

Furthermore, they argued

we'll have to replace the mattresses more often.

The reformers

met these arguments by adopting the following compromise.

Each woman

could have a maximum of three overnight male guests each week

they didn't say whether it had to be the same one or three different,

provided

and this was the compromise, provided

the guest paid fifty pence

to defray the cost to the college.

The next day

the national headline in the national newspaper read

St. Anne's girls fifty pence a night.

Another

illustration

of the difficulty

of translating

all values

in this case a certain idea of virtue

into utilitarian terms.

So,

that's

all to illustrate

the second objection

to utilitarianism, at least the part of that objection

that questions whether

utilitarianism

is right

to assume

that we can

assume the uniformity of

all values, the commensurability of all values and translate all moral considerations

into

dollars

or money.

But there is a second

aspect to this worry about aggregating

values and preferences.

Why should we

weigh

all preferences

that people have

without assessing

whether they're good preferences or bad preferences?

Shouldn't we distinguish

between

higher

pleasures

and lower pleasures?

Now, part of the appeal of

not making any qualitative distinctions about the worth of people's preferences, part of

the appeal

is that it is

non-judgmental

and egalitarian.

The Benthamite utilitarian says

that these preferences count

and they count regardless of what people want,

regardless of what makes different people happy.

For Bentham,

all that matters,

you'll remember,

are the intensity and the duration

of a pleasure or pain.

The so-called higher pleasures or nobler virtues are simply those, according to Bentham,

that produce stronger,

longer

pleasure.

He had a famous phrase to express this idea,

the quantity of pleasure being equal,

pushpin

is as good as poetry.

What was pushpin?

It was some kind of a child's game, like kiddlywinks, pushpin is as good as poetry,

Bentham says.

And lying behind this idea,

I think,

is the claim,

the intuition,

that it's a presumption

to judge

whose pleasures

are intrinsically higher

or worthier

or better.

And there is something attractive in this

refusal to judge, after all, some people like

Mozart, others,

Madonna,

some people like ballet,

others,

bowling.

Who's to say,

a Benthamite might argue,

who's to say

which of these pleasures,

whose pleasures,

are higher,

worthier,

nobler

than others?

But, is that right?

This refusal to make qualitative distinctions.

Can we,

altogether,

dispense with the idea

that certain things we take pleasure in are

better or worthier

than others?

Think back to the case of the Romans in the Colosseum. One thing that troubled people

about that practice

is that it seemed to violate the rights

of the Christian.

Another way of objecting to what's going on there

is that the

pleasure that the Romans take

in this bloody spectacle,

should that pleasure,

which is a base, kind of corrupt,

degrading pleasure, should that even

be valorized or weighed in deciding what the

what the general welfare is.

So, here are the objections to Bentham's utilitarianism,

and now we turn to someone who tried to

respond to those objections,

a later day utilitarian,

John Stuart Mill.

So, what we need to

examine now

is whether John Stuart Mill had a convincing reply

to these objections to utilitarianism.

John Stuart Mill

was born in 1806.

His father, James Mill,

was a disciple of Bentham's,

and James Mill set about giving his son,

John Stuart Mill, a model education.

He was a child prodigy,

John Stuart Mill.

He knew Latin at the age of, sorry, Greek at the age of three, Latin at eight,

and age ten

he wrote a history of Roman law.

At age twenty,

he had a nervous breakdown.

This left him in a depression for five years,

but at age twenty-five, what helped lift him out of this depression

is that he met Harriet Taylor.

She and Mill got married, they lived happily ever after,

and it was under her

influence

that John Stuart Mill tried to humanize

utilitarianism.

What Mill tried to do was to see

whether the utilitarian calculus could be

enlarged

and modified

to accommodate

humanitarian concerns like

the concern to respect individual rights

and also to address the distinction between higher and lower pleasures.

In 1859, Mill wrote a famous book on liberty,

the main point of which

was the importance of defending individual rights and minority rights.

And in 1861,

toward the end of his life,

he wrote the book we read as part of this course,

Utilitarianism.

He makes it clear

that utility is the only standard of morality

in his view.

So he's not challenging

Bentham's premise,

he's affirming it.

He says very explicitly,

the sole evidence

it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people actually do

desire it.

So he stays with the idea that our de facto, actual, empirical desires are the only basis

for moral judgment.

But then,

page eight,

also in chapter two, he argues that it is possible for a utilitarian to distinguish

higher from lower pleasures.

Now, those of you who have read

Mill already,

how,

according to him, is it possible

to draw that distinction?

How can a utilitarian

distinguish qualitatively higher pleasures

from lesser ones, base ones, unworthy ones?

Yes? If you've tried both of them

and you prefer the higher one naturally, always.

That's great, that's right.

What's your name? John.

So, as John points out,

Mill says, here's the test,

since we can't step outside

actual desires,

actual preferences,

that would

violate utilitarian premises.

The only test

of whether

a pleasure is higher

or lower

is whether someone who has experienced both

would

prefer it.

And here,

in chapter two,

we see the passage

where Mill makes the point that John just described,

if two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience

of both

give a decided preference,

irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, in other words, no outside, no

independent standard,

then that is the more desirable pleasure.

What do people think about that argument?

Does that,

does it succeed?

How many think that it does succeed

of arguing within utilitarian terms for a distinction between higher and lower pleasures?

How many

think it doesn't succeed?

I want to hear your reasons,

but before

we give the reasons,

let's do an experiment

of Mill's

claim.

In order to do this experiment,

we're going to look

at three

short excerpts

of popular entertainment.

The first one is a Hamlet soliloquy.

It'll be followed by two other

experiences.

See what you think.

What a piece of work is a man!

How noble in reason!

How infinite in faculties!

In form and moving, how express and admirable!

In action, how like an angel! In apprehension, how like a god!

The beauty of the world!

The paragon of animals!

And yet, to me,

what is this quintessence of dust?

Man delights not me.

Imagine a world where your greatest fears become reality.

Each show, six contestants from around the country battle each other in three extreme stunts.

These stunts are designed to challenge the contestants both physically

and mentally.

Among six contestants,

three stunts,

one winner.

Fear Factor.

Hi Diddley-Ho, pedal to the metal-o-philes!

Landers, since when do you like anything cool?

Well, I don't care for the speed, but

I can't get enough of that safety gear.

Helmets, roll bars, caution flags. I like the fresh air and looking at the poor

people in the infield.

Dang, Cletus, why'd you have to park by my parents?

Now, honey, it's my parents too.

I don't even have to ask which one you like most.

The Simpsons, how many like The Simpsons most?

How many Shakespeare?

What about Fear Factor?

How many preferred Fear Factor?

Really?

People overwhelmingly

like The Simpsons

better

than

Shakespeare. All right, now let's take the other

part of the poll.

Which is the

the highest

experience or pleasure?

How many say

Fear Factor?

No, you can't be serious. Really?

All right, go ahead, you can say.

I found that one the most entertaining.

I know, but which do you think was the worthiest, the noblest experience? I know you found it the most entertaining.

If something is

something is

good just because it is pleasurable, what does it matter whether you have sort of an abstract

idea of whether it is good by someone else's sense or not?

All right, so

you come down in the straight Benthamite side.

Who's to judge?

And why should we judge?

Apart from just registering and aggregating de facto preferences. All right, that's fair enough. What's your name?

Nate, okay.

All right, so

how many think that Simpsons is actually,

apart from liking it,

is actually the higher experience?

Higher than Shakespeare?

All right, let's see the vote for Shakespeare again.

How many think Shakespeare is higher?

So, why is it?

Ideally, I'd like to hear from someone, is there someone

who thinks Shakespeare is higher than Shakespeare?

All right,

ideally I'd like to hear from someone, is there someone

who thinks Shakespeare is highest

but who preferred watching

The Simpsons?

Like, I guess just sitting watching The Simpsons, it's entertaining because they make jokes and they make us laugh, but like

someone has to tell us that Shakespeare was this great writer, we had to be taught how to read and how to

understand and we had to be taught how to

kind of take in Rembrandt, how to analyze a painting.

So let me, what's your name?

Anisha.

Anisha, when you say someone

told you that Shakespeare is better,

are you accepting it on blind faith? You voted that Shakespeare is higher only because the culture

tells you that or teachers tell you that, or do you

actually agree with that yourself?

Well, in the sense of Shakespeare, no, but

earlier you made an

example of Rembrandt.

I feel like I would enjoy reading a comic book more than I would enjoy kind of analyzing

Rembrandt because someone told me it was great, you know.

Right, so some of this seems to be you're suggesting a kind of

cultural convention and pressure, we're told

what books, what works of art

are great.

Who else?

Although I enjoyed watching The Simpsons more in this particular moment in Justice,

if I were to spend the rest of my life considering

the three different

video clips shown,

I would not want to spend

that remainder of my life considering

the latter two clips.

I think I would derive more pleasure

from being able to

branch out in my own mind,

sort of considering more deep pleasures, more deep thoughts.

And tell me your name.

Joe.

So,

if you had to spend the rest of your life on a

farm in Kansas with only

with only Shakespeare

or the

collected episodes of The Simpsons,

you would prefer

Shakespeare?

What do you conclude from that

about John Stuart Mill's test?

That the test of a higher pleasure

is whether

people who have experienced

both prefer it?

Can I cite another example briefly?

In biology, neurobiology last year we were told of a rat

who was tested

a particular center in the brain

where the rat was able to stimulate its brain and cause itself intense pleasure repeatedly.

The rat did not eat or drink until it died.

So the rat was clearly experiencing intense pleasure.

Now if you ask me right now if I'd rather experience intense pleasure

or have

a full lifetime of higher pleasure, I would consider intense pleasure to be low pleasure.

I would right now enjoy intense pleasure.

But,

yes I would.

But over a lifetime, I think

I would think almost a complete majority here would agree

that they would rather be a human with higher pleasure than be that rat

with intense pleasure

for a momentary period of time.

In answer to your question, I think

this proves that, or I won't say proves,

I think the conclusion

is that

Mill's theory that when

a majority of people are asked

what they would rather do,

they will answer

that they would rather

engage in a higher pleasure.

So you think that this supports, you think Mill is onto something here? I do.

Alright, is there anyone

who disagrees with Joe and who thinks that our experiment

disproves

Mill's

test?

Shows that that's not an adequate way

that you can't distinguish higher pleasures within the utilitarian

framework.

If whatever is good is truly just whatever people prefer, it's truly relative and there's no objective

definition then

there will be some society where people prefer Simpsons

more.

Anyone can appreciate the Simpsons but I think it does take education to appreciate Shakespeare as much.

Alright, you're saying it takes education to appreciate higher

things.

Mill's point is

that the higher pleasures do require

cultivation and appreciation and education.

He doesn't dispute that.

Once having been cultivated

and educated

people will see

not only see the difference between higher and lower

pleasures

but will actually

prefer

the higher

to the lower.

You find this famous passage from John Stuart Mill

it is better

to be a human being dissatisfied

than a pig satisfied.

It is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.

And if the fool

or the pig

are of a different opinion

it is because they only know

their side of the question.

So here you have

an attempt

to distinguish

higher from lower

pleasures.

So going to an art museum or being a couch potato and swilling beer watching television

at home.

As Mill agrees we might

succumb

to the temptation

to do the latter,

to be couch potatoes.

But even when we do that

out of indolence

and sloth

we know

that the pleasure we get

gazing at Rembrandts

in the museum

is actually higher

because we've experienced both.

And it is a higher pleasure

gazing at Rembrandts because it engages our higher human faculties.

What about Mill's attempt

to reply to the objection about individual rights?

In a way he uses the same

kind of argument

and this comes out in chapter five

he says I dispute the pretensions of any theory which sets up an imaginary

standard of justice

not grounded on utility

but still

he considers

justice

grounded on utility

to be what he calls the chief part

and incomparably the most sacred and binding part

of all morality.

So justice is higher

individual rights are privileged

but not for

reasons that depart from utilitarian assumptions.

Justice is a name

for certain moral requirements

which regarded collectively

stand higher in the scale of social utility

and are therefore

of more

paramount obligation

than any others.

So justice is sacred, it's prior, it's privileged, it isn't something that can easily be traded

off against lesser things.

But the reason

is ultimately

Mill claims

a utilitarian reason

once you consider

the long-run interests

of humankind

of all of us

as progressive beings.

If we do justice and if we respect rights

society as a whole

will be better off in the long run.

Well is that convincing?

Or is Mill actually without admitting it

stepping outside

utilitarian considerations

in arguing

for qualitatively higher

pleasures

and for sacred

or especially important

individual rights?

We haven't fully answered that question

because to answer that question

in the case of rights and justice

it will require that we explore

other ways

non-utilitarian ways

of accounting for the basis of rights

and then asking

whether they succeed.

As for Jeremy Bentham

who launched

utilitarianism

as a doctrine

in moral and legal philosophy

Bentham died in 1832 at the age of 85

but if you go to London you can visit him today

literally.

He provided in his will

that his body be preserved

embalmed and displayed

in the University of London

where he still presides

in a glass case

with a wax head

dressed in his actual clothing.

You see before he died

Bentham addressed himself

to a question consistent with his philosophy

of what use

could a dead man be to the living?

One use he said would be to make one's corpse available

to the study of anatomy.

In the case of great philosophers however

better yet

to preserve one's physical presence

in order to inspire future generations of thinkers.

You want to see what Bentham looks like stuffed?

Here's what he looks like.

Now

if you look closely

you will notice

that

the embalming of his actual head was not a success so they substituted a waxed head

and

at the bottom for verisimilitude

you can actually see his actual head

on a plate.

You see it?

Right there.

So

what's the moral of the story?

The moral of the story

by the way they bring him out during meetings of the board at University College London

and the minutes record him as present but not voting.

Here is a philosopher

in life and in death

who adhered

to the principles

of his philosophy.

We'll continue with rights next time.

Don't miss the chance to interact online with other viewers of Justice.

Join the conversation, take a pop quiz,

watch lectures you've missed and learn a lot more.

Visit justiceharvard.org. It's the right thing to do.

Funding for this program is provided by

Additional funding provided by


Episode 02: "PUTTING A PRICE TAG ON LIFE" Folge 02: "DAS LEBEN MIT EINEM PREISZEICHEN AUSSTATTEN" Episodio 02: "PONER UN PRECIO A LA VIDA" Épisode 02 : " METTRE UN PRIX À LA VIE " エピソード02:"人生に値札をつける" Epizodas 02: "GYVENIMO ĮKAINOJIMAS" Odcinek 02: "NAKŁADANIE CENY NA ŻYCIE" Episódio 02: "PUTTING A PRICE TAG ON LIFE" (Pôr um preço na vida) Эпизод 02: "УВЕЛИЧЕНИЕ ЦЕНЫ НА ЖИЗНЬ" Епізод 02: "Поставити цінник на життя" 第02集:“给生活贴上价格标签” 第02集:“給生活貼上價格標籤”

Funding for this program is provided by

Additional funding provided by

Last time, we argued about the case of the Queen versus Dudley and Stevens. La dernière fois, nous avons débattu de l'affaire de la Reine contre Dudley et Stevens.

The lifeboat case, the case of cannibalism at sea. L'affaire du canot de sauvetage, l'affaire du cannibalisme en mer.

And with the arguments about the lifeboat in mind, the arguments for and against what Et en gardant à l'esprit les arguments concernant le canot de sauvetage, les arguments pour et contre ce que l'on appelle le "canot de sauvetage".

Dudley and Stevens did in mind, let's turn back to the philosophy, the utilitarian philosophy Dudley et Stevens à l'esprit, revenons à la philosophie, la philosophie utilitariste

of Jeremy Bentham.

Bentham was born in England in 1748.

At the age of 12, he went to Oxford.

At 15, he went to law school. À 15 ans, il s'inscrit à l'école de droit. A 15 anni si iscrisse alla facoltà di giurisprudenza.

He was admitted to the bar at age 19, but he never practiced law. Il a été admis au barreau à l'âge de 19 ans, mais n'a jamais pratiqué le droit. Fu ammesso all'albo degli avvocati all'età di 19 anni, ma non esercitò mai la professione.

Instead, he devoted his life to jurisprudence and moral philosophy. Au lieu de cela, il a consacré sa vie à la jurisprudence et à la philosophie morale.

Last time, we began to consider Bentham's version of utilitarianism. La dernière fois, nous avons commencé à examiner la version de l'utilitarisme de Bentham.

The main idea is simply stated, and it's this. L'idée principale, énoncée simplement, est la suivante. L'idea principale, enunciata in modo semplice, è questa.

The highest principle of morality, whether personal or political morality, is to maximize Le principe le plus élevé de la moralité, qu'elle soit personnelle ou politique, est de maximiser la valeur de la vie.

the general welfare, or the collective happiness, or the overall balance of pleasure over pain, le bien-être général, le bonheur collectif ou l'équilibre général entre le plaisir et la douleur, il benessere generale, o la felicità collettiva, o l'equilibrio generale tra piacere e dolore,

in a phrase, maximize utility.

Bentham arrives at this principle by the following line of reasoning. Bentham arrive à ce principe par le raisonnement suivant. Bentham giunge a questo principio attraverso il seguente ragionamento.

We're all governed by pain and pleasure. Nous sommes tous gouvernés par la douleur et le plaisir.

They are our sovereign masters, and so any moral system has to take account of them. Ils sont nos maîtres souverains, et tout système moral doit donc en tenir compte. Sono i nostri padroni sovrani e quindi qualsiasi sistema morale deve tenerne conto. 他们是我们的至高无上的主人,因此任何道德体系都必须考虑到他们。

How best to take account? Comment en tenir compte au mieux ? 怎样考虑才最好呢?

By maximizing. En maximisant.

And this leads to the principle of the greatest good for the greatest number. Cela conduit au principe du plus grand bien pour le plus grand nombre.

What exactly should we maximize? Que devons-nous maximiser exactement ?

Bentham tells us, happiness, or more precisely, utility. Bentham ci dice: la felicità, o più precisamente l'utilità.

Maximizing utility is a principle not only for individuals, but also for communities La maximisation de l'utilité est un principe qui s'applique non seulement aux individus, mais aussi aux communautés

and for legislators. e per i legislatori.

What after all is a community?

Bentham asks.

It's the sum of the individuals who comprise it. Elle est la somme des individus qui la composent. È la somma degli individui che la compongono.

And that's why, in deciding the best policy, in deciding what the law should be, in deciding C'est la raison pour laquelle, lorsqu'il s'agit de décider de la meilleure politique, de la loi à adopter et de la manière de la mettre en œuvre, il est important de prendre en compte les besoins de la population. Ed è per questo che, nel decidere la politica migliore, nel decidere quale dovrebbe essere la legge, nel decidere

what's just, citizens and legislators should ask themselves the question, if we add up Les citoyens et les législateurs devraient se poser la question de savoir si l'on additionne les deux. cosa è giusto, i cittadini e i legislatori dovrebbero porsi la domanda: se sommiamo

all of the benefits of this policy, and subtract all of the costs, the right thing to do is tous les avantages de cette politique, et en soustraire tous les coûts, la bonne chose à faire est de ne pas se laisser influencer par les coûts. tutti i benefici di questa politica, e sottraendo tutti i costi, la cosa giusta da fare è

the one that maximizes the balance of happiness over suffering. celui qui maximise l'équilibre entre le bonheur et la souffrance. quella che massimizza l'equilibrio tra felicità e sofferenza.

That's what it means to maximize utility. C'est ce que signifie maximiser l'utilité.

Now today, I want to see whether you agree or disagree with it. Aujourd'hui, j'aimerais savoir si vous êtes d'accord ou non avec elle.

And it often goes, this utilitarian logic, under the name of cost-benefit analysis, which Et c'est souvent cette logique utilitaire, sous le nom d'analyse coût-bénéfice, qui 这种功利主义逻辑常常打着成本效益分析的旗号,

is used by companies and by governments all the time. est utilisé en permanence par les entreprises et les gouvernements.

And what it involves is placing a value, usually a dollar value, to stand for utility on the Il s'agit d'attribuer une valeur, généralement une valeur monétaire, à l'utilité du produit.

costs and the benefits of various proposals. costi e benefici delle varie proposte.

Recently in the Czech Republic, there was a proposal to increase the excise tax on smoking. Récemment, la République tchèque a proposé d'augmenter les droits d'accise sur le tabac. Recentemente nella Repubblica Ceca è stata avanzata la proposta di aumentare le accise sul fumo.

Philip Morris, the tobacco company, does huge business in the Czech Republic.

They commissioned a study, a cost-benefit analysis of smoking in the Czech Republic. 他们委托进行了一项研究,对捷克共和国吸烟的成本效益进行分析。

And what their cost-benefit analysis found was the government gains by having Czech citizens smoke. Leur analyse coût-bénéfice a montré que le gouvernement gagne à ce que les citoyens tchèques fument.

Now how do they gain? Qu'est-ce qu'ils y gagnent ?

It's true that there are negative effects to the public finance of the Czech government, Il est vrai qu'il y a des effets négatifs sur les finances publiques du gouvernement tchèque,

because there are increased health care costs for people who develop smoking-related diseases. parce que les coûts des soins de santé augmentent pour les personnes qui développent des maladies liées au tabagisme.

On the other hand, there were positive effects, and those were added up on the other side D'autre part, il y a eu des effets positifs, qui ont été additionnés de l'autre côté

of the ledger. del libro mastro.

The positive effects included, for the most part, various tax revenues that the government Les effets positifs comprenaient, pour l'essentiel, diverses recettes fiscales que le gouvernement a perçues au cours de l'année. Gli effetti positivi includono, per la maggior parte, varie entrate fiscali che il governo 积极影响在很大程度上包括政府征收的各种税收收入

derives from the sale of cigarette products, but it also included health care savings to de la vente de cigarettes, mais aussi les économies réalisées en matière de soins de santé pour les personnes âgées.

the government when people die early, pension savings, you don't have to pay pensions for

as long, and also savings in housing costs for the elderly. Les personnes âgées peuvent vivre plus longtemps que les autres et réaliser des économies sur les frais de logement. e anche un risparmio sui costi di alloggio per gli anziani.

And when all of the costs and benefits were added up, the Philip Morris study found that

there is a net public finance gain in the Czech Republic of $147 million. 捷克共和国的公共财政净收益为 1.47 亿美元。

And given the savings in housing, in health care, and pension costs, the government enjoys Et compte tenu des économies réalisées en matière de logement, de soins de santé et de coûts de pension, le gouvernement bénéficie de

a savings of over $1,200 for each person who dies prematurely due to smoking. une économie de plus de 1 200 dollars pour chaque personne qui meurt prématurément à cause du tabagisme.

Cost-benefit analysis.

Now, those among you who are defenders of utilitarianism may think that this is an unfair test. Ceux d'entre vous qui défendent l'utilitarisme peuvent penser qu'il s'agit d'un test injuste.

Philip Morris was pilloried in the press, and they issued an apology for this heartless Philip Morris a été cloué au pilori dans la presse et a présenté des excuses pour cette action sans cœur. La Philip Morris è stata messa alla gogna dalla stampa e ha presentato le sue scuse per questo comportamento sconsiderato. 菲利普·莫里斯公司受到媒体的嘲笑,他们为这种无情行为道歉

calculation.

You may say that what's missing here is something that the utilitarian can easily incorporate, Si potrebbe dire che qui manca qualcosa che l'utilitarista può facilmente incorporare, 你可能会说,这里缺少的是功利主义者可以轻松融入的东西,

namely, the value to the person and to the families of those who die from lung cancer. cioè il valore per la persona e per le famiglie di coloro che muoiono di cancro ai polmoni.

What about the value of life?

Some cost-benefit analyses incorporate a measure for the value of life. 一些成本效益分析纳入了生命价值的衡量标准。

One of the most famous of these involved the Ford Pinto case. L'un des cas les plus célèbres est celui de la Ford Pinto.

Did any of you read about that?

This was back in the 1970s.

Do you remember what the Ford Pinto was, the kind of car?

Anybody?

It was a small car, subcompact car, very popular.

But it had one problem, which is the fuel tank was at the back of the car, and in rear 但它有一个问题,就是油箱在车的后部,而且在后部。

collisions the fuel tank exploded.

And some people were killed, and some severely injured.

Victims of these injuries took Ford to court to sue. Le vittime di queste lesioni hanno portato Ford in tribunale per fare causa. 这些伤害的受害者将福特告上法庭。

And in the court case it turned out that Ford had long since known about the vulnerable E nel corso del processo è emerso che Ford era già da tempo a conoscenza della vulnerabilità della donna.

fuel tank, and had done a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether it would be worth it

to put in a special shield that would protect the fuel tank and prevent it from exploding. per inserire uno scudo speciale che proteggesse il serbatoio del carburante e ne impedisse l'esplosione.

They did a cost-benefit analysis.

The cost per part to increase the safety of the Pinto, they calculated at $11 per part.

And this was the cost-benefit analysis that emerged in the trial.

$11 per part at 12.5 million cars and trucks came to a total cost of $137 million to improve 11 dollari per pezzo, per 12,5 milioni di auto e camion, per un costo totale di 137 milioni di dollari per migliorare la qualità del servizio.

the safety.

But then they calculated the benefits of spending all this money on a safer car, and they counted

180 deaths, and they assigned a dollar value, $200,000 per death. 180 人死亡,他们给出了一个美元价值,每人死亡 20 万美元。

180 injuries, $67,000.

And then the cost to repair, the replacement cost for 2,000 vehicles that would be destroyed

without the safety device, $700 per vehicle.

So the benefits turned out to be only $49.5 million, and so they didn't install the device. 结果,收益只有 4950 万美元,因此他们没有安装该设备。

Needless to say, when this memo of the Ford Motor Company's cost-benefit analysis came 不用说,当福特汽车公司的成本效益分析的这份备忘录出来时

out in the trial, it appalled the jurors who awarded a huge settlement. durante il processo, ha sconcertato i giurati che hanno assegnato un enorme risarcimento. 在审判中,陪审员们感到震惊,他们判给了巨额和解金。

Is this a counterexample to the utilitarian idea of calculating? 这是功利主义计算思想的反例吗?

Because Ford included a measure of the value of life.

Now who here wants to defend cost-benefit analysis from this apparent counterexample? 现在谁想从这个明显的反例中捍卫成本效益分析呢?

Who has a defense?

Or do you think this completely destroys the whole utilitarian calculus? 或者你认为这完全摧毁了整个功利主义的计算?

Yes.

Well, I think that once again they've made the same mistake the previous case did, that

they assigned a dollar value to human life, and once again they failed to take account

things like suffering and emotional losses by the families.

I mean, the families lost earnings, but they also lost a loved one, and that is more valued

than $200,000.

Right.

And wait, wait, wait.

That's good.

What's your name?

Julia Roto.

$200,000, Julie, is too low a figure, because it doesn't include the loss of a loved one 200.000 dollari, Julie, è una cifra troppo bassa, perché non include la perdita di una persona cara.

and the loss of those years of life.

What would be, what do you think would be a more accurate number?

I don't believe I could give a number.

I think that this sort of analysis shouldn't be applied to issues of human life.

I think it can't be used monetarily.

So they didn't just put too low a number, Julie says. Quindi non hanno semplicemente messo un numero troppo basso, dice Julie.

They were wrong to try to put any number at all.

All right, let's hear someone who...

You have to adjust for inflation. Bisogna adeguarsi all'inflazione. 你必须根据通货膨胀进行调整。

All right, fair enough.

So what would the number be now?

This was 30, this was 35 years ago.

$2 million.

You would put $2 million.

And what's your name?

Wojtek.

Wojtek says, we have to allow for inflation. Wojtek dice che dobbiamo tenere conto dell'inflazione.

We should be more generous.

Then would you be satisfied that this is the right way of thinking about the question?

I guess, unfortunately, it is.

There needs to be a number put somewhere. Deve esserci un numero da qualche parte.

I'm not sure what that number would be, but I do agree that there could possibly be a Non sono sicuro di quale sia questo numero, ma sono d'accordo sul fatto che ci potrebbe essere una

number put on human life.

All right, so Wojtek says, and here he disagrees with Julie.

Julie says, we can't put a number on human life for the purpose of a cost-benefit analysis.

Wojtek says, we have to, because we have to make decisions somehow. Wojtek dice che dobbiamo farlo, perché in qualche modo dobbiamo prendere delle decisioni.

What do other people think about this?

Is there anyone prepared to defend cost-benefit analysis here?

As accurate, as desirable? 准确、理想吗?

Yes?

Go ahead.

I think that if Ford and other car companies didn't use cost-benefit analysis, they'd eventually Penso che se Ford e altre aziende automobilistiche non utilizzassero l'analisi costi-benefici, finirebbero per 我认为,如果福特和其他汽车公司不使用成本效益分析,他们最终会

go out of business because they wouldn't be able to be profitable, and millions of people non sarebbero in grado di essere redditizie, e milioni di persone

wouldn't be able to use their cars to get to jobs, to put food on the table, to feed

their children.

So I think that if cost-benefit analysis isn't employed, the greater good is sacrificed. Quindi penso che se non si utilizza l'analisi costi-benefici, si sacrifica il bene comune.

All right, let me ask, what's your name?

Raul.

Raul.

There was recently a study done about cell phone use by a driver when people are driving Di recente è stato condotto uno studio sull'uso del cellulare da parte del conducente durante la guida.

a car, and there's a debate whether that should be banned. un'auto, e si discute se questo debba essere vietato. 汽车,关于是否应该禁止汽车存在争议。

And the figure was that some 2,000 people die as a result of accidents each year using Il dato è che ogni anno muoiono circa 2.000 persone a causa di incidenti. 数据显示,每年约有 2000 人因使用电动工具发生事故而死亡。

cell phones.

And yet, the cost-benefit analysis, which was done by the Center for Risk Analysis at

Harvard, found that if you look at the benefits of the cell phone use, and you put some value

on the life, it comes out about the same, because of the enormous economic benefit of

enabling people to take advantage of their time, not waste time, be able to make deals consentire alle persone di sfruttare il proprio tempo, di non sprecarlo, di fare accordi

and talk to friends and so on while they're driving.

Doesn't that suggest that it's a mistake to try to put monetary figures on questions Questo non suggerisce che è un errore cercare di dare un valore monetario alle domande?

of human life?

Well, I think that if the great majority of people try to derive maximum utility out of 好吧,我认为如果绝大多数人都试图从其中获得最大效用

a service like using cell phones and the convenience that cell phones provide, that sacrifice is 像使用手机这样的服务以及手机提供的便利,这种牺牲是

necessary for satisfaction to occur. 满足感的发生所必需的。

You're an outright utilitarian. Lei è un vero e proprio utilitarista. 你是一个彻头彻尾的功利主义者。

Yes.

Okay.

All right, then one last question, Raul.

And I put this to Wojtek.

What dollar figure should be put on human life to decide whether to ban the use of cell Quale cifra dovrebbe essere attribuita alla vita umana per decidere se vietare l'uso di cellule

phones?

Well, I don't want to arbitrarily calculate a figure.

I mean, right now, I think that...

You want to take it under advisement? Vuoi prendere in considerazione la cosa? 你想接受建议吗?

Yeah, I'll take it under advisement. Sì, lo terrò in considerazione.

But what, roughly speaking, would it be? Ma cosa sarebbe, a grandi linee,?

You've got 2300 deaths.

You've got to assign a dollar value to know whether you want to prevent those deaths by

banning the use of cell phones in cars.

So what would your hunch be? Quale sarebbe la tua intuizione?

How much?

A million?

Two million?

Two million was Wojtek's figure.

Yeah.

Is that about right?

Maybe a million.

A million?

Yeah.

You know, that's good.

Thank you.

So these are some of the controversies that arise these days from cost-benefit analysis,

especially those that involve placing a dollar value on everything to be added up.

Well, now I want to turn to your objections.

To your objections, not necessarily to cost-benefit analysis specifically, because that's just

one version of the utilitarian logic in practice today.

But to the theory as a whole, to the idea that the right thing to do, the just basis 但对于整个理论,对于做正确的事情、公正的基础的想法

for policy and law, is to maximize utility. 对于政策和法律来说,就是效用最大化。

How many disagree with the utilitarian approach to law and to the common good? 有多少人不同意对法律和公共利益采取功利主义态度?

How many agree with it?

So more agree than disagree.

So let's hear from the critics. 那么让我们听听批评者的意见。

Yes.

My main issue with it is that I feel like you can't say that just because someone's

in the minority, what they want and need is less valuable than someone who's in the majority. 对于少数人来说,他们想要和需要的东西不如多数人有价值。

So I guess I have an issue with the idea that the greatest good for the greatest number

is okay because there's still, what about people who are in the lesser number, like

it's not fair to them, they didn't have any say in where they wanted to be. non è giusto nei loro confronti, non hanno avuto voce in capitolo su dove volevano essere.

That's an interesting objection.

You're worried about the effect on the minority.

Yes.

What's your name, by the way?

Anna.

Who has an answer to Anna's worry about the effect on the minority?

What do you say to Anna?

She said that the minorities value less.

I don't think that's the case because individually the minority's value is just the same as the Non credo sia questo il caso, perché individualmente il valore della minoranza è uguale a quello della minoranza.

individual of the majority.

It's just that the numbers outweigh the minority. È solo che i numeri superano la minoranza.

And I mean at a certain point you have to make a decision and I'm sorry for the minority

but sometimes it's for the general, for the greater good.

For the greater good.

Anna, what do you say, what's your name?

Yangda.

What do you say to Yangda?

Yangda says you just have to add up people's preferences and those in the minority do have Yangda dice che basta sommare le preferenze delle persone e quelle in minoranza hanno 杨达说你只要把人们的喜好加起来就可以了,少数人确实有

their preferences weighed. le loro preferenze sono state soppesate. 他们的喜好权衡。

Can you give an example of the kind of thing you're worried about when you say you're worried

about utilitarianism violating the concern or respect due to the minority? 功利主义是否侵犯了对少数人应有的关心或尊重?

Can you give an example?

So well with any of the cases that we've talked about, like for the shipwreck one, I think Così bene con tutti i casi di cui abbiamo parlato, come per quello del naufragio, penso che

the boy who was eaten still had as much of a right to live as the other people and just il ragazzo che era stato mangiato aveva ancora il diritto di vivere come le altre persone e solo 被吃掉的男孩仍然和其他人一样有生存的权利,只是

because he was the minority in that case, the one who maybe had less of a chance to 因为他是那种情况下的少数人,可能没有多少机会

keep living, that doesn't mean that the others automatically have a right to eat him just 继续活下去,并不意味着其他人就自动有权吃掉他

because it would give a greater amount of people a chance to live.

So there may be certain rights that the minority members have, that the individual has, that 因此,少数群体成员、个人可能拥有某些权利,

shouldn't be traded off for the sake of utility? non dovrebbe essere scambiato per l'utilità? 不应该为了实用性而做出牺牲吗?

Yes.

Yes, Anna?

Yangda, this would be a test for you.

Back in ancient Rome, they threw Christians to the lions in the Colosseum for sport. 早在古罗马,他们就将基督徒扔到斗兽场的狮子面前作为娱乐。

If you think how the utilitarian calculus would go,

yes, the Christian thrown to the lion suffers enormous excruciating pain, but look at the

collective ecstasy of the Romans.

Yangda?

Well in that time, I don't, if in modern day of time, to value the, to give a number to Beh, a quell'epoca, io non, se ai giorni nostri, per valutare il, per dare un numero al 好吧,在那个时候,如果在现代,我不会去重视,也不会给一个数字

the happiness given to the people watching, I don't think any policymaker would say the la felicità data alle persone che guardano, non credo che nessun politico direbbe che il

pain of one person, the suffering of one person is much, much, in comparison to the happiness Il dolore di una persona, la sofferenza di una persona è molto, molto, in confronto alla felicità di un'altra persona.

gained.

No, but you have to admit that if there were enough Romans delirious enough with happiness, No, ma bisogna ammettere che se ci fosse un numero sufficiente di romani deliranti di felicità, 不,但你必须承认,如果有足够多的罗马人幸福得神魂颠倒,

it would outweigh even the most excruciating pain of a handful of Christians thrown to supererebbe anche il dolore più straziante di una manciata di cristiani gettati in

the lion.

So we really have here two different objections to utilitarianism.

One has to do with whether utilitarianism adequately respects individual rights or minority Uno di questi ha a che fare con il fatto che l'utilitarismo rispetti adeguatamente i diritti individuali o quelli delle minoranze. 一是功利主义是否充分尊重个人权利或少数群体

rights, and the other has to do with the whole idea of aggregating utility or preferences 权利,另一个与聚合效用或偏好的整个想法有关

or values.

Is it possible to aggregate all values to translate them into dollar terms?

There was in the 1930s, a psychologist who tried to address this second question. 20世纪30年代,一位心理学家试图解决第二个问题。

He tried to prove what utilitarianism assumes, that it is possible to translate all goods,

all values, all human concerns into a single uniform measure. tutti i valori, tutte le preoccupazioni umane in un'unica misura uniforme.

And he did this by conducting a survey of young recipients of relief. E lo ha fatto conducendo un'indagine sui giovani beneficiari degli aiuti. 他通过对年轻的救济对象进行调查来做到这一点。

This was in the 1930s.

And he asked them, he gave them a list of unpleasant experiences. 他问他们,他给了他们一系列不愉快的经历。

And he asked them, how much would you have to be paid to undergo the following experiences?

And he kept track.

For example, how much would you have to be paid to have one upper front tooth pulled out?

Or how much would you have to be paid to have one little toe cut off?

Or to eat a live earthworm six inches long?

Or to live the rest of your life on a farm in Kansas?

Or to choke a stray cat to death with your bare hands?

Now what do you suppose, what do you suppose was the most expensive item on that list? 现在您认为该清单上最昂贵的物品是什么?

Kansas?

You're right, it was Kansas.

For Kansas, people said they'd have to pay them, they'd have to be paid $300,000.

What do you think, what do you think was the next most expensive?

Not the cat.

Not the tooth.

Not the toe.

The worm.

People said you'd have to pay them $100,000 to eat the worm.

What do you think was the least expensive item? 你认为最便宜的物品是什么?

Not the cat.

The tooth.

During the depression people were willing to have their tooth pulled

for only $4,500.

Now

here's what Thorndike ecco cosa dice Thorndike

concluded from his study,

any want or satisfaction which exists, exists in some amount and is therefore measurable. ogni desiderio o soddisfazione che esiste, esiste in una certa quantità ed è quindi misurabile. 任何存在的需求或满足都以一定的量存在,因此是可以衡量的。

The life of a dog or a cat

or a chicken

consists

of appetites, cravings, desires and their gratifications.

So does the life

of human beings

though the appetites and desires

are more complicated.

But what about

Thorndike's study?

Does it support

Bentham's idea

that all

goods, all values can be captured according to a single uniform measure of value

or does the preposterous character of those different items on the list o il carattere assurdo di queste diverse voci dell'elenco

suggest the opposite conclusion

that maybe whether we're talking about life che forse, se stiamo parlando di vita

or Kansas

or the worm

maybe

the things we value

and cherish

can't be captured

according to a single uniform measure of value.

And if they can't

what are the consequences

for the utilitarian

theory

of morality?

That's a question we'll continue with next time.

Alright now let's take the other

part of the poll parte del sondaggio

which is the

the highest

experience or pleasure?

How many say

pleasure?

How many say

fear factor? fattore paura? 恐惧因素?

No you can't be serious. Really?

Last time

last time we began to consider some objections

to Jeremy Bentham's version

of utilitarianism.

People raised two objections in the discussion

we had.

The first

was the objection, the claim

that utilitarianism

by concerning itself

with the greatest good for the greatest number

fails adequately to respect

civil rights.

Today we have debates

about torture and terrorism.

Suppose

a suspected terrorist was apprehended on September 10th il 10 settembre è stato arrestato un sospetto terrorista.

and you had reason to believe

that the suspect

had crucial information about an impending terrorist attack that would kill over three thousand people aveva informazioni cruciali su un imminente attacco terroristico che avrebbe ucciso più di tremila persone

and you couldn't extract the information.

Would it be just

to torture

the suspect

to get the information?

Or, do you say no?

There is a categorical moral duty of respect for individual rights.

In a way we're back to the questions we started with

about trolley cars and organ transplants. So that's the first issue.

And you remember we considered

some examples of cost-benefit analysis

but a lot of people were unhappy with cost-benefit analysis

when it came to placing a dollar value on human life.

And so that led us to the

second objection.

It questioned whether it's possible to translate all values

into a single uniform measure of value.

It asks, in other words, whether all values are commensurable.

Let me give you one other

example

of an experience, this actually is a true story, it comes from personal experience,

that raises a question at least about whether all values can be translated without loss

into utilitarian terms.

Some years ago

when I was a graduate student, I was at Oxford in England and the men, they had men's and Quando mi sono laureata, sono stata a Oxford in Inghilterra e gli uomini, hanno avuto un'area maschile e una maschile. 当我还是一名研究生时,我在英国的牛津大学,那里有男装和男装。

women's colleges, they weren't yet mixed scuole femminili, non erano ancora miste.

and the women's colleges had rules against

overnight male guests. 过夜的男客人。

By the 1970s these

rules were rarely enforced and easily violated le regole erano raramente applicate e facilmente violate

or so I was told. o almeno così mi è stato detto. 至少有人告诉我。

By the late 1970s when I was there, pressure grew to relax these rules and it became the Alla fine degli anni '70, quando ero lì, è cresciuta la pressione per un allentamento di queste regole ed è diventato il 到了 20 世纪 70 年代末,当我在那里时,放宽这些规则的压力越来越大,它成为了

subject of debate among the faculty at St. Anne's 圣安妮学院教师争论的话题

College which was one of these all women's colleges.

The older women on the faculty

were traditionalists, they were opposed to change

on unconventional moral grounds. 基于非常规的道德基础。

But times had changed and they were embarrassed Ma i tempi erano cambiati e loro erano in imbarazzo

to

give the true grounds for their objection fornire i veri motivi della loro obiezione 给出他们反对的真正理由

and so they translated their arguments 所以他们翻译了他们的论点

into utilitarian terms.

If men stay overnight, 如果男人过夜,

they argued the costs to the college will increase. 他们认为大学的成本将会增加。

How, you might wonder? Come, vi chiederete?

Well, they'll want to take baths and that'll use up hot water, they said. Beh, vorranno fare il bagno e questo consumerà acqua calda, hanno detto. 他们说,好吧,他们会想洗澡,这会消耗热水。

Furthermore, they argued

we'll have to replace the mattresses more often.

The reformers

met these arguments by adopting the following compromise. 通过采取以下折衷方案来满足这些论点。

Each woman

could have a maximum of three overnight male guests each week 每周最多可接待三位男性客人过夜

they didn't say whether it had to be the same one or three different, 他们没有说它是否必须是相同的一个或三个不同的,

provided

and this was the compromise, provided e questo era il compromesso, a condizione che

the guest paid fifty pence

to defray the cost to the college.

The next day

the national headline in the national newspaper read

St. Anne's girls fifty pence a night.

Another

illustration

of the difficulty

of translating

all values

in this case a certain idea of virtue

into utilitarian terms.

So,

that's

all to illustrate

the second objection

to utilitarianism, at least the part of that objection

that questions whether

utilitarianism

is right

to assume

that we can

assume the uniformity of

all values, the commensurability of all values and translate all moral considerations

into

dollars

or money.

But there is a second

aspect to this worry about aggregating

values and preferences.

Why should we

weigh pesare

all preferences

that people have

without assessing senza valutare

whether they're good preferences or bad preferences?

Shouldn't we distinguish

between

higher

pleasures

and lower pleasures?

Now, part of the appeal of

not making any qualitative distinctions about the worth of people's preferences, part of non facendo alcuna distinzione qualitativa sul valore delle preferenze delle persone, una parte della

the appeal

is that it is

non-judgmental 不带评判性

and egalitarian.

The Benthamite utilitarian says L'utilitarista benthamiano dice

that these preferences count

and they count regardless of what people want,

regardless of what makes different people happy.

For Bentham,

all that matters, tutto ciò che conta,

you'll remember,

are the intensity and the duration 是强度和持续时间

of a pleasure or pain.

The so-called higher pleasures or nobler virtues are simply those, according to Bentham, 根据边沁的说法,所谓的更高的快乐或更高尚的美德只不过是:

that produce stronger,

longer

pleasure.

He had a famous phrase to express this idea,

the quantity of pleasure being equal, 快乐的数量相等,

pushpin puntina

is as good as poetry. è buono come la poesia.

What was pushpin?

It was some kind of a child's game, like kiddlywinks, pushpin is as good as poetry,

Bentham says.

And lying behind this idea, E che si cela dietro questa idea,

I think,

is the claim, è l'affermazione,

the intuition,

that it's a presumption

to judge

whose pleasures

are intrinsically higher

or worthier o più degno

or better.

And there is something attractive in this

refusal to judge, after all, some people like rifiuto di giudicare, dopo tutto, ad alcune persone piace

Mozart, others,

Madonna,

some people like ballet,

others,

bowling.

Who's to say, Chi può dirlo,

a Benthamite might argue,

who's to say

which of these pleasures,

whose pleasures,

are higher,

worthier,

nobler

than others?

But, is that right?

This refusal to make qualitative distinctions.

Can we,

altogether,

dispense with the idea rinunciare all'idea

that certain things we take pleasure in are

better or worthier

than others?

Think back to the case of the Romans in the Colosseum. One thing that troubled people

about that practice

is that it seemed to violate the rights

of the Christian.

Another way of objecting to what's going on there Un altro modo di opporsi a ciò che sta accadendo lì

is that the

pleasure that the Romans take

in this bloody spectacle,

should that pleasure, dovrebbe essere un piacere,

which is a base, kind of corrupt, che è una base, un po' corrotta,

degrading pleasure, should that even

be valorized or weighed in deciding what the

what the general welfare is.

So, here are the objections to Bentham's utilitarianism,

and now we turn to someone who tried to

respond to those objections,

a later day utilitarian, un utilitarista dei giorni nostri,

John Stuart Mill. John Stuart Mill.

So, what we need to

examine now

is whether John Stuart Mill had a convincing reply è se John Stuart Mill abbia avuto una risposta convincente

to these objections to utilitarianism.

John Stuart Mill

was born in 1806.

His father, James Mill,

was a disciple of Bentham's,

and James Mill set about giving his son, e James Mill si accinse a dare al figlio,

John Stuart Mill, a model education.

He was a child prodigy,

John Stuart Mill.

He knew Latin at the age of, sorry, Greek at the age of three, Latin at eight,

and age ten

he wrote a history of Roman law. ha scritto una storia del diritto romano.

At age twenty,

he had a nervous breakdown. ha avuto un esaurimento nervoso.

This left him in a depression for five years,

but at age twenty-five, what helped lift him out of this depression

is that he met Harriet Taylor.

She and Mill got married, they lived happily ever after, Lei e Mill si sposarono e vissero per sempre felici e contenti,

and it was under her

influence

that John Stuart Mill tried to humanize

utilitarianism.

What Mill tried to do was to see

whether the utilitarian calculus could be

enlarged

and modified

to accommodate

humanitarian concerns like

the concern to respect individual rights

and also to address the distinction between higher and lower pleasures.

In 1859, Mill wrote a famous book on liberty,

the main point of which

was the importance of defending individual rights and minority rights.

And in 1861,

toward the end of his life,

he wrote the book we read as part of this course,

Utilitarianism.

He makes it clear Lo dice chiaramente

that utility is the only standard of morality

in his view.

So he's not challenging Quindi non sta sfidando

Bentham's premise,

he's affirming it. lo sta affermando.

He says very explicitly,

the sole evidence

it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people actually do è possibile produrre che qualsiasi cosa sia desiderabile è che le persone effettivamente lo fanno

desire it.

So he stays with the idea that our de facto, actual, empirical desires are the only basis

for moral judgment.

But then,

page eight,

also in chapter two, he argues that it is possible for a utilitarian to distinguish

higher from lower pleasures.

Now, those of you who have read

Mill already,

how,

according to him, is it possible

to draw that distinction?

How can a utilitarian

distinguish qualitatively higher pleasures

from lesser ones, base ones, unworthy ones? da quelli inferiori, da quelli bassi, da quelli indegni?

Yes? If you've tried both of them

and you prefer the higher one naturally, always.

That's great, that's right.

What's your name? John.

So, as John points out,

Mill says, here's the test,

since we can't step outside visto che non possiamo uscire

actual desires,

actual preferences,

that would

violate utilitarian premises.

The only test

of whether

a pleasure is higher

or lower

is whether someone who has experienced both

would

prefer it.

And here,

in chapter two,

we see the passage

where Mill makes the point that John just described,

if two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience se due piaceri, se ce n'è uno al quale tutti o quasi tutti quelli che hanno esperienza 如果有两种快乐,如果有一种快乐是所有或几乎所有的人都经历过的

of both

give a decided preference, dare una preferenza decisa,

irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, in other words, no outside, no indipendentemente da qualsiasi sentimento di obbligo morale a preferirlo, in altre parole, nessun esterno, nessun 不考虑任何选择它的道德义务感,换句话说,没有外部,没有

independent standard, 独立标准,

then that is the more desirable pleasure.

What do people think about that argument?

Does that, Lo fa,

does it succeed?

How many think that it does succeed

of arguing within utilitarian terms for a distinction between higher and lower pleasures? di sostenere in termini utilitaristici la distinzione tra piaceri superiori e inferiori?

How many

think it doesn't succeed?

I want to hear your reasons,

but before

we give the reasons,

let's do an experiment

of Mill's

claim.

In order to do this experiment,

we're going to look

at three

short excerpts brevi estratti

of popular entertainment. 的流行娱乐活动。

The first one is a Hamlet soliloquy.

It'll be followed by two other 接下来将是另外两个

experiences. 经验。

See what you think.

What a piece of work is a man! Che razza di uomo!

How noble in reason! 理性是多么高尚啊!

How infinite in faculties! Quanto sono infinite le facoltà!

In form and moving, how express and admirable! 其形式和动人,多么抒情和令人钦佩!

In action, how like an angel! In apprehension, how like a god! In azione, come un angelo! Nell'apprensione, come un dio! 行动起来,多么像天使啊!心中惶恐,何如神明!

The beauty of the world!

The paragon of animals! L'esempio degli animali!

And yet, to me,

what is this quintessence of dust? 这尘埃的本质是什么?

Man delights not me. L'uomo non mi delizia. 男人不让我高兴。

Imagine a world where your greatest fears become reality. 想象一个你最大的恐惧变成现实的世界。

Each show, six contestants from around the country battle each other in three extreme stunts. In ogni puntata, sei concorrenti provenienti da tutto il Paese si sfidano in tre acrobazie estreme. 每场比赛,来自全国各地的六名选手都会以三项极限特技相互较量。

These stunts are designed to challenge the contestants both physically

and mentally.

Among six contestants,

three stunts,

one winner.

Fear Factor. 恐惧因素。

Hi Diddley-Ho, pedal to the metal-o-philes! Ciao Diddley-Ho, pedalate sul metallo! 嗨,Diddley-Ho,金属爱好者们!

Landers, since when do you like anything cool? Landers, da quando ti piace qualcosa di bello?

Well, I don't care for the speed, but

I can't get enough of that safety gear. Non riesco a fare a meno dei dispositivi di sicurezza.

Helmets, roll bars, caution flags. I like the fresh air and looking at the poor 头盔、防滚架、警示旗。我喜欢新鲜空气和看着穷人

people in the infield. persone all'interno del campo. 内场的人。

Dang, Cletus, why'd you have to park by my parents?

Now, honey, it's my parents too.

I don't even have to ask which one you like most. Non c'è nemmeno bisogno di chiedere quale ti piace di più. 我什至不用问你最喜欢哪一个。

The Simpsons, how many like The Simpsons most?

How many Shakespeare?

What about Fear Factor?

How many preferred Fear Factor?

Really?

People overwhelmingly La maggior parte delle persone 人们压倒性地

like The Simpsons

better

than

Shakespeare. All right, now let's take the other

part of the poll.

Which is the

the highest

experience or pleasure?

How many say

Fear Factor?

No, you can't be serious. Really?

All right, go ahead, you can say.

I found that one the most entertaining.

I know, but which do you think was the worthiest, the noblest experience? I know you found it the most entertaining.

If something is

something is

good just because it is pleasurable, what does it matter whether you have sort of an abstract

idea of whether it is good by someone else's sense or not? idea se sia buona o meno secondo il senso di qualcun altro?

All right, so

you come down in the straight Benthamite side.

Who's to judge?

And why should we judge?

Apart from just registering and aggregating de facto preferences. All right, that's fair enough. What's your name? A parte la semplice registrazione e l'aggregazione delle preferenze di fatto. Va bene, mi sembra giusto. Come si chiama?

Nate, okay.

All right, so

how many think that Simpsons is actually,

apart from liking it,

is actually the higher experience?

Higher than Shakespeare?

All right, let's see the vote for Shakespeare again.

How many think Shakespeare is higher?

So, why is it?

Ideally, I'd like to hear from someone, is there someone

who thinks Shakespeare is higher than Shakespeare?

All right,

ideally I'd like to hear from someone, is there someone

who thinks Shakespeare is highest

but who preferred watching

The Simpsons?

Like, I guess just sitting watching The Simpsons, it's entertaining because they make jokes and they make us laugh, but like

someone has to tell us that Shakespeare was this great writer, we had to be taught how to read and how to

understand and we had to be taught how to

kind of take in Rembrandt, how to analyze a painting. tipo di prendere in Rembrandt, come analizzare un dipinto.

So let me, what's your name?

Anisha.

Anisha, when you say someone

told you that Shakespeare is better,

are you accepting it on blind faith? You voted that Shakespeare is higher only because the culture

tells you that or teachers tell you that, or do you

actually agree with that yourself?

Well, in the sense of Shakespeare, no, but Beh, nel senso di Shakespeare, no, ma

earlier you made an prima ha fatto un

example of Rembrandt.

I feel like I would enjoy reading a comic book more than I would enjoy kind of analyzing

Rembrandt because someone told me it was great, you know.

Right, so some of this seems to be you're suggesting a kind of

cultural convention and pressure, we're told

what books, what works of art

are great.

Who else? Chi altro?

Although I enjoyed watching The Simpsons more in this particular moment in Justice, Anche se mi è piaciuto di più guardare i Simpson in questo particolare momento della giustizia,

if I were to spend the rest of my life considering

the three different

video clips shown, video clip mostrati,

I would not want to spend

that remainder of my life considering

the latter two clips. gli ultimi due filmati.

I think I would derive more pleasure

from being able to

branch out in my own mind, diramarsi nella mia mente,

sort of considering more deep pleasures, more deep thoughts.

And tell me your name.

Joe.

So,

if you had to spend the rest of your life on a

farm in Kansas with only

with only Shakespeare

or the

collected episodes of The Simpsons,

you would prefer

Shakespeare?

What do you conclude from that

about John Stuart Mill's test?

That the test of a higher pleasure

is whether

people who have experienced

both prefer it?

Can I cite another example briefly?

In biology, neurobiology last year we were told of a rat

who was tested

a particular center in the brain

where the rat was able to stimulate its brain and cause itself intense pleasure repeatedly.

The rat did not eat or drink until it died.

So the rat was clearly experiencing intense pleasure.

Now if you ask me right now if I'd rather experience intense pleasure

or have

a full lifetime of higher pleasure, I would consider intense pleasure to be low pleasure.

I would right now enjoy intense pleasure.

But,

yes I would.

But over a lifetime, I think

I would think almost a complete majority here would agree

that they would rather be a human with higher pleasure than be that rat

with intense pleasure

for a momentary period of time.

In answer to your question, I think

this proves that, or I won't say proves, questo prova, o non dirò che prova,

I think the conclusion

is that

Mill's theory that when

a majority of people are asked

what they would rather do, cosa preferirebbero fare,

they will answer

that they would rather

engage in a higher pleasure.

So you think that this supports, you think Mill is onto something here? I do. Quindi pensi che questo supporti, pensi che Mill abbia qualcosa in mente? Lo penso.

Alright, is there anyone

who disagrees with Joe and who thinks that our experiment

disproves confuta

Mill's

test?

Shows that that's not an adequate way

that you can't distinguish higher pleasures within the utilitarian che non è possibile distinguere i piaceri superiori nell'ambito dell'utilitarismo.

framework. quadro.

If whatever is good is truly just whatever people prefer, it's truly relative and there's no objective Se ciò che è buono è davvero solo ciò che la gente preferisce, è davvero relativo e non c'è alcun obiettivo.

definition then

there will be some society where people prefer Simpsons

more.

Anyone can appreciate the Simpsons but I think it does take education to appreciate Shakespeare as much.

Alright, you're saying it takes education to appreciate higher

things.

Mill's point is

that the higher pleasures do require

cultivation and appreciation and education.

He doesn't dispute that.

Once having been cultivated

and educated

people will see

not only see the difference between higher and lower

pleasures

but will actually

prefer

the higher

to the lower.

You find this famous passage from John Stuart Mill

it is better

to be a human being dissatisfied essere un essere umano insoddisfatto

than a pig satisfied.

It is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.

And if the fool

or the pig

are of a different opinion

it is because they only know

their side of the question.

So here you have

an attempt

to distinguish

higher from lower

pleasures.

So going to an art museum or being a couch potato and swilling beer watching television Quindi andare in un museo d'arte o stare sul divano a bere birra guardando la televisione...

at home.

As Mill agrees we might

succumb

to the temptation

to do the latter,

to be couch potatoes.

But even when we do that

out of indolence

and sloth

we know

that the pleasure we get

gazing at Rembrandts

in the museum

is actually higher

because we've experienced both.

And it is a higher pleasure

gazing at Rembrandts because it engages our higher human faculties.

What about Mill's attempt

to reply to the objection about individual rights?

In a way he uses the same

kind of argument

and this comes out in chapter five

he says I dispute the pretensions of any theory which sets up an imaginary dice che contesto le pretese di qualsiasi teoria che crei un immaginario

standard of justice

not grounded on utility

but still

he considers

justice

grounded on utility

to be what he calls the chief part di essere ciò che egli chiama la parte principale

and incomparably the most sacred and binding part e incomparabilmente la parte più sacra e vincolante

of all morality.

So justice is higher

individual rights are privileged

but not for

reasons that depart from utilitarian assumptions.

Justice is a name

for certain moral requirements

which regarded collectively

stand higher in the scale of social utility

and are therefore

of more

paramount obligation

than any others.

So justice is sacred, it's prior, it's privileged, it isn't something that can easily be traded Quindi la giustizia è sacra, è precedente, è privilegiata, non è qualcosa che può essere facilmente barattata.

off against lesser things. contro cose minori.

But the reason

is ultimately

Mill claims

a utilitarian reason

once you consider

the long-run interests

of humankind

of all of us

as progressive beings.

If we do justice and if we respect rights Se facciamo giustizia e rispettiamo i diritti

society as a whole

will be better off in the long run. sarà migliore nel lungo periodo.

Well is that convincing?

Or is Mill actually without admitting it Oppure Mill è in realtà senza ammetterlo

stepping outside uscire fuori

utilitarian considerations

in arguing

for qualitatively higher

pleasures

and for sacred

or especially important

individual rights?

We haven't fully answered that question

because to answer that question

in the case of rights and justice

it will require that we explore

other ways

non-utilitarian ways

of accounting for the basis of rights di contabilità per la base dei diritti

and then asking

whether they succeed. se hanno successo.

As for Jeremy Bentham

who launched che ha lanciato

utilitarianism

as a doctrine

in moral and legal philosophy

Bentham died in 1832 at the age of 85

but if you go to London you can visit him today

literally.

He provided in his will

that his body be preserved

embalmed and displayed imbalsamato ed esposto

in the University of London

where he still presides dove ancora presiede

in a glass case

with a wax head

dressed in his actual clothing.

You see before he died

Bentham addressed himself Bentham si rivolgeva

to a question consistent with his philosophy a una domanda coerente con la sua filosofia

of what use

could a dead man be to the living? un uomo morto potrebbe essere per i vivi?

One use he said would be to make one's corpse available Un utilizzo, a suo dire, sarebbe quello di rendere disponibile il proprio cadavere

to the study of anatomy.

In the case of great philosophers however Nel caso dei grandi filosofi, tuttavia

better yet

to preserve one's physical presence preservare la propria presenza fisica

in order to inspire future generations of thinkers.

You want to see what Bentham looks like stuffed? Volete vedere come appare Bentham impagliato?

Here's what he looks like.

Now

if you look closely

you will notice

that

the embalming of his actual head was not a success so they substituted a waxed head

and

at the bottom for verisimilitude

you can actually see his actual head è possibile vedere la sua testa vera e propria

on a plate. su un piatto.

You see it?

Right there.

So

what's the moral of the story?

The moral of the story

by the way they bring him out during meetings of the board at University College London dal modo in cui lo tirano fuori durante le riunioni del consiglio di amministrazione dell'University College di Londra

and the minutes record him as present but not voting. e il verbale lo registra come presente ma non votante.

Here is a philosopher

in life and in death

who adhered

to the principles

of his philosophy.

We'll continue with rights next time.

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