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Stanford Entrepreneurship corner, Entrepreneurship Gives Life Meaning Part1

Entrepreneurship Gives Life Meaning Part1

Without further ado, David.

Thank you. Hi. Thanks for coming in the rain. You know the weather can have an impact on how things turn out and I'm glad that we had a great turnout here today. I start it out with a picture of the greatest entrepreneur that never lived, Willy Wonka, so we have a fond appreciation for him. When I was asked to give a talk about entrepreneurism, it sort of got me thinking along the lines of, you know, well, I've never thought of myself as an entrepreneur. People sort of use that term a lot and it's bandied about that entrepreneurism is like a career. It's like something you decide you're going to do. And a lot of people say, I'm a serial entrepreneur, I'm going to go do entrepreneurial stuff and so it got me thinking about, well, why do I not feel that way and what is it about what I do that makes me say I'm not an entrepreneur. So I tried to sort of put together some of those thoughts and put together some of the things that I feel I've learnt in starting this company and I hope that it helps frame things. So just by way of - important to have an agenda - I've learnt over the last couple of years, it's important to be organized.

So I've tried to - Greg works with me, so he knows it's something I've had to work on. So I'm going to talk a little bit about my background, a little bit about the company that we started about five years ago called WeatherBill, and then there are sort of some learnings about entrepreneurism and some ways that I like to think about entrepreneurism now that I thought I'd share with you. So I was born in South Africa and Cape Town is where I spent my youth.

When I was six years old, my parents and my sister and I moved to United States. At the time in 1986 when we moved, a partite was ending in South Africa and for those who aren't familiar with the history, a lot of folks left the country. My parents' family, all - both sides of the family, everyone seemed to move to London. It's a popular place to find oneself after South Africa. And my parents set out on what I would call sort of their entrepreneurial conquest, which was to become big filmmakers in Hollywood. So they were filmmakers in South Africa, work for the public television station there. And they wanted to go in and have a shot at making it big. So they took my sister and I, and we moved to Los Angeles when I was six years old. When we moved, in 1984, my - the first Macintosh computer came out and my dad had bought one of the first Macs made available in South Africa and he used MacPaint and old ImageWriter printer to print up a sign that said 'Go for Gold'. And he took the sign and he put it up in my mom's editing room where she edited her films and that sign is out there as sort of a reminder that they made this big change in their life when they were young with two young kids in tow, and no money to make it happen to come to LA and try and go for their dreams, and try and make a new life for themselves. And I'm assuming I haven't really delved too much into it, but I'm assuming there was some sort of relationship between my parents' attitude towards making life decisions and what I ended up doing in my life later on. So when I grow up in Hollywood, you know I went to the school with all the Hollywood kids, but we didn't have a lot of money and there is a lot of unemployment and my parents struggled in Hollywood as a lot of independent filmmakers do over the years.

And I was always sort of the kid at school who didn't really have the ability to afford all the things that the other kids could. I always thought a little bit constrained, a little bit as an outsider and not very socially well adjusted. And it was sort of when I was 16 years old that I got my first opportunity to leave and get out of there and try and change my life. I've realized looking back that was sort of why I ended up leaving. I went to Upstate New York to a school for a year where I actually got a job working in a pool hall and the owner of of the pool hall was really big into playing poker and I started playing poker with him and a local bookie that ran the books for all the sports betting in Upstate New York, it was a really funny experience at 16 years old to go through with this. I ended up coming back to California and starting a program at Cal, I majored in astrophysics. And since I was a young kid I always said when I was a young kid, I want to understand the secrets of the universe. I want to unlock and understand why things work the way they do? And I know there is a lot of engineering students in here and I've got to imagine there is a hint of a motivation in each one of you that says why are things the way they are? What makes them work? And for me the biggest problems, the biggest questions that had never been answered are found in cosmology and in astrophysics and this is what sort of drove me to go get my degree in astrophysics. And while I was at school, I got a job as an undergrad doing some work at Lawrence Berkeley Labs and it's sort of like getting inside the sausage factory.

When you work at these Department of Energy labs, you really see sort of what is it about the scientific breakthroughs that people win Nobel prizes for, how does it all work? And I know that there is probably some folks here who might work at SLACK or might have some experience similarly. But I always thought as a kid fantastically like Albert Einstein sat in a room and with a piece of paper and a pencil he solved the secrets of universe and wrote the general theory of relativity. That's how it works, right? No, there is a machine and it takes forever and there is thousands of people involved and the degree of impact at which and the pace at which things progressed, I found frustrating and I realized it's not the life I wanted to live. While I was an undergrad in 1998 to 2000 there was this dotcom bubble going on and it might be read about in the history books nowadays, I'm really surprised because I walk in I feel old.

And so like this was 10 years ago when I graduated, but - so at the time the dotcom bubble was going on and I'd start to read the Wall Street Journal. I thought it was really interesting, like these crazy ideas coming out of Silicon Valley and people are doing crazy stuff and they're seemingly changing the world. The world is changing before my very eyes and around the world in which I live and I read these stories in the Wall Street Journal, I remember I love the marketplace section because it was like profiles of people doing cool stuff. And I thought this is want I want to do. Rather than sit in the dark room and just be part of a cog in a machine that was going to take forever to output some theory that may or may not be disproven 50 years later, I wanted to be able to go out and do something that was impactful and would have lasting change in the world and I could control my own destiny, I could make that happen in the time that I live on this earth. And it was really exciting to me. Towards the end of my undergrad career, so I said I want to go and do technology stuff and I want to go do the Silicon Valley stuff. So towards the end of my career, it became clear this dotcom bubble was blowing up and there were all sorts of problems in Silicon Valley and around that time I got a job in investment banking when I graduated.

Because that was like the one thing that seem like oh, it's a good job, you can actually make a - that's The Secret of My Success, Michael J. Fox. The - that's the one job that everyone sort of say that's a good profile job, you will learn a lot about how technology works, so I was doing technology investment banking, we basically advice companies on acquisitions and when I started there was 11 people in my investment banking analyst class, and two years later there were only two of us left. It was like the great contraction, I'd call it, of Silicon Valley that I got to sit through and watch dozens of companies and I worked on about 20 acquisitions at the time, and I got to feel these companies and sort of the CEO that started these things and the failures that they went through and the challenges and they are selling these companies off because it's a frenzy and it's a disaster and so on and so forth. Then I did a little work in private equity and during the time I was focused on finding investments to make an online advertising company.

So it was really cool, I got to see all these different businesses and how they worked and how they operated and I learnt a lot about Google at the time and how Google was doing when it was a growing-up company. There's about less than 1,000 people there at the time. There was clearly a future in front of it, it was still a private company, very secretive, but there is a good understanding of sort of what was going on there. And they were forming a corporate development team, and so I took advantage of the opportunity and joined because let's see how a business works. This is something that's interesting and exciting and I've never actually worked at a company and see how these companies work. And the exciting part about private equity was you could invest in these businesses and see them grow. Well now you could actually be a part of it, so that's why I made the move to Google and I learnt more in Google than I did at any other point in my career, in my life for that matter because there was so much going on, by the time I left Google there was over 10,000 people. And I left Google to start WeatherBill. So let me tell you the story.

In 2002 I used to drive past the - down the Embarcadero to get on the 280 to go to work. Sorry, to get on the 280 then 101 to go to work in Foster City. I mean it's a drive past this place called The Bike Hut, it's right next to AT&T Park on the Embarcadero. And they rent bicycles to tourists and they ride them around on the waterfront. And at the time when I was doing investment banking, you know, I was learning about finance and I was learning about business and how managers think about their P&L, and their operating and their income statements and so on. And every day it was raining, The Bike Hut would be closed. So the guy wouldn't even come in and open up shop because tourists aren't renting bikes and riding around in the rain. So the dude didn't even show up to work. And I thought that's a pretty crappy business, like whether or not this guy is going to make money in a given month it's based on how many days it rains. And so you start to think well that's actually a big problem. Do you ever go to the movie theater on a Sunday when it's raining? There's like so many people in the movie theatre and the coffee shops are packed when it's raining. No one goes to the ski resorts when it's warm and it hasn't snowed. So like you start to think about it and it turns out that - and I love the statistic, this is our big number, the 70% of businesses are affected by the weather every year. So years later when I was at Google, I came back to this idea about sort of all the world's businesses affected by the weather, maybe there is something they can do about it.

And we can sell coverage to pay them if bad weather happens, making it easier for them to run and manage their businesses. 70% of the world's businesses, you know, $4 trillion of the GDP in the United States each year and at the time I was working at Google, working on AdWords and this idea of sort of taking lots of data and being able to extract signal from it and determine some sort of fee or charge that one would make to a customer in the case of Google advertisers could apply here. We could analyze weather data, we could determine the probability of future weather events occurring and we could sell you coverage that would pay you if bad weather were to happen to your business. And so if you know that the bad weather is going to cause a loss of $100, well then you want to get paid $100 when that bad weather happens. And so we will give you a price to cover that because we will be able to figure out the probable - the probability of that event occurring and we will charge you an appropriate charge to cover you. And there's no claims process or proof of loss because we can monitor the weather, there is all these data feeds available now. So choose a weather station where we have a data feed and we will monitor the weather automatically and we will trigger a check to you if it happens. So big problem, huge global market opportunity.

The first step was building a basic sort of prototype. So this was our first prototype, can you see that okay? Yeah, cool. It's pretty good looking website. So I wrote a prototype - the first thing I did was buy some weather data. So you got to - we bought some weather data for about 200 stations and we got availability on feeds into those 200 weather stations. So we can now monitor 200 weather stations and we knew what the history was going back 30 years. And so the first pricing engine was written in R. Everyone here are familiar with R, right, so it's like open source, you can thread a Java Connector and then you can write a front-end app, now you've got a website that uses R to price stuff. And so we were able to use the data that we had bought and so when you typed in the dates of coverage you wanted and choose your weather station and say what do you want to get paid for? I want to get paid $1,000 every day it rains more than a quarter inch as measured at the Stanford Campus. So we would take the appropriate weather data, look at the last 30 years of history, get a distribution, fit a distribution model to the empirical data and we will be able to use that to calculate the expected loss on that product and be able to figure out what we should charge you to cover you against that occurring. So that was the very simplistic prototype and we could use that to then go and ask people for money to start this business. So the first guy to give us money was a guy named Danny Rimer who works at a venture fund called Index Ventures.

He wrote us a check for $300,000 which I then was able to quit Google and go and say comfortable enough to do this. And when I quit Google I left a lot of stock on the table and a lot of money behind and I didn't have a lot of money at the time and it was kind of like, well, you know, why not, like let's just take advantage of this opportunity we have in life and when you're presented with opportunities where you feel you can make a really big impact, it's worth doing it in light of the sort of comfort of not doing it. So the first step was to raise more money because $300,000 was enough to get things going, but to hire folks to work for us and try and recruit them we needed to raise a Series A round or a seed round of funding from angel investors. So we went across the Silicon Valley, Sand Hill Road and all the VCs that we met with said no, including some who are now investors in the company many years later. You can never hold a grudge in Silicon Valley. There is always smile and say I will take your check, thank you very much. So we completely failed at raising money.

Because when we went to these VCs they were like, we are going to start this business that pays people for bad weather and they can choose the weather they want to get paid for and we will figure out the probability and we will cover them. Like that is not an X for Y business. I call them X for Y, it's like Groupon for moms, like it's a lot easier for people to understand something in the context of how they're already operating when the context of other business models are in the context of how things operate today. So to sort of come at this from a fundamental problem with what we think is a good technology solution was sort of a little bit challenging to sell. And granted, we probably weren't doing a good job selling at the time and over time we refined the pitch and we refined the story and this is a completely greenfield, no one knows what's going to happen with what we're doing. So luckily I knew a lot of people that had a lot of money because I had worked at Google and company had gone public and people had done well. So I raised money from them. And so we raised about $2 million from what I would call angel investor friends and we started this thing and later on Index Ventures and NEA gave us another $2 million note and we sort of - we are able to start hiring people. So this was our launch.

We launched in January of 2007, this is the best picture I could find. I did a Google image search for phone booth in the middle of a field because that sort of what it felt like, right. We did this great big build, right. We were like 24x7, no sleep for months before we launched in January of 2007. And the idea was we would put that great website you just saw, made it available to the world and the 70% of businesses that had problems with the weather or were exposed to the weather would all show up and they would finally say, finally I'm a lemonade stand owner, I've always wanted to buy this product, I'm still glad you put the WeatherBill website up. Let me pull out my credit card. And they would start buying stuff. So no one bought. At the time we also had to do a lot of learning about regulatory stuff. So we met with the CFTC and lawyers and we're like we didn't have insurance paper, that's a whole another multi day lecture about how insurance works. And it's a painful lesson we have all had to learn, but we wrote these products as derivative contracts. Over the counter derivatives, the thing that blew up the economy, that sort of what everyone calls it now. But at the time it was like efficient stuff. So we used these over the counter derivatives, and we had to figure out how to make all this stuff work. So there was a lot of plumbing involved in pulling this whole business together with a big sort of launch out to the world. We moved from 200 stations to 400 stations. So, now you could measure the weather at 400 different places, it's amazing. We went to industry conferences and learnt about what was going on in the weather-derivatives market, which is used by energy companies and so on and so forth. So, in that first year, after no one came to the website to buy coverage, I was sort of along with the rest of our early team of endeavourers, pioneers, cold calling businesses in all these different industries, like why aren't you buying, so, hey, Mr. Construction Company, doesn't it cause delays in your operations when it rains or hey, Mr. Farmer like if there is a freeze, you're going to lose your entire citrus crop, right?

And you start to end up in these consultative dialogs with these potential customers. And cold calling was something that I would say is sort of a critical, something you shouldn't be afraid to do if you're dealing with customers because you're going to have to do it to understand what your customers want. So, through this process we realized, well, there are people that want this and we're able to close some sales, but every single one of them we're having to say, well, tell me the weather that affects you, and then they'll give you whole story, then you do an analysis for them and then you run the price. So, we were using our own website to sell products to people that wouldn't go to our website because there was a whole bunch of handholding and positioning and the technology work, but at the end of the day we hadn't productized yet. We clearly just had a proof-of-technology. So, the next year we ended up being - what was the guy, that Yahoo!

Peanut Butter - we were like spread very thin. So, we were trying to sell into all these different markets, travel companies, energy companies, how do we make this thing work, like can we get travel companies to give rain free guarantees to all their customers you know, negotiations getting on planes flying back and forth, meeting with all the online travel agencies. We almost got a deal. We're almost there. That's not really going to work. So, we've got to back off of that market. Ski resorts, you know, can we get all those ski resorts to buy, well, we make snow and people will show up, we'll make money other way as well. So, we learnt a lot about customers in different markets, but we didn't get deep enough to provide a solution to a customer at any given market. So, in 2009, we made the decision to focus the entire business around agriculture.

And we're really lucky that we raised a ton of money in our first year of business. After that first year, where I was cold calling all those businesses, we were able to close a couple of million dollars of sales. And so for a startup during the Web 2.0 heyday to actually make a couple of million dollars in their first year of business was a big deal, despite the fact that a lot of people didn't fully understand or comprehend or care about what we were doing, just you made money and you are a Web 2.0 company, you can get a big check. So, we raised money. And that money afforded us the ability to make a lot of mistakes. And a lot of mistakes were really required for us to figure out what could work as a business. 2009, we were seeing our cash go down.

And we hadn't yet built a model in any market where we could scale the business. So, we said, let's make a bet, the bet is we're going to focus on agriculture. We're going on focus on farmers, because if we do this the right way, we'll be able to build a product that we can sell to farmers over and over again. And this is the market that we felt at the time provided the best opportunity for us to build a scalable business. And Greg Smirin, our Chief Revenue Officer, joined us around this time and helped lead this effort for us. Big learning was when Greg came onboard and really made us diligent about this approach, just how little we knew and how little focus we had at the time in solving the right problems. And so, in 2009, we started selling the specific products to farmers. We moved to 14,000 grids as opposed to 400 stations because we realized no one cares about the rainfall 150 miles away, they want the rainfall to be measured at their location. That was a big reason a lot of people weren't buying. And so that's really where we understood at that point the focus of the technology that we build as a company. Measure the weather more and more locally. And today, we measure the weather using Doppler radar and satellite imagery and all sorts of things that can pinpoint the weather to your exact location and the technology scale at which we operate has become pretty substantial, but at the time that was a big move for us. And so, the ag products started to work and we realized that we needed to provide full season protection to farmers. So, none of us came from an agricultural background, none of us came from an insurance background, but it turns out, farmers won't buy your product unless it's written on insurance papers. So, we had to figure out how do we build an insurance company. And that was a lot of fun. Like I said, I'm going to leave that conversation off for another day, but we had to get all the regulatory approvals in all 51 jurisdictions in the United States for doing this, where you're not actually sending an adjuster out to measure what happens to your farm we're actually just writing your policy that says if this weather occurs, I'll send you a check and how do we get that approved and how do we get an A rating on the product and how do we get the money and the reinsurance to back us and this all became a big hustle, but it worked. And last year, we launched a program called Total Weather Insurance and we figured out a sales model that works, that scales, where people will buy the product every season and we can go out and close sale after sale after sale in a given day.

And so, we raised a bunch of money earlier this year based on the fact that our business was growing very quickly and we had a product that every farmer wanted to buy. There is 160 million acres of corn and soybeans planted just in the Midwest of the United States. Our product costs $40 an acre. There's $6 billion of revenue we're going after and our close rate is very, very high. More than half of the farmers that are offered our product actually buy it because it's something that we finally figured out to make a lot of value and makes a lot of sense for them and we can scale this business pretty substantially. So, we're less than 30 people in Q1 of this year, and we're now over 100 people, Eli our recent addition to the team, Stanford undergrad, joining in a couple of months. And we've a revenue number now that's in the tens of million of dollars per quarter. And the business is growing very quickly and the technology that we're building is exciting. We've probably one of the largest - we're probably the largest user of the Elastic MapReduce service at Amazon, which is basically Hadoop in the cloud. We're simulating the weather on a two-by-two mile basis for the next 730 days, 10,000 times, covering the entire United States and then similarly on a grid basis covering the entire globe. So, the scale of the data, which we operate, we monitor that weather and we update the simulations twice a day as new simulation models come out, has become pretty substantial and it gives us the ability to better service our clients and there is a whole sort of product mission around what we do. We're renaming the company.

I was going to say it, but Greg has asked me not to. We are doing the renaming announcement next Tuesday. Five years later, we're renaming the company, it's crazy. So, I was perfectly happy doing this. This is one point because I think it speaks to how nimble one needs to be and how sort of brutally self-honest and self-aware you need to be as you go through this process. We've had to change what we are doing and how we are doing it many times over in the course of this - the development of this business. And it came to a point recently that the company may or may not be appropriate for what we are doing and the scope of the things that we'd like to do as an organization. And so, let's change the company name. Well, okay, that's not off the table and we've found a great URL and we're going to launch it on Tuesday next week with this great new company name. So, we didn't hold any sort of personal, sort of, you know, I'm stuck on this name because it's what I always wanted to build, it's my business, it's my baby, I can't let go of it, you know, like every day is a new challenge and everyday there is a new solution to that problem. And as long as you keep living every day like that you're going to progress and at some point you're going to have success in your mission, but you cannot hold on to the things in the past and I tell my VCs and so on, you know, they introduced me as sort of the founder of the company. I'm like, founder isn't really a role, it's not really a title I like, I'm the CEO of the company today and I may not necessarily be the best CEO of the company tomorrow, and a lot of founders it's for them, it's very much like they cling on to that title because it's what they're doing, but it's important to avoid it. So I want to talk a little bit about some of the learnings of the last couple of - I'm just checking your clock here, the last couple of years.

So first one, doing a startup, I might alienate the - I don't know, but I might alienate people with some of the things I'm going to say, but I'm just going to speak from the heart. The first one is, I hear a lot of people in Silicon Valley say, I'm going to go do a startup and similar in the vein of, I'm a serial entrepreneur, doing a startup has about as much meaning as saying I'm going to jump out off a plane. What I mean by this is that doing a startup is really an activity or a way of organizing a group of people around a problem that they are trying to solve. You don't get a bunch of people together and say, hey, let's all grab a couple of guns and maybe we'll go find a dictator to kill. If there is a dictator to kill, you put together a team that's most appropriate for taking that dictator out. Okay? It's a terrible analogy, but I wanted to wake everyone up. Okay? And be controversial. So, the process of starting up a company to solve a problem is exactly that, I'm starting up a company to solve this specific problem. So, the way I'm going to go back doing it, the people that are going to help me do it, is really dependent on the problem. It's not an exercise in an activity stream that I'd like to undertake of getting my ass-kicked every day, not getting paid enough, suffering through years of misery and maybe you all find a problem to solve. And that's why I say it's a candid thing, I'm going to go jump out of the plane. The second one is that I hear or there is a sense in my limited exposure to the sort of - what I call the rock star motif of what entrepreneurism is, in - especially in Silicon Valley, and it's good.

I mean there is a culture of taking leaps and doing big exciting things here and you're an important person if you do that. But just being an entrepreneur does not make one a rock star. The odds of the guy - or being the guy on the left are according to a study and I put the URL up there, 0.0006%, that's the odds of - I'm starting up a company and having the company be worth more than a billion dollars. However, all of the press coverage and all of the attention at Silicon Valley goes to the guy on the left. The person on the right is the status quo, your typical entrepreneur, your typical Silicon Valley startup team looks like the person on the right. There is a reason I look like I'm 50, and I'm only 31 years old, okay? The probability of being the person on the right is greater than 99%. And so, I would say, don't do a startup and don't try and solve a problem via a startup, if your goal is to have the status of the rock star entrepreneur because it is a false premise. The financial reward or the opportunity cost of doing a startup is very high. This is from that same study that I just used. There are a lot of engineers here, I'm assuming 100% of you will have the ability to interview for a job at Google when you graduate, and if you were to get a job at Google when you graduate, the anecdotal evidence suggests that your first year salary would be about $105,000 this year. If you were to start a company and raise money from a venture capitalist and you were then able to sell that company or take that company public, your median time to doing that will be 49 months. And assuming three founders, your median expected payoff to the founders will be about $300,000 each, which works out to an annualized salary equivalent of $73,000. And the probability that you actually make no money is 67%.


Entrepreneurship Gives Life Meaning Part1 Entrepreneurship Gives Life Meaning Part1 El espíritu empresarial da sentido a la vida Parte 1 起業が人生に与える意味 Part1 Tinh thần kinh doanh mang lại ý nghĩa cuộc sống Phần 1 创业赋予生命意义第1部分

Without further ado, David. それ以上の苦労なしに、デビッド。 Không cần thêm lời khuyên, David.

Thank you. Hi. Thanks for coming in the rain. Cảm ơn vì đã đến trong cơn mưa. You know the weather can have an impact on how things turn out and I’m glad that we had a great turnout here today. 天気が状況に影響を与える可能性があることをご存知でしょう。今日ここで素晴らしい投票率が得られたことをうれしく思います。 Bạn biết đấy, thời tiết có thể ảnh hưởng đến việc mọi thứ diễn ra như thế nào và tôi rất vui vì hôm nay chúng ta đã có một lượt cử tri tuyệt vời ở đây. I start it out with a picture of the greatest entrepreneur that never lived, Willy Wonka, so we have a fond appreciation for him. 私はそれを、これまで生きたことのない最も偉大な起業家、ウィリー・ウォンカの写真から始めます。それで、私たちは彼に心から感謝しています。 When I was asked to give a talk about entrepreneurism, it sort of got me thinking along the lines of, you know, well, I’ve never thought of myself as an entrepreneur. 起業家の話を聞かれたとき、自分を起業家だと思ったことは一度もありませんでした。 People sort of use that term a lot and it’s bandied about that entrepreneurism is like a career. 人々はその用語をよく使用しますが、起業家精神はキャリアのようなものだと言われています。 Mọi người sử dụng thuật ngữ đó rất nhiều và nó bị ràng buộc về chủ nghĩa kinh doanh giống như một nghề nghiệp. It’s like something you decide you’re going to do. It's like something you decide you're going to do. それはあなたがやろうと決心したことのようなものです。 Nó giống như một cái gì đó bạn quyết định bạn sẽ làm. And a lot of people say, I’m a serial entrepreneur, I’m going to go do entrepreneurial stuff and so it got me thinking about, well, why do I not feel that way and what is it about what I do that makes me say I’m not an entrepreneur. そして、多くの人が、私はシリアルアントレプレナーだと言います。私は起業家の仕事をするつもりです。それで、なぜ私はそのように感じないのか、そして私が何をするのかについて考えさせられました。私は起業家ではないと言います。 So I tried to sort of put together some of those thoughts and put together some of the things that I feel I’ve learnt in starting this company and I hope that it helps frame things. そこで、そういう考えをまとめて、この会社を立ち上げて学んだことをまとめてみました。それが物事の枠組みに役立つことを願っています。 So just by way of - important to have an agenda - I’ve learnt over the last couple of years, it’s important to be organized. ですから、議事を持っていることが重要ですが、ここ数年で学んだことですが、整理することが重要です。

So I’ve tried to - Greg works with me, so he knows it’s something I’ve had to work on. だから私はしようとしました-グレッグは私と一緒に働いているので、彼はそれが私が取り組まなければならなかったものであることを知っています。 So I’m going to talk a little bit about my background, a little bit about the company that we started about five years ago called WeatherBill, and then there are sort of some learnings about entrepreneurism and some ways that I like to think about entrepreneurism now that I thought I’d share with you. So I was born in South Africa and Cape Town is where I spent my youth. Vì vậy, tôi sinh ra ở Nam Phi và Cape Town là nơi tôi đã trải qua tuổi trẻ của mình.

When I was six years old, my parents and my sister and I moved to United States. Khi tôi sáu tuổi, cha mẹ tôi và chị gái tôi và tôi chuyển đến Hoa Kỳ. At the time in 1986 when we moved, a partite was ending in South Africa and for those who aren’t familiar with the history, a lot of folks left the country. My parents' family, all - both sides of the family, everyone seemed to move to London. It’s a popular place to find oneself after South Africa. 南アフリカに次ぐ人気の場所です。 And my parents set out on what I would call sort of their entrepreneurial conquest, which was to become big filmmakers in Hollywood. そして私の両親は、私が彼らの起業家的征服のようなものと呼ぶものに着手しました。それはハリウッドで大きな映画製作者になることでした。 So they were filmmakers in South Africa, work for the public television station there. And they wanted to go in and have a shot at making it big. そして、彼らは入って、それを大きくすることを試みたかったのです。 So they took my sister and I, and we moved to Los Angeles when I was six years old. When we moved, in 1984, my - the first Macintosh computer came out and my dad had bought one of the first Macs made available in South Africa and he used MacPaint and old ImageWriter printer to print up a sign that said 'Go for Gold'. 私たちが引っ越したとき、1984年に、最初のMacintoshコンピュータが発売され、父は南アフリカで利用可能になった最初のMacの1つを購入し、MacPaintと古いImageWriterプリンタを使用して、「GoforGold」と書かれた看板を印刷しました。 。 And he took the sign and he put it up in my mom’s editing room where she edited her films and that sign is out there as sort of a reminder that they made this big change in their life when they were young with two young kids in tow, and no money to make it happen to come to LA and try and go for their dreams, and try and make a new life for themselves. そして彼は看板を手に取り、彼女が彼女の映画を編集した私の母の編集室にそれを置きました、そしてその看板は彼らが2人の幼い子供を連れて若いときに彼らの人生にこの大きな変化をもたらしたことを思い出させるものとしてそこにあります、そしてそれを実現するためのお金はありませんLAに来て、彼らの夢のために努力し、そして彼ら自身のために新しい人生を作ろうと試みてください。 And I’m assuming I haven’t really delved too much into it, but I’m assuming there was some sort of relationship between my parents' attitude towards making life decisions and what I ended up doing in my life later on. あまり深く掘り下げていないのではないかと思いますが、両親の人生の決断に対する態度と、その後の人生でやったこととの間に何らかの関係があったと思います。 So when I grow up in Hollywood, you know I went to the school with all the Hollywood kids, but we didn’t have a lot of money and there is a lot of unemployment and my parents struggled in Hollywood as a lot of independent filmmakers do over the years. ですから、私がハリウッドで育ったとき、私はすべてのハリウッドの子供たちと一緒に学校に通っていましたが、私たちにはたくさんのお金がなく、失業が多く、両親は多くの独立した映画製作者としてハリウッドで苦労していました何年にもわたって行います。

And I was always sort of the kid at school who didn’t really have the ability to afford all the things that the other kids could. そして、私はいつも学校の子供で、他の子供たちができるすべてのものを買う余裕が本当にありませんでした。 I always thought a little bit constrained, a little bit as an outsider and not very socially well adjusted. 私はいつも少し制約があり、部外者として少しで、社会的にあまりうまく調整されていないと思っていました。 And it was sort of when I was 16 years old that I got my first opportunity to leave and get out of there and try and change my life. I’ve realized looking back that was sort of why I ended up leaving. 振り返ってみると、それが私が去ってしまった理由の一種であることに気づきました。 I went to Upstate New York to a school for a year where I actually got a job working in a pool hall and the owner of of the pool hall was really big into playing poker and I started playing poker with him and a local bookie that ran the books for all the sports betting in Upstate New York, it was a really funny experience at 16 years old to go through with this. I ended up coming back to California and starting a program at Cal, I majored in astrophysics. And since I was a young kid I always said when I was a young kid, I want to understand the secrets of the universe. I want to unlock and understand why things work the way they do? ロックを解除して、物事がそのように機能する理由を理解したいですか? And I know there is a lot of engineering students in here and I’ve got to imagine there is a hint of a motivation in each one of you that says why are things the way they are? そして、ここには工学部の学生がたくさんいることを知っています。あなた方一人一人に、なぜ物事が彼らのようになっているのかという動機のヒントがあると想像しなければなりません。 What makes them work? 何がそれらを機能させるのですか? And for me the biggest problems, the biggest questions that had never been answered are found in cosmology and in astrophysics and this is what sort of drove me to go get my degree in astrophysics. そして私にとって最大の問題は、これまで答えられなかった最大の質問が宇宙論と天体物理学にあり、これが私を天体物理学の学位を取得するように駆り立てた理由です。 And while I was at school, I got a job as an undergrad doing some work at Lawrence Berkeley Labs and it’s sort of like getting inside the sausage factory. そして、私が学校にいる間、私はローレンスバークレーラボでいくつかの仕事をしている学部生としての仕事を得ました、そしてそれはソーセージ工場の中に入るようなものです。

When you work at these Department of Energy labs, you really see sort of what is it about the scientific breakthroughs that people win Nobel prizes for, how does it all work? これらのエネルギー省の研究所で働くとき、人々がノーベル賞を受賞する科学的進歩について、実際にどのようなものかがわかりますが、それはすべてどのように機能しますか? And I know that there is probably some folks here who might work at SLACK or might have some experience similarly. But I always thought as a kid fantastically like Albert Einstein sat in a room and with a piece of paper and a pencil he solved the secrets of universe and wrote the general theory of relativity. しかし、私はいつも、アルバート・アインシュタインが部屋に座って、一枚の紙と鉛筆で宇宙の秘密を解き、一般相対性理論を書いたように、素晴らしく子供の頃に考えていました。 That’s how it works, right? それがその仕組みですよね? No, there is a machine and it takes forever and there is thousands of people involved and the degree of impact at which and the pace at which things progressed, I found frustrating and I realized it’s not the life I wanted to live. いいえ、機械があり、それは永遠にかかり、何千人もの人々が関わっており、物事が進行する速度と速度に影響を与え、私はイライラし、それが私が生きたいと思っていた人生ではないことに気づきました。 While I was an undergrad in 1998 to 2000 there was this dotcom bubble going on and it might be read about in the history books nowadays, I’m really surprised because I walk in I feel old. 1998年から2000年に学部生だった頃、このドットコムバブルが起こっていて、最近は歴史書に載っているかもしれませんが、中に入っていくと年をとっているのでびっくりします。

And so like this was 10 years ago when I graduated, but - so at the time the dotcom bubble was going on and I’d start to read the Wall Street Journal. そして、このように私が卒業したのは10年前のことでしたが、そのときドットコムバブルが続いていたので、ウォールストリートジャーナルを読み始めました。 I thought it was really interesting, like these crazy ideas coming out of Silicon Valley and people are doing crazy stuff and they’re seemingly changing the world. The world is changing before my very eyes and around the world in which I live and I read these stories in the Wall Street Journal, I remember I love the marketplace section because it was like profiles of people doing cool stuff. 世界は私の目の前で、そして私が住んでいる世界中で変化していて、ウォールストリートジャーナルでこれらの物語を読んでいます。それはクールなことをしている人々のプロフィールのようだったので、私はマーケットプレイスセクションが大好きだと覚えています。 And I thought this is want I want to do. Rather than sit in the dark room and just be part of a cog in a machine that was going to take forever to output some theory that may or may not be disproven 50 years later, I wanted to be able to go out and do something that was impactful and would have lasting change in the world and I could control my own destiny, I could make that happen in the time that I live on this earth. And it was really exciting to me. Towards the end of my undergrad career, so I said I want to go and do technology stuff and I want to go do the Silicon Valley stuff. 学部生のキャリアの終わりに向かって、私はテクノロジー関連の仕事に行きたいと言い、シリコンバレーの仕事に行きたいと言いました。 So towards the end of my career, it became clear this dotcom bubble was blowing up and there were all sorts of problems in Silicon Valley and around that time I got a job in investment banking when I graduated.

Because that was like the one thing that seem like oh, it’s a good job, you can actually make a - that’s The Secret of My Success, Michael J. Fox. The - that’s the one job that everyone sort of say that’s a good profile job, you will learn a lot about how technology works, so I was doing technology investment banking, we basically advice companies on acquisitions and when I started there was 11 people in my investment banking analyst class, and two years later there were only two of us left. It was like the great contraction, I’d call it, of Silicon Valley that I got to sit through and watch dozens of companies and I worked on about 20 acquisitions at the time, and I got to feel these companies and sort of the CEO that started these things and the failures that they went through and the challenges and they are selling these companies off because it’s a frenzy and it’s a disaster and so on and so forth. Then I did a little work in private equity and during the time I was focused on finding investments to make an online advertising company. それから私はプライベートエクイティで少し仕事をしました、そしてその間私はオンライン広告会社を作るための投資を見つけることに集中していました。

So it was really cool, I got to see all these different businesses and how they worked and how they operated and I learnt a lot about Google at the time and how Google was doing when it was a growing-up company. There’s about less than 1,000 people there at the time. 当時、そこには約1,000人未満の人がいます。 There was clearly a future in front of it, it was still a private company, very secretive, but there is a good understanding of sort of what was going on there. And they were forming a corporate development team, and so I took advantage of the opportunity and joined because let’s see how a business works. そして、彼らは企業開発チームを結成していたので、この機会を利用して、ビジネスの仕組みを見てみましょう。 This is something that’s interesting and exciting and I’ve never actually worked at a company and see how these companies work. And the exciting part about private equity was you could invest in these businesses and see them grow. Well now you could actually be a part of it, so that’s why I made the move to Google and I learnt more in Google than I did at any other point in my career, in my life for that matter because there was so much going on, by the time I left Google there was over 10,000 people. And I left Google to start WeatherBill. そして、WeatherBillを開始するためにGoogleを離れました。 So let me tell you the story.

In 2002 I used to drive past the - down the Embarcadero to get on the 280 to go to work. 2002年に、私はエンバカデロを通り過ぎて280に乗り、仕事に行くのが常でした。 Sorry, to get on the 280 then 101 to go to work in Foster City. I mean it’s a drive past this place called The Bike Hut, it’s right next to AT&T Park on the Embarcadero. つまり、エンバカデロのAT&Tパークのすぐ隣にあるバイクハットと呼ばれるこの場所を通り過ぎたドライブです。 And they rent bicycles to tourists and they ride them around on the waterfront. そして彼らは観光客に自転車を借りてウォーターフロントを走り回っています。 And at the time when I was doing investment banking, you know, I was learning about finance and I was learning about business and how managers think about their P&L, and their operating and their income statements and so on. そして、私が投資銀行業務を行っていたとき、私は金融について学び、ビジネスについて、そして経営者が彼らのP&Lについてどのように考えているか、そして彼らの営業と損益計算書などについて学びました。 And every day it was raining, The Bike Hut would be closed. そして、雨が降っていた毎日、バイクハットは閉鎖されていました。 So the guy wouldn’t even come in and open up shop because tourists aren’t renting bikes and riding around in the rain. それで、観光客が自転車を借りたり、雨の中を走り回ったりしていないので、男は入って店を開くことさえしませんでした。 So the dude didn’t even show up to work. それで、男は仕事に現れさえしませんでした。 And I thought that’s a pretty crappy business, like whether or not this guy is going to make money in a given month it’s based on how many days it rains. そして、それはかなりくだらないビジネスだと思いました。たとえば、この男が特定の月にお金を稼ぐかどうかは、雨が降る日数に基づいています。 And so you start to think well that’s actually a big problem. そして、あなたはそれが実際には大きな問題であるとよく考え始めます。 Do you ever go to the movie theater on a Sunday when it’s raining? 雨が降っている日曜日に映画館に行くことはありますか? There’s like so many people in the movie theatre and the coffee shops are packed when it’s raining. 映画館にはたくさんの人がいて、雨が降ると喫茶店は満員になります。 No one goes to the ski resorts when it’s warm and it hasn’t snowed. So like you start to think about it and it turns out that - and I love the statistic, this is our big number, the 70% of businesses are affected by the weather every year. ですから、あなたがそれについて考え始めて、それが判明したように-そして私は統計が大好きです、これは私たちの大きな数です、企業の70%は毎年天気の影響を受けています。 So years later when I was at Google, I came back to this idea about sort of all the world’s businesses affected by the weather, maybe there is something they can do about it. それで、数年後、私がグーグルにいたとき、私は天気の影響を受けた世界のすべてのビジネスの種類についてこの考えに戻りました、多分彼らがそれについてできることがあるかもしれません。

And we can sell coverage to pay them if bad weather happens, making it easier for them to run and manage their businesses. また、悪天候が発生した場合に補償を販売して支払いを行うことができるため、ビジネスの運営と管理が容易になります。 70% of the world’s businesses, you know, $4 trillion of the GDP in the United States each year and at the time I was working at Google, working on AdWords and this idea of sort of taking lots of data and being able to extract signal from it and determine some sort of fee or charge that one would make to a customer in the case of Google advertisers could apply here. 世界のビジネスの70%、ご存知のとおり、米国では毎年4兆ドルのGDPがあり、私がGoogleで働いていたときは、AdWordsと、大量のデータを取得して信号を抽出できるというこのアイデアに取り組んでいました。それから、Googleの広告主がここで適用できる場合に顧客に支払うであろうある種の料金または料金を決定します。 We could analyze weather data, we could determine the probability of future weather events occurring and we could sell you coverage that would pay you if bad weather were to happen to your business. 気象データを分析し、将来の気象イベントが発生する可能性を判断し、悪天候がビジネスに発生した場合に支払う補償範囲を販売することができます。 And so if you know that the bad weather is going to cause a loss of $100, well then you want to get paid $100 when that bad weather happens. したがって、悪天候によって100ドルの損失が発生することがわかっている場合は、悪天候が発生したときに100ドルの支払いを受けたいと考えています。 And so we will give you a price to cover that because we will be able to figure out the probable - the probability of that event occurring and we will charge you an appropriate charge to cover you. そして、その可能性を把握できるため、それをカバーするための価格を提供します。そのイベントが発生する可能性を把握し、適切な料金を請求します。 And there’s no claims process or proof of loss because we can monitor the weather, there is all these data feeds available now. また、天気を監視できるため、請求プロセスや損失の証明はありません。これらすべてのデータフィードが現在利用可能です。 So choose a weather station where we have a data feed and we will monitor the weather automatically and we will trigger a check to you if it happens. したがって、データフィードがある気象観測所を選択すると、気象が自動的に監視され、発生した場合はチェックがトリガーされます。 So big problem, huge global market opportunity. とても大きな問題、巨大なグローバル市場の機会。

The first step was building a basic sort of prototype. So this was our first prototype, can you see that okay? これが私たちの最初のプロトタイプでした、あなたはそれを大丈夫見ることができますか? Yeah, cool. It’s pretty good looking website. So I wrote a prototype - the first thing I did was buy some weather data. So you got to - we bought some weather data for about 200 stations and we got availability on feeds into those 200 weather stations. つまり、約200の気象観測所の気象データを購入し、それらの200の気象観測所へのフィードを利用できるようになりました。 So we can now monitor 200 weather stations and we knew what the history was going back 30 years. これで、200の気象観測所を監視できるようになり、30年前の歴史を知ることができました。 And so the first pricing engine was written in R. Everyone here are familiar with R, right, so it’s like open source, you can thread a Java Connector and then you can write a front-end app, now you’ve got a website that uses R to price stuff. And so we were able to use the data that we had bought and so when you typed in the dates of coverage you wanted and choose your weather station and say what do you want to get paid for? そして、購入したデータを使用することができたので、希望するカバレッジの日付を入力し、気象観測所を選択して、何に対して支払いをしたいかを言いますか? I want to get paid $1,000 every day it rains more than a quarter inch as measured at the Stanford Campus. スタンフォードキャンパスで測定した場合、4分の1インチ以上の雨が降ると、毎日1,000ドルの支払いを受けたいと思っています。 So we would take the appropriate weather data, look at the last 30 years of history, get a distribution, fit a distribution model to the empirical data and we will be able to use that to calculate the expected loss on that product and be able to figure out what we should charge you to cover you against that occurring. したがって、適切な気象データを取得し、過去30年間の履歴を調べ、分布を取得し、分布モデルを経験的データに適合させると、それを使用してその製品の期待損失を計算し、次のことができるようになります。その発生に対してあなたをカバーするために私たちがあなたに請求すべきものを理解してください。 So that was the very simplistic prototype and we could use that to then go and ask people for money to start this business. これは非常に単純なプロトタイプであり、それを使用して、このビジネスを開始するために人々にお金を要求することができました。 So the first guy to give us money was a guy named Danny Rimer who works at a venture fund called Index Ventures.

He wrote us a check for $300,000 which I then was able to quit Google and go and say comfortable enough to do this. 彼は私たちに$300,000の小切手を書いてくれましたが、それから私はGoogleを辞めて、これを行うのに十分快適だと言うことができました。 And when I quit Google I left a lot of stock on the table and a lot of money behind and I didn’t have a lot of money at the time and it was kind of like, well, you know, why not, like let’s just take advantage of this opportunity we have in life and when you’re presented with opportunities where you feel you can make a really big impact, it’s worth doing it in light of the sort of comfort of not doing it. そして、グーグルを辞めたとき、私はテーブルにたくさんの株とたくさんのお金を残しました、そして私はその時たくさんのお金を持っていませんでした、そしてそれは一種の、まあ、あなたが知っている、なぜそうではないか、私たちが人生で持っているこの機会を利用するだけで、本当に大きな影響を与えることができると感じる機会が与えられたとき、それをしないという一種の快適さを考慮して、それを行う価値があります。 So the first step was to raise more money because $300,000 was enough to get things going, but to hire folks to work for us and try and recruit them we needed to raise a Series A round or a seed round of funding from angel investors. ですから、最初のステップは、物事を進めるのに30万ドルで十分だったので、より多くの資金を調達することでしたが、私たちのために働く人々を雇い、彼らを募集するために、シリーズAラウンドまたはエンジェル投資家からの資金のシードラウンドを調達する必要がありました。 So we went across the Silicon Valley, Sand Hill Road and all the VCs that we met with said no, including some who are now investors in the company many years later. そこで、シリコンバレー、サンドヒルロード、そして会ったすべてのベンチャーキャピタルを横断しました。その中には、何年も後に会社に投資している人も含まれます。 You can never hold a grudge in Silicon Valley. シリコンバレーでは決して恨みを抱くことはできません。 There is always smile and say I will take your check, thank you very much. いつも笑顔でチェックしてみようと言ってくれてありがとうございます。 So we completely failed at raising money. だから私たちは完全にお金を集めることに失敗しました。

Because when we went to these VCs they were like, we are going to start this business that pays people for bad weather and they can choose the weather they want to get paid for and we will figure out the probability and we will cover them. 私たちがこれらのVCに行ったとき、彼らはそうだったので、私たちは人々に悪天候の代金を支払うこのビジネスを開始し、彼らが支払いたい天気を選択できるので、確率を計算してそれらをカバーします。 Like that is not an X for Y business. そのように、XforYビジネスではありません。 I call them X for Y, it’s like Groupon for moms, like it’s a lot easier for people to understand something in the context of how they’re already operating when the context of other business models are in the context of how things operate today. 私はそれらをXforYと呼んでいます。これは、他のビジネスモデルのコンテキストが今日の動作のコンテキストにあるときに、人々がすでに動作しているコンテキストのコンテキストで何かを理解するのがはるかに簡単であるように、ママのGrouponのようなものです。 So to sort of come at this from a fundamental problem with what we think is a good technology solution was sort of a little bit challenging to sell. ですから、これを、優れたテクノロジーソリューションであると私たちが考える根本的な問題から解決することは、販売するのが少し難しいことでした。 And granted, we probably weren’t doing a good job selling at the time and over time we refined the pitch and we refined the story and this is a completely greenfield, no one knows what’s going to happen with what we’re doing. 確かに、当時は売り込みがうまくいかなかった可能性があり、時間の経過とともにピッチを洗練し、ストーリーを洗練しました。これは完全にグリーンフィールドであり、私たちがやっていることで何が起こるかは誰にもわかりません。 So luckily I knew a lot of people that had a lot of money because I had worked at Google and company had gone public and people had done well. 幸運なことに、私はグーグルで働いていて、会社が公開され、人々がうまくやっていたので、たくさんのお金を持っている多くの人々を知っていました。 So I raised money from them. And so we raised about $2 million from what I would call angel investor friends and we started this thing and later on Index Ventures and NEA gave us another $2 million note and we sort of - we are able to start hiring people. そして、私がエンジェル投資家の友人と呼ぶものから約200万ドルを調達し、このことを始めました。その後、インデックスベンチャーズで、NEAからさらに200万ドルのメモが届きました。そうすれば、人を雇うことができます。 So this was our launch. これが私たちの立ち上げでした。

We launched in January of 2007, this is the best picture I could find. 2007年1月にローンチしました。これは私が見つけた中で最高の写真です。 I did a Google image search for phone booth in the middle of a field because that sort of what it felt like, right. フィールドの真ん中で電話ブースをグーグルで画像検索したのは、そういう感じだったからです。 We did this great big build, right. 私たちはこの素晴らしい大きなビルドを行いました。 We were like 24x7, no sleep for months before we launched in January of 2007. 私たちは24時間年中無休で、2007年1月にローンチするまで何ヶ月も眠りませんでした。 And the idea was we would put that great website you just saw, made it available to the world and the 70% of businesses that had problems with the weather or were exposed to the weather would all show up and they would finally say, finally I’m a lemonade stand owner, I’ve always wanted to buy this product, I’m still glad you put the WeatherBill website up. そして、あなたが今見た素晴らしいウェブサイトを世界中に公開し、天気に問題がある、または天気にさらされた企業の70%がすべて表示され、最終的に私が言うというアイデアでした。私はレモネードスタンドの所有者です。私はいつもこの製品を購入したいと思っていました。WeatherBillのWebサイトを公開していただきありがとうございます。 Let me pull out my credit card. クレジットカードを抜かせてください。 And they would start buying stuff. So no one bought. At the time we also had to do a lot of learning about regulatory stuff. 当時、私たちは規制に関することについても多くのことを学ばなければなりませんでした。 So we met with the CFTC and lawyers and we’re like we didn’t have insurance paper, that’s a whole another multi day lecture about how insurance works. それで、私たちはCFTCと弁護士に会いました、そして私たちは保険証書を持っていなかったようです、それは保険がどのように機能するかについての全く別の数日間の講義です。 And it’s a painful lesson we have all had to learn, but we wrote these products as derivative contracts. そして、それは私たち全員が学ばなければならなかった苦痛な教訓ですが、私たちはこれらの製品をデリバティブ契約として書きました。 Over the counter derivatives, the thing that blew up the economy, that sort of what everyone calls it now. 店頭デリバティブ、経済を爆破したもの、そのようなものは今では誰もがそれを呼んでいます。 But at the time it was like efficient stuff. しかし、当時は効率的なもののようでした。 So we used these over the counter derivatives, and we had to figure out how to make all this stuff work. したがって、これらを店頭証券で使用し、これらすべてを機能させる方法を理解する必要がありました。 So there was a lot of plumbing involved in pulling this whole business together with a big sort of launch out to the world. そのため、このビジネス全体をまとめて、世界に向けて大規模なローンチを行うには、多くの配管工事が必要でした。 We moved from 200 stations to 400 stations. 200駅から400駅に移動しました。 So, now you could measure the weather at 400 different places, it’s amazing. We went to industry conferences and learnt about what was going on in the weather-derivatives market, which is used by energy companies and so on and so forth. 業界の会議に行って、エネルギー会社などで使われている天候デリバティブ市場で何が起こっているのかを学びました。 So, in that first year, after no one came to the website to buy coverage, I was sort of along with the rest of our early team of endeavourers, pioneers, cold calling businesses in all these different industries, like why aren’t you buying, so, hey, Mr. Construction Company, doesn’t it cause delays in your operations when it rains or hey, Mr. Farmer like if there is a freeze, you’re going to lose your entire citrus crop, right? それで、その最初の年に、誰もカバレッジを購入するためにWebサイトにアクセスしなかった後、私は、これらのさまざまな業界のすべての努力者、開拓者、コールドコールビジネスの初期のチームの残りの人たちと一緒にいました。購入するので、建設会社さん、雨が降ったり、雨が降ったりすると、作業が遅れることはありませんか。ファーマーさんは、凍結した場合、柑橘類全体を失うことになりますよね?

And you start to end up in these consultative dialogs with these potential customers. そして、あなたはこれらの潜在的な顧客とのこれらの協議の対話に行き着き始めます。 And cold calling was something that I would say is sort of a critical, something you shouldn’t be afraid to do if you’re dealing with customers because you’re going to have to do it to understand what your customers want. そして、コールドコールは一種の重要なことであり、顧客が何を望んでいるかを理解するためにそれをしなければならないので、顧客と取引している場合は恐れてはいけないことです。 So, through this process we realized, well, there are people that want this and we’re able to close some sales, but every single one of them we’re having to say, well, tell me the weather that affects you, and then they’ll give you whole story, then you do an analysis for them and then you run the price. ですから、このプロセスを通じて、私たちはこれを望んでいる人々がいて、いくつかの販売を閉じることができることに気づきましたが、私たちが言わなければならないのは、あなたに影響を与える天気を教えてください、そしてそれから彼らはあなたに全体の話をします、そしてあなたは彼らのために分析をし、そしてあなたは価格を実行します。 So, we were using our own website to sell products to people that wouldn’t go to our website because there was a whole bunch of handholding and positioning and the technology work, but at the end of the day we hadn’t productized yet. ですから、私たちは自分のウェブサイトを使って、手持ちやポジショニング、テクノロジーの仕事がたくさんあったためにウェブサイトにアクセスしない人々に製品を販売していましたが、結局のところ、まだ製品化されていませんでした。 We clearly just had a proof-of-technology. 私たちは明らかに技術の証明を持っていました。 So, the next year we ended up being - what was the guy, that Yahoo! それで、翌年、私たちは結局、そのヤフー!

Peanut Butter - we were like spread very thin. ピーナッツバター-私たちは非常に薄く広がったようでした。 So, we were trying to sell into all these different markets, travel companies, energy companies, how do we make this thing work, like can we get travel companies to give rain free guarantees to all their customers you know, negotiations getting on planes flying back and forth, meeting with all the online travel agencies. それで、私たちはこれらのさまざまな市場、旅行会社、エネルギー会社すべてに売り込もうとしていました。旅行会社にあなたが知っているすべての顧客に雨のない保証を与えることができるように、どのようにこれを機能させることができますか、飛行機での交渉が飛んでいます前後に、すべてのオンライン旅行代理店と会う。 We almost got a deal. 私たちはほとんど取引をしました。 We’re almost there. That’s not really going to work. So, we’ve got to back off of that market. ですから、私たちはその市場から撤退しなければなりません。 Ski resorts, you know, can we get all those ski resorts to buy, well, we make snow and people will show up, we’ll make money other way as well. スキーリゾート、あなたが知っている、私たちはそれらすべてのスキーリゾートを買わせることができますか、まあ、私たちは雪を作り、人々が現れるでしょう、私たちは他の方法でもお金を稼ぐでしょう。 So, we learnt a lot about customers in different markets, but we didn’t get deep enough to provide a solution to a customer at any given market. So, in 2009, we made the decision to focus the entire business around agriculture.

And we’re really lucky that we raised a ton of money in our first year of business. After that first year, where I was cold calling all those businesses, we were able to close a couple of million dollars of sales. And so for a startup during the Web 2.0 heyday to actually make a couple of million dollars in their first year of business was a big deal, despite the fact that a lot of people didn’t fully understand or comprehend or care about what we were doing, just you made money and you are a Web 2.0 company, you can get a big check. そのため、Web 2.0の全盛期のスタートアップにとって、ビジネスの最初の年に実際に数百万ドルを稼ぐことは、多くの人々が私たちが何であるかを完全に理解または理解または気にかけていなかったという事実にもかかわらず、大したことでした。そうすれば、あなたがお金を稼ぎ、あなたがWeb 2.0の会社であるだけで、大きなチェックを受けることができます。 So, we raised money. And that money afforded us the ability to make a lot of mistakes. And a lot of mistakes were really required for us to figure out what could work as a business. 2009, we were seeing our cash go down. 2009年、私たちは現金が下がるのを見ていました。

And we hadn’t yet built a model in any market where we could scale the business. So, we said, let’s make a bet, the bet is we’re going to focus on agriculture. だから、私たちは賭けをしましょう、賭けは私たちが農業に焦点を当てるつもりだと言いました。 We’re going on focus on farmers, because if we do this the right way, we’ll be able to build a product that we can sell to farmers over and over again. And this is the market that we felt at the time provided the best opportunity for us to build a scalable business. And Greg Smirin, our Chief Revenue Officer, joined us around this time and helped lead this effort for us. Big learning was when Greg came onboard and really made us diligent about this approach, just how little we knew and how little focus we had at the time in solving the right problems. 大きな学びは、グレッグが参加し、このアプローチについて本当に熱心に取り組んだときでした。私たちが知っていたことがどれだけ少なく、適切な問題を解決するためにその時点で焦点を合わせていなかったのです。 And so, in 2009, we started selling the specific products to farmers. そこで、2009年から農家への販売を開始しました。 We moved to 14,000 grids as opposed to 400 stations because we realized no one cares about the rainfall 150 miles away, they want the rainfall to be measured at their location. 150マイル離れた場所の降雨量を気にする人がいないことに気付いたため、400のステーションではなく、14,000のグリッドに移動しました。彼らは、その場所で降雨量を測定することを望んでいます。 That was a big reason a lot of people weren’t buying. And so that’s really where we understood at that point the focus of the technology that we build as a company. そして、それは私たちがその時点で私たちが会社として構築するテクノロジーの焦点を理解したところです。 Measure the weather more and more locally. ますますローカルで天気を測定します。 And today, we measure the weather using Doppler radar and satellite imagery and all sorts of things that can pinpoint the weather to your exact location and the technology scale at which we operate has become pretty substantial, but at the time that was a big move for us. そして今日、私たちはドップラーレーダーと衛星画像を使用して天気を測定し、天気を正確な場所に正確に特定できるあらゆる種類のものと、私たちが運用する技術規模はかなり大きくなっていますが、当時は大きな動きでした我ら。 And so, the ag products started to work and we realized that we needed to provide full season protection to farmers. So, none of us came from an agricultural background, none of us came from an insurance background, but it turns out, farmers won’t buy your product unless it’s written on insurance papers. ですから、私たちの誰もが農業のバックグラウンドから来たわけではなく、保険のバックグラウンドから来たわけでもありませんが、保険証書に書かれていない限り、農家はあなたの製品を購入しません。 So, we had to figure out how do we build an insurance company. ですから、どうやって保険会社を作るのかを考えなければなりませんでした。 And that was a lot of fun. Like I said, I’m going to leave that conversation off for another day, but we had to get all the regulatory approvals in all 51 jurisdictions in the United States for doing this, where you’re not actually sending an adjuster out to measure what happens to your farm we’re actually just writing your policy that says if this weather occurs, I’ll send you a check and how do we get that approved and how do we get an A rating on the product and how do we get the money and the reinsurance to back us and this all became a big hustle, but it worked. 私が言ったように、私はその会話を別の日に中断するつもりですが、これを行うために米国の51の管轄区域すべてですべての規制当局の承認を得る必要がありました。あなたの農場に何が起こるか私たちは実際にあなたのポリシーを書いているだけです。この天気が発生した場合、私はあなたに小切手を送ります、そして私たちはそれをどのように承認し、どのように製品のA評価を取得し、どのように取得しますか私たちを支援するためのお金と再保険、そしてこれはすべて大きな騒ぎになりましたが、それはうまくいきました。 And last year, we launched a program called Total Weather Insurance and we figured out a sales model that works, that scales, where people will buy the product every season and we can go out and close sale after sale after sale in a given day. そして昨年、Total Weather Insuranceというプログラムを立ち上げ、季節ごとに商品を購入し、特定の日に販売を終えて販売を終了できる、拡張性のある販売モデルを考案しました。

And so, we raised a bunch of money earlier this year based on the fact that our business was growing very quickly and we had a product that every farmer wanted to buy. There is 160 million acres of corn and soybeans planted just in the Midwest of the United States. 米国中西部には、1億6000万エーカーのトウモロコシと大豆が植えられています。 Our product costs $40 an acre. There’s $6 billion of revenue we’re going after and our close rate is very, very high. 私たちが追求している収益は60億ドルで、成約率は非常に高くなっています。 More than half of the farmers that are offered our product actually buy it because it’s something that we finally figured out to make a lot of value and makes a lot of sense for them and we can scale this business pretty substantially. So, we’re less than 30 people in Q1 of this year, and we’re now over 100 people, Eli our recent addition to the team, Stanford undergrad, joining in a couple of months. つまり、今年の第1四半期の人数は30人未満で、現在は100人を超えています。最近チームに加わったEliは、スタンフォード大学の学部生で、数か月で参加します。 And we’ve a revenue number now that’s in the tens of million of dollars per quarter. そして今では、四半期あたり数千万ドルの収益を上げています。 And the business is growing very quickly and the technology that we’re building is exciting. We’ve probably one of the largest - we’re probably the largest user of the Elastic MapReduce service at Amazon, which is basically Hadoop in the cloud. We’re simulating the weather on a two-by-two mile basis for the next 730 days, 10,000 times, covering the entire United States and then similarly on a grid basis covering the entire globe. 次の730日間、10,000回、2 x 2マイルベースで天気をシミュレートし、米国全体をカバーし、同様に全世界をカバーするグリッドベースでシミュレートします。 So, the scale of the data, which we operate, we monitor that weather and we update the simulations twice a day as new simulation models come out, has become pretty substantial and it gives us the ability to better service our clients and there is a whole sort of product mission around what we do. We’re renaming the company.

I was going to say it, but Greg has asked me not to. 私はそれを言うつもりでしたが、グレッグは私にそうしないように頼みました。 We are doing the renaming announcement next Tuesday. Five years later, we’re renaming the company, it’s crazy. So, I was perfectly happy doing this. This is one point because I think it speaks to how nimble one needs to be and how sort of brutally self-honest and self-aware you need to be as you go through this process. We’ve had to change what we are doing and how we are doing it many times over in the course of this - the development of this business. このビジネスの発展の過程で、私たちは自分たちがしていることとそれをどのように行っているかを何度も変えなければなりませんでした。 And it came to a point recently that the company may or may not be appropriate for what we are doing and the scope of the things that we’d like to do as an organization. そして最近、会社は私たちがしていることや組織としてやりたいことの範囲に適しているかもしれないし、そうでないかもしれないということがわかりました。 And so, let’s change the company name. Well, okay, that’s not off the table and we’ve found a great URL and we’re going to launch it on Tuesday next week with this great new company name. So, we didn’t hold any sort of personal, sort of, you know, I’m stuck on this name because it’s what I always wanted to build, it’s my business, it’s my baby, I can’t let go of it, you know, like every day is a new challenge and everyday there is a new solution to that problem. And as long as you keep living every day like that you’re going to progress and at some point you’re going to have success in your mission, but you cannot hold on to the things in the past and I tell my VCs and so on, you know, they introduced me as sort of the founder of the company. そして、あなたがそのように毎日生き続ける限り、あなたは進歩し、ある時点であなたはあなたの使命を成功させるでしょう、しかしあなたは過去のことを保持することはできません、そして私は私のVCなどに話しますで、あなたが知っている、彼らは会社の創設者のようなものとして私を紹介しました。 I’m like, founder isn’t really a role, it’s not really a title I like, I’m the CEO of the company today and I may not necessarily be the best CEO of the company tomorrow, and a lot of founders it’s for them, it’s very much like they cling on to that title because it’s what they’re doing, but it’s important to avoid it. 私は、創設者は実際には役割ではなく、私が好きな役職でもありません。私は今日の会社のCEOであり、明日は必ずしも会社の最高CEOになるとは限りません。多くの創設者は、彼らにとって、それは彼らがしていることなので、彼らがそのタイトルにしがみついているのと非常によく似ていますが、それを避けることが重要です。 So I want to talk a little bit about some of the learnings of the last couple of - I’m just checking your clock here, the last couple of years. それで、ここ数年の学習のいくつかについて少しお話ししたいと思います-ここ数年、ここであなたの時計をチェックしています。

So first one, doing a startup, I might alienate the - I don’t know, but I might alienate people with some of the things I’m going to say, but I’m just going to speak from the heart. だから最初に、スタートアップをやって、私は疎外するかもしれない-私は知らないが、私が言おうとしていることのいくつかで人々を疎外するかもしれない、しかし私はただ心から話すつもりだ。 The first one is, I hear a lot of people in Silicon Valley say, I’m going to go do a startup and similar in the vein of, I’m a serial entrepreneur, doing a startup has about as much meaning as saying I’m going to jump out off a plane. 1つ目は、シリコンバレーの多くの人が言うのを聞いています。私はスタートアップをするつもりです。私はシリアルアントレプレナーです。スタートアップをすることは、私と同じくらい意味があります。飛行機から飛び降りるつもりです。 What I mean by this is that doing a startup is really an activity or a way of organizing a group of people around a problem that they are trying to solve. これが意味するのは、スタートアップを行うことは、実際には、彼らが解決しようとしている問題の周りに人々のグループを組織化する活動または方法であるということです。 You don’t get a bunch of people together and say, hey, let’s all grab a couple of guns and maybe we’ll go find a dictator to kill. たくさんの人が集まって、「ねえ、みんなで銃をいくつか手に入れよう。殺すための独裁者を探しに行くかもしれない」と言うことはありません。 If there is a dictator to kill, you put together a team that’s most appropriate for taking that dictator out. 殺す独裁者がいる場合は、その独裁者を連れ出すのに最も適したチームを編成します。 Okay? It’s a terrible analogy, but I wanted to wake everyone up. それはひどいアナロジーですが、私はみんなを目覚めさせたかったのです。 Okay? And be controversial. そして物議を醸す。 So, the process of starting up a company to solve a problem is exactly that, I’m starting up a company to solve this specific problem. ですから、問題を解決するために会社を立ち上げるプロセスはまさにそれです。私はこの特定の問題を解決するために会社を立ち上げています。 So, the way I’m going to go back doing it, the people that are going to help me do it, is really dependent on the problem. ですから、私がそれをやり直す方法、私がそれをするのを手伝ってくれる人々は、本当に問題に依存しています。 It’s not an exercise in an activity stream that I’d like to undertake of getting my ass-kicked every day, not getting paid enough, suffering through years of misery and maybe you all find a problem to solve. 毎日お尻を蹴られたり、十分な給料が支払われなかったり、何年にもわたる惨めさで苦しんだり、解決すべき問題を見つけたりすることを私が引き受けたいのは、活動の流れの中での運動ではありません。 And that’s why I say it’s a candid thing, I’m going to go jump out of the plane. The second one is that I hear or there is a sense in my limited exposure to the sort of - what I call the rock star motif of what entrepreneurism is, in - especially in Silicon Valley, and it’s good. 2つ目は、特にシリコンバレーで、ある種の、つまり起業家精神のロックスターモチーフと呼んでいるものへの限られた露出に感覚があるということです。それは良いことです。

I mean there is a culture of taking leaps and doing big exciting things here and you’re an important person if you do that. ここには飛躍して大きなエキサイティングなことをする文化があり、そうするならあなたは重要な人物です。 But just being an entrepreneur does not make one a rock star. しかし、起業家であるだけでは、ロックスターになるわけではありません。 The odds of the guy - or being the guy on the left are according to a study and I put the URL up there, 0.0006%, that’s the odds of - I’m starting up a company and having the company be worth more than a billion dollars. その男のオッズ-または左側の男であるということは調査によるものであり、私はそこにURLを0.0006%入れました、それはのオッズです-私は会社を立ち上げており、会社に1以上の価値がある十億ドル。 However, all of the press coverage and all of the attention at Silicon Valley goes to the guy on the left. しかし、すべての報道とシリコンバレーでの注目はすべて左側の男に向けられています。 The person on the right is the status quo, your typical entrepreneur, your typical Silicon Valley startup team looks like the person on the right. 右側の人は現状、あなたの典型的な起業家、あなたの典型的なシリコンバレーのスタートアップチームは右側の人のように見えます。 There is a reason I look like I’m 50, and I’m only 31 years old, okay? The probability of being the person on the right is greater than 99%. 右側の人である確率は99%以上です。 And so, I would say, don’t do a startup and don’t try and solve a problem via a startup, if your goal is to have the status of the rock star entrepreneur because it is a false premise. ですから、もしあなたの目標がロックスターの起業家の地位を持つことであるなら、それは誤った前提であるため、スタートアップをしたり、スタートアップを介して問題を解決しようとしたりしないでください。 The financial reward or the opportunity cost of doing a startup is very high. スタートアップを行うことの金銭的報酬または機会費用は非常に高いです。 This is from that same study that I just used. There are a lot of engineers here, I’m assuming 100% of you will have the ability to interview for a job at Google when you graduate, and if you were to get a job at Google when you graduate, the anecdotal evidence suggests that your first year salary would be about $105,000 this year. ここには多くのエンジニアがいます。卒業時に100%の人がGoogleで面接できると思います。卒業時にGoogleに就職した場合、事例証拠は次のことを示唆しています。今年の初年度の給与は約105,000ドルになります。 If you were to start a company and raise money from a venture capitalist and you were then able to sell that company or take that company public, your median time to doing that will be 49 months. あなたが会社を立ち上げてベンチャーキャピタリストから資金を調達し、その会社を売却したり、その会社を公開したりすることができた場合、それを行うまでの期間の中央値は49か月になります。 And assuming three founders, your median expected payoff to the founders will be about $300,000 each, which works out to an annualized salary equivalent of $73,000. そして、3人の創設者を想定すると、創設者への期待される見返りの中央値は、それぞれ約300,000ドルになります。これは、年俸73,000ドルに相当します。 And the probability that you actually make no money is 67%. そして、あなたが実際にお金を稼がない確率は67%です。