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PBS NewsHour (Nov to Dec 2017), Dec 12, 2017 - The long-term global consequences of Trump’s Jerusalem move

Dec 12, 2017 - The long-term global consequences of Trump's Jerusalem move

Judy Woodruff:

Last week, President Trump declared Jerusalem the capital of Israel and promised to move the U.S. Embassy, currently in Tel Aviv, to the Holy City.

The announcement overturned decades of U.S. policy, but it was met with less outrage than many feared.

Now, how the decision may echo in the region and beyond, and to special correspondent Nick Schifrin. Nick Schifrin:

Judy, the president's announcement was dramatic, but the immediate response has been relatively muted. That doesn't mean, though, there aren't longer-term strategic consequences. To consider that, I'm joined here in the studio by Paul Salem. He's the senior vice president for policy analysis, research and programs at the Middle East Institute. And Ryan Crocker, who served as ambassador to six countries across the Middle East and South Asia, he joins us from Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School, where he is diplomat in residence. Paul, it seems that there are a couple reasons that we haven't seen more violence. One of them perhaps, all politics are local, in this region as well, and also maybe it's not a surprise that the U.S. supports Israel, right? Paul Salem:

Yes.

I mean, first of all, it wouldn't be correct to measure the long-term impact by the amount of protests and violence. In the Palestinian communities, both in Gaza and the West Bank, Palestinians are exhausted. They have been dispirited for a long time. They had very little hopes that there actually was a peace process.

This was very aggravating for them, but doesn't come as a big surprise. And they — many of them don't think having another violent intifada will get them any further. In the Arab world, there's a lot of sympathy for the Palestinian cause, and this issue of Jerusalem has sparked a lot of emotions and some protests. But most Arabs are also mired in their own domestic problems, their domestic politics. The big uprisings of 2011 were really about domestic issues, so people care, but they don't want to ruin their own country or have a revolution because of it. And the final part, which is Iran and its allies, Hezbollah and so on, who have been organizing protests also don't want them to get out of hand or turn violent, because they are pretty happy with the way things are. Nick Schifrin:

So, Ambassador Crocker, perhaps not only a little Palestinian fatigue, but also perhaps regional fatigue? Ryan Crocker:

These things can take a long time to manifest themselves.

So, I wouldn't immediately rush to the conclusion that, well, this issue is no longer significant, there wasn't any violence. I think that significance may only come clear in the months ahead. Nick Schifrin:

No, and actually quite the opposite. What I think we're talking about is those longer-term strategic influences or impacts. So, Paul Salem, one of them seems to be on the peace process. But it's not just the peace process, the effect. It's about impacts for the larger region, isn't it? Paul Salem:

Right.

The impact on the peace process, the peace process really wasn't going anywhere, most probably, but this really maybe puts an end to even the semblance of having a peace process. It also, in the Palestinian context, weakens President Abbas, who would have been any partner even for stabilization, and strengthens Hamas, who has now called for a third intifada.

In the wider Middle East, it undermines and weakens America's partners, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and others who have worked with the U.S. on issues relating to Iran, but also were hopeful that there would be a peace plan they could be part of. It weakens and undermines them.

The ones perhaps who are happiest, other than the Israeli government itself, which certainly is very happy, are Iran and its allies and Russia's President Putin. We saw President Putin immediately take a victory lap, visiting Syria, Egypt, and Turkey all in one day, denouncing the Jerusalem decision, while also declaring victory in Syria and other places.

And it's been a great gift to Iran and Hezbollah, who have wanted to change the narrative from the carnage of Syria, which they have been embroiled in, to reviving the issue of Jerusalem, which is a very evocative issue, and pose as the champions of Jerusalem. So, they're in a middle of a rebranding. And this couldn't have come at a better time for them. Nick Schifrin:

So Ambassador Crocker, is that right? Does this help Russia? Does this help Iran? Does this make it a little more difficult for the Sunni Arab states in the region who President Trump has wanted to ally with to ally with him in the future? Ryan Crocker:

I'm not sure it will have that much impact. Jordan and Egypt, the two Arab states with peace agreements with Israel, have survived worse shocks than this.

I would watch Saudi Arabia, though. I do not expect to see significant criticism coming out of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, again, for the reasons Paul was talking about. They have other more immediate issues that concern them, like where the kingdom is going in general. Yemen, Iran, these are the issues that are occupying the bandwidth, not Jerusalem. Nick Schifrin:

And I think it's important to also broaden out the discussion and ask whether the impact will actually be felt beyond the region. On Friday, the United Nations Security Council held an extraordinary session in which they actually called an emergency session thanks to something the United States has done.

And let's listen now to Matthew Rycroft — he's the British permanent representative to the U.N. — criticizing President Trump and the United States. Matthew Rycroft:

We disagree with the U.S. decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and to begin preparation to move the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

It is not in line with Security Council resolutions, and is unhelpful in terms of prospects for peace in the region. Nick Schifrin:

So, Paul Salem, is one of the long-term impacts actually less on the region and more the U.S. relationship with the rest of the world? Paul Salem:

I do think so. And I think it's in line with a set of policy decisions that President Trump has taken to kind of dismantle American global leadership, whether by design or by instinct, on issues of climate change, the Pacific trade agreement. And this decision violates decades of U.S. policy, violates U.N. Security Council resolution, violates international law, in the sense that he's recognizing, at least in East Jerusalem, territory that was occupied by force in 1967, and doing it in a way that clearly flaunts any idea of consultation beforehand or working with allies. It seems to be part of how President Trump and some of his advisers seem to view America's role in the world. Nick Schifrin:

Ambassador Crocker, is that how you see it, a lack of U.S. leadership and other countries stepping into a vacuum? Ryan Crocker:

Well, clearly, the U.S. has been backing away from its traditional leadership role.

I would have to point out, though, it didn't start with President Trump. It started with President Obama. So we kind of — and we saw that most clearly, I think, with the refugee crisis, where we just were not a player.

So, yes, the backing away is — it's real, and it's potentially quite significant. And I'm sure that the French and the British will try to step into this. But there's another bigger question there. Can they do it? And I would have to suggest that neither Britain nor France nor the two together can be an adequate substitute for the role.

There are voices now coming out of the region saying, OK, we get it. No more two-state, two-capital solutions. It will be one state, one capital, with guaranteed equal rights for all of its people.

But I think you may see some fairly dramatic things said in the months ahead. Nick Schifrin:

Ambassador Ryan Crocker joining us from Princeton University, and Paul Salem from the Middle East Institute, thank you very much to you both. Paul Salem:

Thank you, Nick. Ryan Crocker:

Thank you.


Dec 12, 2017 - The long-term global consequences of Trump’s Jerusalem move 12. Dezember 2017 - Die langfristigen globalen Folgen von Trumps Jerusalem-Bewegung Dec 12, 2017 - Las consecuencias globales a largo plazo de la medida de Trump sobre Jerusalén 12 décembre 2017 - Les conséquences mondiales à long terme du déménagement de Trump à Jérusalem 12 dic 2017 - Le conseguenze globali a lungo termine della mossa di Trump su Gerusalemme. 2017年12月12日 - トランプ大統領のエルサレム移転がもたらす長期的な世界的影響 12 grudnia 2017 r. - Długoterminowe globalne konsekwencje ruchu Trumpa w Jerozolimie 12 dez 2017 - As consequências globais a longo prazo da mudança de Trump para Jerusalém Dec 12, 2017 - Долгосрочные глобальные последствия переезда Трампа в Иерусалим 12 Aralık 2017 - Trump'ın Kudüs hamlesinin uzun vadeli küresel sonuçları 12 грудня 2017 - Довгострокові глобальні наслідки кроку Трампа щодо Єрусалиму 2017 年 12 月 12 日 - 特朗普耶路撒冷之举的长期全球后果 2017 年 12 月 12 日 - 特朗普耶路撒冷之举的长期全球后果

Judy Woodruff:

Last week, President Trump declared Jerusalem the capital of Israel and promised to move the U.S. Embassy, currently in Tel Aviv, to the Holy City.

The announcement overturned decades of U.S. L'annonce a renversé des décennies de policy, but it was met with less outrage than many feared. politique, mais elle a suscité moins d'indignation que beaucoup ne le craignaient.

Now, how the decision may echo in the region and beyond, and to special correspondent Nick Schifrin. Maintenant, comment la décision peut faire écho dans la région et au-delà, et au correspondant spécial Nick Schifrin. Nick Schifrin:

Judy, the president's announcement was dramatic, but the immediate response has been relatively muted. That doesn't mean, though, there aren't longer-term strategic consequences. To consider that, I'm joined here in the studio by Paul Salem. He's the senior vice president for policy analysis, research and programs at the Middle East Institute. Il est vice-président senior pour l'analyse des politiques, la recherche et les programmes au Middle East Institute. And Ryan Crocker, who served as ambassador to six countries across the Middle East and South Asia, he joins us from Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School, where he is diplomat in residence. Et Ryan Crocker, qui a été ambassadeur dans six pays du Moyen-Orient et d'Asie du Sud, il nous rejoint depuis la Woodrow Wilson School de Princeton, où il est diplomate en résidence. Paul, it seems that there are a couple reasons that we haven't seen more violence. One of them perhaps, all politics are local, in this region as well, and also maybe it's not a surprise that the U.S. L'un d'eux peut-être, toutes les politiques sont locales, dans cette région également, et il n'est peut-être pas surprenant que les États-Unis supports Israel, right? Paul Salem:

Yes.

I mean, first of all, it wouldn't be correct to measure the long-term impact by the amount of protests and violence. In the Palestinian communities, both in Gaza and the West Bank, Palestinians are exhausted. They have been dispirited for a long time. Ils sont découragés depuis longtemps. They had very little hopes that there actually was a peace process. Ils avaient très peu d'espoir qu'il y ait réellement un processus de paix.

This was very aggravating for them, but doesn't come as a big surprise. And they — many of them don't think having another violent intifada will get them any further. Et ils - beaucoup d'entre eux ne pensent pas qu'une autre Intifada violente les fera avancer. In the Arab world, there's a lot of sympathy for the Palestinian cause, and this issue of Jerusalem has sparked a lot of emotions and some protests. But most Arabs are also mired in their own domestic problems, their domestic politics. The big uprisings of 2011 were really about domestic issues, so people care, but they don't want to ruin their own country or have a revolution because of it. And the final part, which is Iran and its allies, Hezbollah and so on, who have been organizing protests also don't want them to get out of hand or turn violent, because they are pretty happy with the way things are. Nick Schifrin:

So, Ambassador Crocker, perhaps not only a little Palestinian fatigue, but also perhaps regional fatigue? Ryan Crocker:

These things can take a long time to manifest themselves.

So, I wouldn't immediately rush to the conclusion that, well, this issue is no longer significant, there wasn't any violence. Donc, je ne me précipiterais pas immédiatement sur la conclusion que, eh bien, ce problème n'est plus significatif, il n'y a pas eu de violence. I think that significance may only come clear in the months ahead. Je pense que cette signification ne peut devenir claire que dans les mois à venir. Nick Schifrin:

No, and actually quite the opposite. Non, et en fait tout le contraire. What I think we're talking about is those longer-term strategic influences or impacts. Je pense que nous parlons de ces influences ou impacts stratégiques à plus long terme. So, Paul Salem, one of them seems to be on the peace process. But it's not just the peace process, the effect. It's about impacts for the larger region, isn't it? Paul Salem:

Right.

The impact on the peace process, the peace process really wasn't going anywhere, most probably, but this really maybe puts an end to even the semblance of having a peace process. L'impact sur le processus de paix, le processus de paix n'allait vraiment nulle part, très probablement, mais cela met peut-être fin à même le semblant d'avoir un processus de paix. It also, in the Palestinian context, weakens President Abbas, who would have been any partner even for stabilization, and strengthens Hamas, who has now called for a third intifada. Cela affaiblit également, dans le contexte palestinien, le président Abbas, qui aurait été n'importe quel partenaire même pour la stabilisation, et renforce le Hamas, qui a maintenant appelé à une troisième Intifada.

In the wider Middle East, it undermines and weakens America's partners, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and others who have worked with the U.S. Au Moyen-Orient élargi, cela sape et affaiblit les partenaires de l'Amérique, l'Égypte, l'Arabie saoudite, les Émirats arabes unis, Bahreïn et d'autres qui ont travaillé avec les États-Unis. on issues relating to Iran, but also were hopeful that there would be a peace plan they could be part of. sur les questions relatives à l'Iran, mais espéraient également qu'il y aurait un plan de paix auquel ils pourraient participer. It weakens and undermines them.

The ones perhaps who are happiest, other than the Israeli government itself, which certainly is very happy, are Iran and its allies and Russia's President Putin. We saw President Putin immediately take a victory lap, visiting Syria, Egypt, and Turkey all in one day, denouncing the Jerusalem decision, while also declaring victory in Syria and other places. Nous avons vu le président Poutine faire immédiatement le tour de la victoire, visitant la Syrie, l'Égypte et la Turquie en une seule journée, dénonçant la décision de Jérusalem, tout en déclarant la victoire en Syrie et ailleurs.

And it's been a great gift to Iran and Hezbollah, who have wanted to change the narrative from the carnage of Syria, which they have been embroiled in, to reviving the issue of Jerusalem, which is a very evocative issue, and pose as the champions of Jerusalem. Et cela a été un grand cadeau pour l'Iran et le Hezbollah, qui ont voulu changer le récit du carnage de la Syrie, dans lequel ils ont été mêlés, pour relancer la question de Jérusalem, qui est une question très évocatrice, et se poser en champions de Jérusalem. So, they're in a middle of a rebranding. Donc, ils sont au milieu d'un changement de marque. And this couldn't have come at a better time for them. Nick Schifrin:

So Ambassador Crocker, is that right? Does this help Russia? Does this help Iran? Does this make it a little more difficult for the Sunni Arab states in the region who President Trump has wanted to ally with to ally with him in the future? Cela rend-il un peu plus difficile pour les États arabes sunnites de la région avec lesquels le président Trump a voulu s'allier de s'allier avec lui à l'avenir ? Ryan Crocker:

I'm not sure it will have that much impact. Jordan and Egypt, the two Arab states with peace agreements with Israel, have survived worse shocks than this. La Jordanie et l'Égypte, les deux États arabes ayant conclu des accords de paix avec Israël, ont survécu à des chocs pires que celui-ci.

I would watch Saudi Arabia, though. I do not expect to see significant criticism coming out of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, again, for the reasons Paul was talking about. Je ne m'attends pas à voir des critiques significatives sortir du royaume d'Arabie saoudite, encore une fois, pour les raisons dont parlait Paul. They have other more immediate issues that concern them, like where the kingdom is going in general. Yemen, Iran, these are the issues that are occupying the bandwidth, not Jerusalem. Le Yémen, l'Iran, ce sont les questions qui occupent la bande passante, pas Jérusalem. Nick Schifrin:

And I think it's important to also broaden out the discussion and ask whether the impact will actually be felt beyond the region. Et je pense qu'il est important d'élargir également la discussion et de se demander si l'impact se fera réellement sentir au-delà de la région. On Friday, the United Nations Security Council held an extraordinary session in which they actually called an emergency session thanks to something the United States has done. Vendredi, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies a tenu une session extraordinaire au cours de laquelle ils ont en fait convoqué une session d'urgence grâce à quelque chose que les États-Unis ont fait.

And let's listen now to Matthew Rycroft — he's the British permanent representative to the U.N. — criticizing President Trump and the United States. Matthew Rycroft:

We disagree with the U.S. decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and to begin preparation to move the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

It is not in line with Security Council resolutions, and is unhelpful in terms of prospects for peace in the region. Elle n'est pas conforme aux résolutions du Conseil de sécurité et n'est d'aucune utilité en termes de perspectives de paix dans la région. Nick Schifrin:

So, Paul Salem, is one of the long-term impacts actually less on the region and more the U.S. Donc, Paul Salem, est l'un des impacts à long terme en fait moins sur la région et plus sur les États-Unis relationship with the rest of the world? Paul Salem:

I do think so. And I think it's in line with a set of policy decisions that President Trump has taken to kind of dismantle American global leadership, whether by design or by instinct, on issues of climate change, the Pacific trade agreement. Et je pense que c'est conforme à un ensemble de décisions politiques que le président Trump a prises pour en quelque sorte démanteler le leadership mondial américain, que ce soit à dessein ou par instinct, sur les questions de changement climatique, l'accord commercial du Pacifique. And this decision violates decades of U.S. policy, violates U.N. Security Council resolution, violates international law, in the sense that he's recognizing, at least in East Jerusalem, territory that was occupied by force in 1967, and doing it in a way that clearly flaunts any idea of consultation beforehand or working with allies. résolution du Conseil de sécurité, viole le droit international, dans le sens où il reconnaît, au moins à Jérusalem-Est, un territoire qui a été occupé par la force en 1967, et le fait d'une manière qui affiche clairement toute idée de consultation préalable ou de collaboration avec des alliés. It seems to be part of how President Trump and some of his advisers seem to view America's role in the world. Nick Schifrin:

Ambassador Crocker, is that how you see it, a lack of U.S. Ambassadeur Crocker, c'est ainsi que vous le voyez, un manque de leadership and other countries stepping into a vacuum? leadership et d'autres pays s'enfonçant dans le vide ? Ryan Crocker:

Well, clearly, the U.S. has been backing away from its traditional leadership role. s'est éloigné de son rôle de chef de file traditionnel.

I would have to point out, though, it didn't start with President Trump. It started with President Obama. So we kind of — and we saw that most clearly, I think, with the refugee crisis, where we just were not a player.

So, yes, the backing away is — it's real, and it's potentially quite significant. Donc, oui, le recul est - c'est réel, et c'est potentiellement assez important. And I'm sure that the French and the British will try to step into this. Et je suis sûr que les Français et les Britanniques essaieront de s'y mettre. But there's another bigger question there. Can they do it? And I would have to suggest that neither Britain nor France nor the two together can be an adequate substitute for the role. Et je devrais suggérer que ni la Grande-Bretagne ni la France ni les deux ensemble ne peuvent être un substitut adéquat pour le rôle.

There are voices now coming out of the region saying, OK, we get it. Il y a maintenant des voix qui sortent de la région pour dire, OK, nous comprenons. No more two-state, two-capital solutions. It will be one state, one capital, with guaranteed equal rights for all of its people.

But I think you may see some fairly dramatic things said in the months ahead. Mais je pense que vous pourriez voir des choses assez dramatiques se dire dans les mois à venir. Nick Schifrin:

Ambassador Ryan Crocker joining us from Princeton University, and Paul Salem from the Middle East Institute, thank you very much to you both. Paul Salem:

Thank you, Nick. Ryan Crocker:

Thank you.