Murder and Fascism - Rise of the Ustaše | BETWEEN 2 WARS I 1934 Part 3 of 4 - YouTube (1)
In 1934, the world witnesses the very public rise of a Croat terror organization in Yugoslavia
that will eventually collaborate with the Nazis and commit hideous crimes against humanity
during WW2.
It is the Ustasa.
Welcome to Between-2-Wars a chronological summary of the interwar years, covering all
facets of life, the uncertainty, hedonism, and euphoria, and ultimately humanity's descent
into the darkness of the Second World War.
I'm Indy Neidell.
As we have seen, the 1930s is a decade where rulers across the world try to mold their
countries and subjects into their own worldviews.
Hitler approaches it by creating a state within the state that then proceeds with the total
Nazification of Germany; in the Soviet Union, Stalinist economic policy attempts to transform
the economy via a "revolution from above";
Both approaches start with an underground extremist political movement centered on political
violence.
In the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, this will all come together in fateful combination for a
monarch who has done everything he can to forcefully unify a quarreling nation often
paralyzed by ethnic conflict.
That monarch is King Aleksandar I, who as we saw in our previous episode on Yugoslavia
had done away with the parliamentary system and made himself dictator, in an effort to
forge a single Yugoslav identity and put an end to the "tribal" division that he thought
were destroying his country.
One of the most radical changes he introduces is the Banovina system which reorganizes the
Kingdom into nine new provinces which carefully ignore ethnic boundaries or old borders.
He couples such reorganization with the suppression of his opponents.
And as the 30s begin, Aleksandar and his Prime Minister, Petar Zivkovic, appear to have everything
under control.
Vladko Macek, leader of the now-banned Croat Peasant Party (HSS), is safely in jail and
awaiting trial because of his alleged involvement with a separatist bomb plot; Svetozar Pribicevic,
a Democrat, and a leading opposition voice allied to the Croat Nationalists is under
virtual house arrest in Serbia; the illegal Communist Party is under constant police surveillance,
and other opposition leaders are lying low.
But there is an undercurrent of resentment felt by many of the King's subjects.
When Macek and over 20 other defendants go on trial in April 1930, it quickly turns into
a public fiasco.
Many of the defendants retract previous confessions, claiming that they were extracted under torture.
Macek and his legal team deny the charge of separatism, but also openly denounce the proceedings
as an act of propaganda.
Macek and seven co-conspirators are acquitted.
Thirteen others receive jail sentences, and the accusations of torture leave a bitter
aftertaste with much of the Croat public.
Conscious that this can easily trigger "tribal loyalties," Aleksandar and Zivkovic move to
mobilize popular support.
They seed a new regime-friendly "grassroots" movement amongst Croat peasants to supplant
the influence of the HSS.
With the help of Karla Kovacevic, former vice president of the HSS, they create the "Yugoslav
Peasant Movement" with almost weekly pro-Yugoslavian mass rallies throughout Croatia.
They fund cultural organizations to publish journals and calendars and run libraries and
archives that promote the Yugoslav idea.
And they make sure that any resistance is held in check by an efficient police state.
As soon as Aleksandar seized power, he had enacted several laws to create a new security
apparatus primed to monitor and pressure any potential political threats.
Anyone who wants to hold a public meeting has to request permission three days in advance,
provide authorities an agenda for the meeting, and accept the presence of a police agent
who has the power to disperse it immediately if he deems it unlawful.
Special courts are set up to deal with any acts of 'treason.'
Control over the press is tightened with state censors given significant power to ban anything
which might threaten the regime.
Their primary targets are stories about Croat-Serb disputes and economic difficulties, but the
paranoia of authorities sometimes goes further.
For instance, an article on the Indian independence movement is censored out of a Croat paper
for being an analogy for independence.
Paranoia spreads through state security institutions.
Thousands of politicians are monitored daily, every minute detail of their lives recorded.
But even fairly apolitical citizens draw the spying eye of the state.
Choral groups are disbanded by authorities if they are unable to sing the Yugoslav national
anthem.
Teachers are monitored closely for any sign that they are not wholly devoted to Nationalist
education.
Denunciations are encouraged with frequent cases of citizens accusing one another of
insulting the King or displaying tribal symbols.
It checks organized resistance for now, but the colossal effort burdens a regime that
soon seems to be running out of steam.
Aleksandar and Zivkovic are running out of ideas.
In the first year of the dictatorship, 163 new laws introduce significant changes.
But already in 1930, only one or two acts of relevant legislation can be considered
as substantial.
Not a big deal if they would so far be successful in cementing their goal of Yugoslavism right?
But that is hardly the case.
The countless rallies by Kovacevic's Yugoslav Peasant Movement haven't really managed to
engage the Croat peasants for Yugoslavism.
They dismiss participants and speakers as sycophant opportunists.
By 1931 the movement is already fading into insignificance.
Muslims in the Bosnia and Herzegovina region are also suspicious of the regime.
They resent its tendency to view Islam as a barrier to further integration.
While authorities make concerted efforts to intervene in religious matters, they fail
or decline to investigate reported cases of discrimination and abuse by state operatives.
Now, the common gripe amongst most non-Serbs is that Yugoslav unitarianism is basically
an unconvincing cover for Serb dominance.
But many Serbs are also dissatisfied.
King Aleksandar, viewed by Serbs as their champion, has also taken away their political
representation and democratic rights.
Professors at the University of Belgrade fume at being forced to focus their lessons on
"Yugoslav history" and literature instead of continuing to follow Serbian biased historiography
and culture.
Continued economic hardship doesn't help.
Agricultural prices, although taking slightly longer to fall than other South Eastern European
countries, have by now plummeted.
Protectionist isolationism has gripped many industrialized foreign countries during the
trade war launched by the US Smoot Hawley Act in 1930.
By 1934 Yugoslav exports have fallen by 58%.
The German Banking Crisis of 1931 also impacts Yugoslavia.
The Austrian bank, Creditanstalt, whose collapse triggered the crisis in the first place, was
the largest lender to Yugoslavia.
As the domino effect topples bank after bank, any alternatives are eliminated, and Yugaolavia's
pool of credit dries up.
That could be mitigated somewhat by German Reparations, but the Hoover Moratorium, which
effectively ends Germany's reparations obligations also cancels the annual payment of $16 million
Yugoslavia receives.
As always, economic difficulties drive political decisions in a new direction.
France is pressuring Aleksander to return to democracy.
When in 1931 they offer a badly needed loan, under the condition of a new constitution,
the King agrees.
But despite royal assurances, it's hardly a return to democracy.
The highest goal of Yugoslav unity is used to justify hugely restrictive regulations
of the re-established "parliamentary" system.
New electoral rules are designed to prevent any tribal or religious parties remerging.
In practice, this means that no meaningful opposition can be elected at all.
Candidates can only stand if they have support in every single one of the 306 electoral districts,
and can only run if they are on a government-approved list.
A Senate system is also introduced, but this is similarly restrictive, with the King selecting
half of the members personally and the loyal Banovina councils the rest.
The first election is announced for November 8, but only the government's party is allowed
to stand.
Elections proceed despite a joint statement from leaders of the former major parties;
the Radicals, the Agrarians, the Democrats, the Slovene People's Party, and the Yugoslav
Muslim Organization declaring that the new constitution has changed nothing.
Macek and his HSS are not signatories; instead, they author a leaflet calling on Croats to
boycott the election.
In the run-up to voting day, the state apparatus does everything they can to encourage participation.
The press reminds readers that failure to vote is a betrayal of the millions who died
for Yugoslavia in the Great War.
Police also ramp up surveillance of any "tribalist" individuals and take action against anyone
encouraging a boycott.
Predictably, the government party wins the election.
In December it is given a name: Yugoslav Radical-Peasant Democracy, a cumbersome amalgamation of the
names of previous parties to provide some sense of continuity.
But this effort to force unity soon backfires.
Factions now start to emerge within the single-party.
Some Croat deputies grow increasingly rebellious, and probe how far they can forward 'tribal'
interests and get away with it.
Some of the Serb deputies start planning for a revival of the Radical Party.
In April 1932, as things continue to deteriorate, the King forces Prime Minister Zivkovic to
retire.
His successor only lasts a couple of months and is replaced in July by Milan Srskic.
But he won't really do much other than aggravate groups already resentful of the government.
And resentful they are.
Despite the lack of organized resistance, spontaneous peasant riots are frequent in
1932.
In one incident near Ludbreg, 200 hundred angry Croat peasants march along a country
road to personally confront the governor of their Banovina, all while waving Croatian
flags and singing nationalist hymns.
Constitutional resistance re-emerges.
Frustrated by the lack of change, ex-politicians from the Croatian Peasant Party, Independent
Democrats, and other federalist and even separatist groups, draft the Zagreb Points in November
1932.
The resolution condemns royal absolutism and demands a reorganization of the state with
respect for autonomous interests.
The resolution triggers similar demands from Slovene and Muslim leaders.
The King does make a small concession, loosening electoral regulations somewhat.
Other than this, however, nothing changes.
No new elections are held, and Macek is again thrown into prison at the beginning of 1933.
The other Croat leader, Pribicevic, had been freed from his internment in 1931 because
of ill health and allowed to emigrate.
Free from the risk of prison, he will now mount an intense campaign against Aleksandar's
rule form abroad.
But there are more sinister forces for Aleksandar on the horizon.
There has always been another side to the Croat nationalism beyond the HSS and its constitutional
politics.
The most significant radical movement is the Croatian Party of Rights.
Active since the mid-19th century, the Party of Rights espouses extreme Croat nationalism
and anti-Serb feeling.
Founded on the principle of a Greater Croatia, many of its leaders have denied the existence
of separate Serb, Slovene, and Bosnian Muslim nationalities altogether, seeing them instead
as Croats corrupted by foreign influence.
The Party of Rights has never been able to build a mass movement, being side-lined by
the charismatic Radic and his peasant following.
Many no longer live in Yugoslavia, and the ones in the country have been operating underground
since Aleksandar's dictatorship began.
The more militant members both at home and abroad are now coalescing around Ante Pavelic.
He is currently in exile making connections with the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary
Organization, the IMRO a long-established militant movement for an autonomous Macedonia.
This has resulted in Pavelic being sentenced in death in absentia, which only heightens
his radical credentials.
Even before he left Croatia, Pavelic had set up a rudimentary paramilitary group and an
underground newspaper.
Now a more forceful movement gains importance under Pavic's leadership.
Founded in 1930 it is called the Ustasa after the Croatian verb 'ustati' to rise up.
Its constitution is released in 1932 and declares that the "movement has the task to liberate
Croatia under foreign yoke, with all means, including an armed uprising, in order that
it become a completely free and independent state on the whole of its historic ethnic
territory."
Pavelic and the Ustasa find natural allies in the growing fascist movement throughout