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TED Talks 2019 + Video, Rob Reid / How synthetic biology could wipe out humanity —and how we can stop it

Rob Reid / How synthetic biology could wipe out humanity —and how we can stop it

So, there's about seven and a half billion of us. The World Health Organization tells us that 300 million of us are depressed, and about 800,000 people take their lives every year. A tiny subset of them choose a profoundly nihilistic route, which is they die in the act of killing as many people as possible. These are some famous recent examples. And here's a less famous one. It happened about nine weeks ago. If you don't remember it, it's because there's a lot of this going on. Wikipedia just last year counted 323 mass shootings in my home country, the United States. Not all of those shooters were suicidal, not all of them were maximizing their death tolls, but many, many were.

An important question becomes: What limits do these people have? Take the Vegas shooter. He slaughtered 58 people. Did he stop there because he'd had enough? No, and we know this because he shot and injured another 422 people who he surely would have preferred to kill. We have no reason to think he would have stopped at 4,200. In fact, with somebody this nihilistic, he may well have gladly killed us all. We don't know. What we do know is this: when suicidal murderers really go all in, technology is the force multiplier.

Here's an example. Several years back, there was a rash of 10 mass school attacks in China carried out with things like knives and hammers and cleavers, because guns are really hard to get there. By macabre coincidence, this last attack occurred just hours before the massacre in Newtown, Connecticut. But that one American attack killed roughly the same number of victims as the 10 Chinese attacks combined. So we can fairly say, knife: terrible; gun: way worse. And airplane: massively worse, as pilot Andreas Lubitz showed when he forced 149 people to join him in his suicide, smashing a plane into the French Alps.

And there are other examples of this. And I'm afraid there are far more deadly weapons in our near future than airplanes, ones not made of metal. So let's consider the apocalyptic dynamics that will ensue if suicidal mass murder hitches a ride on a rapidly advancing field that for the most part holds boundless promise for society. Somewhere out there in the world, there's a tiny group of people who would attempt, however ineptly, to kill us all if they could just figure out how. The Vegas shooter may or may not have been one of them, but with seven and a half billion of us, this is a nonzero population. There's plenty of suicidal nihilists out there. We've already seen that. There's people with severe mood disorders that they can't even control. There are people who have just suffered deranging traumas, etc. etc. As for the corollary group, its size was simply zero forever until the Cold War, when suddenly, the leaders of two global alliances attained the ability to blow up the world.

The number of people with actual doomsday buttons has stayed fairly stable since then. But I'm afraid it's about to grow, and not just to three. This is going off the charts. I mean, it's going to look like a tech business plan. (Laughter)

And the reason is, we're in the era of exponential technologies, which routinely take eternal impossibilities and make them the actual superpowers of one or two living geniuses and -- this is the big part -- then diffuse those powers to more or less everybody. Now, here's a benign example. If you wanted to play checkers with a computer in 1952, you literally had to be that guy, then commandeer one of the world's 19 copies of that computer, then used your Nobel-adjacent brain to teach it checkers. That was the bar. Today, you just need to know someone who knows someone who owns a telephone, because computing is an exponential technology.

So is synthetic biology, which I'll now refer to as "synbio. " And in 2011, a couple of researchers did something every bit as ingenious and unprecedented as the checkers trick with H5N1 flu. This is a strain that kills up to 60 percent of the people it infects, more than Ebola. But it is so uncontagious that it's killed fewer than 50 people since 2015. So these researchers edited H5N1's genome and made it every bit as deadly, but also wildly contagious. The news arm of one of the world's top two scientific journals said if this thing got out, it would likely cause a pandemic with perhaps millions of deaths. And Dr. Paul Keim said he could not think of an organism as scary as this, which is the last thing I personally want to hear from the Chairman of the National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity. And by the way, Dr. Keim also said this -- ["I don't think anthrax is scary at all compared to this."] And he's also one of these. [Anthrax expert] (Laughter)

Now, the good news about the 2011 biohack is that the people who did it didn't mean us any harm. They're virologists. They believed they were advancing science. The bad news is that technology does not freeze in place, and over the next few decades, their feat will become trivially easy. In fact, it's already way easier, because as we learned yesterday morning, just two years after they did their work, the CRISPR system was harnessed for genome editing. This was a radical breakthrough that makes gene editing massively easier -- so easy that CRISPR is now taught in high schools. And this stuff is moving quicker than computing. That slow, stodgy white line up there? That's Moore's law. That shows us how quickly computing is getting cheaper. That steep, crazy-fun green line, that shows us how quickly genetic sequencing is getting cheaper. Now, gene editing and synthesis and sequencing, they're different disciplines, but they're tightly related. And they're all moving in these headlong rates. And the keys to the kingdom are these tiny, tiny data files. That is an excerpt of H5N1's genome. The whole thing can fit on just a few pages. And yeah, don't worry, you can Google this as soon as you get home. It's all over the internet, right? And the part that made it contagious could well fit on a single Post-it note. And once a genius makes a data file, any idiot can copy it, distribute it worldwide or print it. And I don't just mean print it on this, but soon enough, on this. So let's imagine a scenario. Let's say it's 2026, to pick an arbitrary year, and a brilliant virologist, hoping to advance science and better understand pandemics, designs a new bug. It's as contagious as chicken pox, it's as deadly as Ebola, and it incubates for months and months before causing an outbreak, so the whole world can be infected before the first sign of trouble. Then, her university gets hacked. And of course, this is not science fiction. In fact, just one recent US indictment documents the hacking of over 300 universities. So that file with the bug's genome on it spreads to the internet's dark corners. And once a file is out there, it never comes back -- just ask anybody who runs a movie studio or a music label. So now maybe in 2026, it would take a true genius like our virologist to make the actual living critter, but 15 years later, it may just take a DNA printer you can find at any high school. And if not? Give it a couple of decades.

So, a quick aside: Remember this slide here? Turn your attention to these two words. If somebody tries this and is only 0.1 percent effective, eight million people die. That's 2,500 9/11s. Civilization would survive, but it would be permanently disfigured. So this means we need to be concerned about anybody who has the faintest shot on goal, not just geniuses. So today, there's a tiny handful of geniuses who probably could make a doomsday bug that's .1-percent effective and maybe even a little bit more. They tend to be stable and successful and so not part of this group. So I guess I'm sorta kinda barely OK-ish with that. But what about after technology improves and diffuses and thousands of life science grad students are enabled? Are every single one of them going to be perfectly stable? Or how about a few years after that, where every stress-ridden premed is fully enabled? At some point in that time frame, these circles are going to intersect, because we're now starting to talk about hundreds of thousands of people throughout the world. And they recently included that guy who dressed up like the Joker and shot 12 people to death at a Batman premiere. That was a neuroscience PhD student with an NIH grant.

OK, plot twist: I think we can actually survive this one if we start focusing on it now. And I say this, having spent countless hours interviewing global leaders in synbio and also researching their work for science podcasts I create. I have come to fear their work, in case I haven't gotten that out there yet -- (Laughter) but more than that, to revere its potential. This stuff will cure cancer, heal our environment and stop our cruel treatment of other creatures. So how do we get all this without, you know, annihilating ourselves?

First thing: like it or not, synbio is here, so let's embrace the technology. If we do a tech ban, that would only hand the wheel to bad actors. Unlike nuclear programs, biology can be practiced invisibly. Massive Soviet cheating on bioweapons treaties made that very clear, as does every illegal drug lab in the world.

Secondly, enlist the experts. Let's sign them up and make more of them. For every million and one bioengineers we have, at least a million of them are going to be on our side. I mean, Al Capone would be on our side in this one. The bar to being a good guy is just so low. And massive numerical advantages do matter, even when a single bad guy can inflict grievous harm, because among many other things, they allow us to exploit the hell out of this: we have years and hopefully decades to prepare and prevent. The first person to try something awful -- and there will be somebody -- may not even be born yet.

Next, this needs to be an effort that spans society, and all of you need to be a part of it, because we cannot ask a tiny group of experts to be responsible for both containing and exploiting synthetic biology, because we already tried that with the financial system, and our stewards became massively corrupted as they figured out how they could cut corners, inflict massive, massive risks on the rest of us and privatize the gains, becoming repulsively wealthy while they stuck us with the $22 trillion bill.

And more recently -- (Applause)

Are you the ones who have gotten the thank-you letters? I'm still waiting for mine. I just figured they were too busy to be grateful.

And much more recently, online privacy started looming as a huge issue, and we basically outsourced it. And once again: privatized gains, socialized losses. Is anybody else sick of this pattern? (Applause)

So we need a more inclusive way to safeguard our prosperity, our privacy and soon, our lives. So how do we do all of this?

Well, when bodies fight pathogens, they use ingenious immune systems, which are very complex and multilayered. Why don't we build one of these for the whole damn ecosystem? There's a year of TED Talks that could be given on this first critical layer. So these are just a couple of many great ideas that are out there.

Some R and D muscle could take the very primitive pathogen sensors that we currently have and put them on a very steep price performance curve that would quickly become ingenious and networked and gradually as widespread as smoke detectors and even smartphones. On a very related note: vaccines have all kinds of problems when it comes to manufacturing and distribution, and once they're made, they can't adapt to new threats or mutations. We need an agile biomanufacturing base extending into every single pharmacy and maybe even our homes. Printer technology for vaccines and medicines is within reach if we prioritize it.

Next, mental health. Many people who commit suicidal mass murder suffer from crippling, treatment-resistant depression or PTSD. We need noble researchers like Rick Doblin working on this, but we also need the selfish jerks who are way more numerous to appreciate the fact that acute suffering will soon endanger all of us, not just those afflicted. Those jerks will then join us and Al Capone in fighting this condition. Third, each and every one of us can be and should be a white blood cell in this immune system. Suicidal mass murderers can be despicable, yes, but they're also terribly broken and sad people, and those of us who aren't need to do what we can to make sure nobody goes unloved. (Applause)

Next, we need to make fighting these dangers core to the discipline of synthetic biology. There are companies out there that at least claim they let their engineers spend 20 percent of their time doing whatever they want. What if those who hire bioengineers and become them give 20 percent of their time to building defenses for the common good? Not a bad idea, right? (Applause)

Then, finally: this won't be any fun. But we need to let our minds go to some very, very dark places, and thank you for letting me take you there this evening. We survived the Cold War because every one of us understood and respected the danger, in part, because we had spent decades telling ourselves terrifying ghost stories with names like "Dr. Strangelove" and "War Games. " This is no time to remain calm. This is one of those rare times when it's incredibly productive to freak the hell out -- (Laughter) to come up with some ghost stories and use our fear as fuel to fight this danger. Because, all these terrible scenarios I've painted -- they are not destiny. They're optional. The danger is still kind of distant. And that means it will only befall us if we allow it to. Let's not. Thank you very much for listening.

(Applause)


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So, there's about seven and a half billion of us. Es gibt also etwa siebeneinhalb Milliarden von uns. Así que somos unos siete mil quinientos millones. 所以,我们大约有七五十亿人。 The World Health Organization tells us that 300 million of us are depressed, and about 800,000 people take their lives every year. Nach Angaben der Weltgesundheitsorganisation sind 300 Millionen Menschen depressiv, und jedes Jahr nehmen sich etwa 800.000 Menschen das Leben. 世界卫生组织告诉我们,我们中有 3 亿人患有抑郁症,每年约有 80 万人结束生命。 A tiny subset of them choose a profoundly nihilistic route, which is they die in the act of killing as many people as possible. Eine winzige Untergruppe von ihnen wählt einen zutiefst nihilistischen Weg, der darin besteht, dass sie sterben, während sie so viele Menschen wie möglich töten. Un pequeño subgrupo de ellos opta por una vía profundamente nihilista, que consiste en morir en el acto matando al mayor número posible de personas. Un piccolo sottogruppo di loro sceglie un percorso profondamente nichilista, ovvero muoiono nell'atto di uccidere quante più persone possibile. Крошечная часть из них выбирает глубоко нигилистический путь, который заключается в том, что они умирают, убивая как можно больше людей. 他们中的一小部分人选择了一条极度虚无主义的路线,那就是他们在尽可能多地杀人的过程中死去。 These are some famous recent examples. Dies sind einige berühmte Beispiele aus jüngster Zeit. Estos son algunos ejemplos recientes famosos. Вот несколько известных примеров последнего времени. 这些是最近一些著名的例子。 And here's a less famous one. Y aquí hay una menos famosa. 这是一个不太出名的。 It happened about nine weeks ago. 它发生在大约九周前。 If you don't remember it, it's because there's a lot of this going on. 如果你不记得了,那是因为发生了很多这样的事情。 Wikipedia just last year counted 323 mass shootings in my home country, the United States. Wikipedia zählte allein im letzten Jahr 323 Massenerschießungen in meinem Heimatland, den Vereinigten Staaten. Sólo el año pasado, Wikipedia contabilizó 323 tiroteos masivos en mi país, Estados Unidos. 维基百科仅在去年统计了在我的祖国美国发生的 323 起大规模枪击事件。 Not all of those shooters were suicidal, not all of them were maximizing their death tolls, but many, many were. No todos esos tiradores eran suicidas, no todos maximizaban su número de muertos, pero muchos, muchos lo eran. Не все из этих стрелков были самоубийцами, не все из них стремились максимально увеличить число жертв, но многие, очень многие были самоубийцами. 并非所有这些射手都有自杀倾向,并非所有枪手都在最大限度地增加死亡人数,但很多很多人都是。

An important question becomes: What limits do these people have? Das ist eine wichtige Frage: Welche Grenzen haben diese Menschen? Возникает важный вопрос: Какие ограничения существуют у этих людей? 一个重要的问题变成了:这些人有什么限制? Take the Vegas shooter. Por ejemplo, el tirador de Las Vegas. 以维加斯射手为例。 He slaughtered 58 people. Er hat 58 Menschen abgeschlachtet. Он уничтожил 58 человек. 他屠杀了58人。 Did he stop there because he'd had enough? ¿Se detuvo allí porque ya había tenido suficiente? 他停在那里是因为他受够了吗? No, and we know this because he shot and injured another 422 people who he surely would have preferred to kill. No, y lo sabemos porque disparó e hirió a otras 422 personas a las que seguramente habría preferido matar. 不,我们之所以知道这一点,是因为他开枪打伤了另外 422 人,他肯定更愿意杀死这些人。 We have no reason to think he would have stopped at 4,200. No tenemos motivos para pensar que se hubiera detenido en 4.200. 我们没有理由认为他会止步于 4,200。 In fact, with somebody this nihilistic, he may well have gladly killed us all. Mit jemandem, der so nihilistisch ist, hätte er uns vielleicht sogar gerne alle getötet. 事实上,对于这样一个虚无主义的人,他很可能会很高兴地杀死我们所有人。 We don't know. No lo sabemos. What we do know is this: when suicidal murderers really go all in, technology is the force multiplier. Was wir wissen ist folgendes: Wenn Selbstmordmörder wirklich alles geben, ist die Technologie der Kraftmultiplikator. Мы знаем только одно: когда убийцы-самоубийцы действительно идут на все, технология является мультипликатором силы. 我们所知道的是:当自杀式杀人犯真正全力以赴时,技术就是力量倍增器。

Here's an example. 这是一个例子。 Several years back, there was a rash of 10 mass school attacks in China carried out with things like knives and hammers and cleavers, because guns are really hard to get there. Несколько лет назад в Китае произошла серия из 10 массовых нападений на школы, совершенных с использованием ножей, молотков и тесаков, поскольку оружие там достать очень сложно. 几年前,中国发生了 10 起使用刀子、锤子和菜刀之类的大规模学校袭击事件,因为枪支真的很难拿到那里。 By macabre coincidence, this last attack occurred just hours before the massacre in Newtown, Connecticut. Por macabra coincidencia, este último ataque se produjo pocas horas antes de la masacre de Newtown, Connecticut. По странному совпадению, последний теракт произошел всего за несколько часов до массового убийства в Ньютауне, штат Коннектикут. 巧合的是,最后一次袭击发生在康涅狄格州纽敦大屠杀发生前几个小时。 But that one American attack killed roughly the same number of victims as the 10 Chinese attacks combined. Aber dieser eine amerikanische Anschlag forderte etwa die gleiche Anzahl von Opfern wie die 10 chinesischen Anschläge zusammen. Pero ese único ataque estadounidense mató aproximadamente al mismo número de víctimas que los 10 ataques chinos juntos. 但美国发动的那次袭击造成的受害者人数与中国发动的 10 次袭击造成的死亡人数总和大致相同。 So we can fairly say, knife: terrible; gun: way worse. Así que podemos decir, cuchillo: terrible; pistola: mucho peor. 所以我们可以公平地说,刀:可怕;枪:更糟。 And airplane: massively worse, as pilot Andreas Lubitz showed when he forced 149 people to join him in his suicide, smashing a plane into the French Alps. 还有飞机:更糟糕的是,飞行员安德烈亚斯·卢比茨 (Andreas Lubitz) 强迫 149 人加入他的自杀行列,将一架飞机撞向法国阿尔卑斯山。

And there are other examples of this. 还有其他这样的例子。 And I'm afraid there are far more deadly weapons in our near future than airplanes, ones not made of metal. И я боюсь, что в ближайшем будущем нас ждет гораздо более смертоносное оружие, чем самолеты, причем сделанные не из металла. 恐怕在我们不久的将来会有比飞机更致命的武器,它们不是由金属制成的。 So let's consider the apocalyptic dynamics that will ensue if suicidal mass murder hitches a ride on a rapidly advancing field that for the most part holds boundless promise for society. Betrachten wir also die apokalyptische Dynamik, die sich ergibt, wenn der selbstmörderische Massenmord auf einem sich rasch entwickelnden Gebiet stattfindet, das für die Gesellschaft größtenteils grenzenlose Möglichkeiten bietet. Consideremos, pues, la dinámica apocalíptica que se produciría si el asesinato suicida en masa se enganchara a un campo que avanza rápidamente y que, en su mayor parte, es muy prometedor para la sociedad. Consideriamo quindi le dinamiche apocalittiche che si verificheranno se l'omicidio di massa suicida si aggancia a un campo in rapido progresso che, per la maggior parte, è promettente per la società. Итак, давайте рассмотрим апокалиптическую динамику, которая возникнет, если суицидальные массовые убийства прицепятся к быстро развивающейся области, которая в большинстве своем открывает безграничные перспективы для общества. 因此,让我们考虑一下,如果自杀性大屠杀搭上一个快速发展的领域的便车,而这个领域在很大程度上对社会有着无限的希望,那么世界末日的动态将会随之而来。 Somewhere out there in the world, there's a tiny group of people who would attempt, however ineptly, to kill us all if they could just figure out how. Где-то в мире есть крошечная группа людей, которые, пусть и неумело, но попытаются убить всех нас, если только придумают, как это сделать. 在世界的某个地方,有一小群人会试图杀死我们所有人,无论他们多么笨拙,只要他们能弄清楚如何做。 The Vegas shooter may or may not have been one of them, but with seven and a half billion of us, this is a nonzero population. Стрелок из Лас-Вегаса может быть или не быть одним из них, но нас семь с половиной миллиардов, это ненулевая популяция. 维加斯射手可能是也可能不是其中之一,但我们有 7.5 亿人,这是一个非零人口。 There's plenty of suicidal nihilists out there. 那里有很多自杀的虚无主义者。 We've already seen that. 我们已经看到了。 There's people with severe mood disorders that they can't even control. Есть люди с тяжелыми аффективными расстройствами, которые они даже не могут контролировать. 有些人患有严重的情绪障碍,他们甚至无法控制。 There are people who have just suffered deranging traumas, etc. Hay personas que acaban de sufrir traumas desquiciantes, etc. Есть люди, которые только что перенесли тяжелейшие травмы и т.д. 有些人刚刚遭受了精神错乱的创伤,等等。 etc. ETC。 As for the corollary group, its size was simply zero forever until the Cold War, when suddenly, the leaders of two global alliances attained the ability to blow up the world. Die Größe der entsprechenden Gruppe war bis zum Kalten Krieg, als die Führer zweier globaler Bündnisse plötzlich die Fähigkeit erlangten, die Welt in die Luft zu jagen, einfach null. En cuanto al grupo corolario, su tamaño fue simplemente cero para siempre hasta la Guerra Fría, cuando, de repente, los líderes de dos alianzas mundiales alcanzaron la capacidad de hacer estallar el mundo. Что касается корелляционной группы, то ее численность была просто нулевой всегда, вплоть до холодной войны, когда вдруг лидеры двух глобальных альянсов обрели способность взорвать мир. 至于推论组,它的规模永远为零,直到冷战爆发,突然之间,两个全球联盟的领导人获得了炸毁世界的能力。

The number of people with actual doomsday buttons has stayed fairly stable since then. С тех пор количество людей с кнопками "Судного дня" остается достаточно стабильным. 从那时起,拥有实际世界末日按钮的人数一直保持相当稳定。 But I'm afraid it's about to grow, and not just to three. Aber ich fürchte, sie wird wachsen, und zwar nicht nur auf drei. Pero me temo que está a punto de crecer, y no sólo a tres. Но я боюсь, что она скоро вырастет, и не только до трех. 但恐怕它要长大了,而且不只是长到三岁。 This is going off the charts. Esto se sale de lo normal. Это зашкаливает. 这太离谱了。 I mean, it's going to look like a tech business plan. Quiero decir, va a parecer un plan de negocios de tecnología. 我的意思是,它看起来像是一个技术商业计划。 (Laughter) (笑声)

And the reason is, we're in the era of exponential technologies, which routinely take eternal impossibilities and make them the actual superpowers of one or two living geniuses and -- this is the big part -- then diffuse those powers to more or less everybody. Und der Grund dafür ist, dass wir uns im Zeitalter der Exponentialtechnologien befinden, die routinemäßig ewige Unmöglichkeiten zu den tatsächlichen Superkräften eines oder zweier lebender Genies machen und - das ist das Entscheidende - diese Kräfte dann mehr oder weniger auf alle übertragen. Y la razón es que estamos en la era de las tecnologías exponenciales, que rutinariamente toman imposibilidades eternas y las convierten en superpoderes reales de uno o dos genios vivos y -esta es la gran parte- luego difunden esos poderes a más o menos todo el mundo. Il motivo è che siamo nell'era delle tecnologie esponenziali, che di solito prendono le impossibilità eterne e le trasformano nei superpoteri di uno o due geni viventi e - questa è la parte più importante - le diffondono più o meno a tutti. 原因是,我们处在技术呈指数级增长的时代,这些技术通常会把永远不可能的事情变成一两个在世天才的实际超能力,然后——这是很大一部分——然后将这些能力或多或少地扩散到大家。 Now, here's a benign example. He aquí un ejemplo benigno. 现在,这是一个良性的例子。 If you wanted to play checkers with a computer in 1952, you literally had to be that guy, then commandeer one of the world's 19 copies of that computer, then used your Nobel-adjacent brain to teach it checkers. Wenn man 1952 mit einem Computer Dame spielen wollte, musste man buchstäblich dieser Typ sein, dann eine der weltweit 19 Kopien dieses Computers in seine Gewalt bringen und ihm dann mit seinem nobelpreisgekrönten Gehirn das Damespiel beibringen. Si querías jugar a las damas con un ordenador en 1952, tenías que ser literalmente ese tipo, apoderarte de una de las 19 copias de ese ordenador que había en el mundo y utilizar tu cerebro de Premio Nobel para enseñarle a jugar a las damas. Se nel 1952 volevate giocare a dama con un computer, dovevate letteralmente essere quel tipo di persona, poi requisire una delle 19 copie di quel computer nel mondo, quindi usare il vostro cervello da Nobel per insegnargli la dama. 如果你想在 1952 年用计算机下跳棋,你必须成为那个人,然后征用世界上 19 个该计算机副本之一,然后用你与诺贝尔奖相邻的大脑来教它下跳棋。 That was the bar. Das war die Bar. Ese era el bar. 那是酒吧。 Today, you just need to know someone who knows someone who owns a telephone, because computing is an exponential technology. Heute braucht man nur jemanden zu kennen, der jemanden kennt, der ein Telefon besitzt, denn die Computertechnik ist eine exponentiell wachsende Technologie. 今天,您只需要认识一个认识拥有电话的人,因为计算是一项呈指数增长的技术。

So is synthetic biology, which I'll now refer to as "synbio. Das gilt auch für die synthetische Biologie, die ich im Folgenden als "Synbio" bezeichne. También lo es la biología sintética, a la que me referiré a partir de ahora como "synbio". 合成生物学也是如此,我现在将其称为“synbio”。 " And in 2011, a couple of researchers did something every bit as ingenious and unprecedented as the checkers trick with H5N1 flu. " Und 2011 gelang einigen Forschern mit der H5N1-Grippe etwas ebenso Geniales und noch nie Dagewesenes wie der Damentrick. " Y en 2011, un par de investigadores hicieron algo tan ingenioso y sin precedentes como el truco de las damas con la gripe H5N1. " 在 2011 年,一些研究人员做了一些巧妙而前所未有的事情,就像跳棋在 H5N1 流感中的把戏一样。 This is a strain that kills up to 60 percent of the people it infects, more than Ebola. Se trata de una cepa que mata hasta al 60% de las personas que infecta, más que el ébola. 这是一种毒株,可杀死高达 60% 的感染者,比埃博拉病毒还多。 But it is so uncontagious that it's killed fewer than 50 people since 2015. Aber sie ist so wenig ansteckend, dass seit 2015 weniger als 50 Menschen an ihr gestorben sind. 但它的传染性极低,自 2015 年以来,它造成的死亡人数不到 50 人。 So these researchers edited H5N1's genome and made it every bit as deadly, but also wildly contagious. Die Forscher veränderten also das Genom von H5N1 und machten es genauso tödlich, aber auch hochgradig ansteckend. Así que estos investigadores editaron el genoma del H5N1 y lo hicieron igual de mortífero, pero también tremendamente contagioso. 因此,这些研究人员编辑了 H5N1 的基因组,使其每一点都具有致命性,但也具有极强的传染性。 The news arm of one of the world's top two scientific journals said if this thing got out, it would likely cause a pandemic with perhaps millions of deaths. La rama de noticias de una de las dos revistas científicas más importantes del mundo dijo que si esta cosa saliera a la luz, probablemente causaría una pandemia con tal vez millones de muertes. 世界两大科学期刊之一的新闻部门表示,如果这件事传出去,很可能会导致一场可能导致数百万人死亡的大流行。 And Dr. Paul Keim said he could not think of an organism as scary as this, which is the last thing I personally want to hear from the Chairman of the National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity. Paul Keim 博士说他想不出像这样可怕的有机体,这是我个人最不想从国家生物安全科学顾问委员会主席那里听到的话。 And by the way, Dr. Keim also said this --  ["I don't think anthrax is scary at all compared to this."] Übrigens hat Dr. Keim auch Folgendes gesagt: ["Ich glaube nicht, dass Milzbrand im Vergleich dazu beängstigend ist."] 顺便说一句,凯姆博士也说过——[“我认为炭疽病与此相比一点都不可怕。”] And he's also one of these. Y también es uno de estos. 而他也是其中之一。 [Anthrax expert] (Laughter) [炭疽病专家](笑声)

Now, the good news about the 2011 biohack is that the people who did it didn't mean us any harm. Die gute Nachricht über den Biohack von 2011 ist, dass die Leute, die ihn durchführten, uns nicht schaden wollten. 现在,关于 2011 年生物黑客的好消息是,实施这件事的人并没有伤害我们的意思。 They're virologists. 他们是病毒学家。 They believed they were advancing science. 他们相信他们正在推进科学。 The bad news is that technology does not freeze in place, and over the next few decades, their feat will become trivially easy. Die schlechte Nachricht ist, dass die Technologie nicht an Ort und Stelle erstarrt, und in den nächsten Jahrzehnten wird ihre Leistung trivial einfach werden. 坏消息是技术不会停滞不前,在接下来的几十年里,他们的壮举将变得轻而易举。 In fact, it's already way easier, because as we learned yesterday morning, just two years after they did their work, the CRISPR system was harnessed for genome editing. Tatsächlich ist es bereits viel einfacher, denn wie wir gestern Morgen erfahren haben, wurde das CRISPR-System nur zwei Jahre nach ihrer Arbeit für die Genom-Editierung nutzbar gemacht. 事实上,这已经很容易了,因为正如我们昨天早上了解到的那样,就在他们完成工作两年后,CRISPR 系统被用于基因组编辑。 This was a radical breakthrough that makes gene editing massively easier -- so easy that CRISPR is now taught in high schools. Se trata de un avance radical que facilita enormemente la edición de genes, hasta el punto de que CRISPR se enseña ahora en los institutos. 这是一个根本性的突破,使基因编辑变得非常容易——如此简单以至于现在高中都教授 CRISPR。 And this stuff is moving quicker than computing. Y esto va más rápido que la informática. 而且这些东西比计算发展得更快。 That slow, stodgy white line up there? Die langsame, schwerfällige weiße Linie da oben? ¿Esa lenta y estirada línea blanca de ahí arriba? 那里那条缓慢、呆板的白线? That's Moore's law. Es la ley de Moore. 这就是摩尔定律。 That shows us how quickly computing is getting cheaper. Esto demuestra lo rápido que se está abaratando la informática. That steep, crazy-fun green line, that shows us how quickly genetic sequencing is getting cheaper. Die steile, verrückte grüne Linie, die uns zeigt, wie schnell die genetische Sequenzierung billiger wird. Esa línea verde tan pronunciada y divertida nos muestra lo rápido que se está abaratando la secuenciación genética. Now, gene editing and synthesis and sequencing, they're different disciplines, but they're tightly related. Gen-Editierung, Synthese und Sequenzierung sind zwar unterschiedliche Disziplinen, aber sie sind eng miteinander verbunden. And they're all moving in these headlong rates. Und sie alle bewegen sich in diesem rasanten Tempo. And the keys to the kingdom are these tiny, tiny data files. That is an excerpt of H5N1's genome. The whole thing can fit on just a few pages. Todo puede caber en unas pocas páginas. And yeah, don't worry, you can Google this as soon as you get home. Y sí, no te preocupes, puedes buscarlo en Google en cuanto llegues a casa. It's all over the internet, right? And the part that made it contagious could well fit on a single Post-it note. And once a genius makes a data file, any idiot can copy it, distribute it worldwide or print it. Y una vez que un genio crea un archivo de datos, cualquier idiota puede copiarlo, distribuirlo por todo el mundo o imprimirlo. And I don't just mean print it on this, but soon enough, on this. Y no me refiero sólo a imprimirlo en esto, sino muy pronto, en esto. So let's imagine a scenario. Imaginemos un escenario. Let's say it's 2026, to pick an arbitrary year, and a brilliant virologist, hoping to advance science and better understand pandemics, designs a new bug. Digamos que estamos en 2026, por elegir un año arbitrario, y un brillante virólogo, con la esperanza de hacer avanzar la ciencia y comprender mejor las pandemias, diseña un nuevo bicho. It's as contagious as chicken pox, it's as deadly as Ebola, and it incubates for months and months before causing an outbreak, so the whole world can be infected before the first sign of trouble. Es ist so ansteckend wie Windpocken, es ist so tödlich wie Ebola und brütet monatelang, bevor es einen Ausbruch auslöst, sodass die ganze Welt vor dem ersten Anzeichen von Problemen infiziert werden kann. Es tan contagiosa como la varicela, es tan mortal como el ébola y se incuba durante meses y meses antes de provocar un brote, por lo que todo el mundo puede estar infectado antes de la primera señal de problemas. Then, her university gets hacked. Entonces, su universidad es hackeada. And of course, this is not science fiction. Y, por supuesto, esto no es ciencia ficción. In fact, just one recent US indictment documents the hacking of over 300 universities. Allein in einer aktuellen US-Anklageschrift wird das Hacken von über 300 Universitäten dokumentiert. De hecho, una sola acusación reciente en Estados Unidos documenta el pirateo de más de 300 universidades. So that file with the bug's genome on it spreads to the internet's dark corners. So verbreitet sich die Datei mit dem Genom des Bugs in den dunklen Ecken des Internets. Así que ese archivo con el genoma del bicho se difunde por los rincones oscuros de Internet. And once a file is out there, it never comes back -- just ask anybody who runs a movie studio or a music label. Y una vez que un archivo está ahí fuera, nunca vuelve... que se lo pregunten a cualquiera que dirija un estudio de cine o una discográfica. So now maybe in 2026, it would take a true genius like our virologist to make the actual living critter, but 15 years later, it may just take a DNA printer you can find at any high school. Jetzt, im Jahr 2026, bräuchte man vielleicht ein wahres Genie wie unseren Virologen, um das lebende Tier herzustellen, aber 15 Jahre später reicht vielleicht ein DNA-Drucker, wie er in jeder Schule zu finden ist. Así que ahora, tal vez en 2026, se necesitaría un verdadero genio como nuestro virólogo para hacer la criatura viva real, pero 15 años más tarde, puede que sólo se necesite una impresora de ADN que se puede encontrar en cualquier escuela secundaria. And if not? ¿Y si no? Give it a couple of decades. Dale un par de décadas.

So, a quick aside: Remember this slide here? Also, eine kurze Anmerkung: Erinnern Sie sich an diese Folie hier? Así que, un rápido inciso: ¿Recuerdas esta diapositiva? Turn your attention to these two words. Presta atención a estas dos palabras. If somebody tries this and is only 0.1 percent effective, eight million people die. Si alguien lo intenta y sólo es efectivo en un 0,1%, mueren ocho millones de personas. That's 2,500 9/11s. Son 2.500 11-S. Civilization would survive, but it would be permanently disfigured. La civilización sobreviviría, pero quedaría permanentemente desfigurada. So this means we need to be concerned about anybody who has the faintest shot on goal, not just geniuses. Das bedeutet also, dass wir uns um jeden kümmern müssen, der auch nur den geringsten Torschuss hat, nicht nur um Genies. Esto significa que debemos preocuparnos por cualquiera que tenga el más mínimo tiro a puerta, no sólo por los genios. So today, there's a tiny handful of geniuses who probably could make a doomsday bug that's .1-percent effective and maybe even a little bit more. Así que hoy en día, hay un pequeño puñado de genios que probablemente podría hacer un bicho del juicio final que es 0,1 por ciento eficaz y tal vez incluso un poco más. They tend to be stable and successful and so not part of this group. So I guess I'm sorta kinda barely OK-ish with that. Ich denke also, dass ich damit irgendwie gerade noch zurechtkomme. But what about after technology improves and diffuses and thousands of life science grad students are enabled? Aber was ist, wenn sich die Technologie verbessert und verbreitet und Tausende von Studenten der Biowissenschaften in die Lage versetzt werden? Are every single one of them going to be perfectly stable? Or how about a few years after that, where every stress-ridden premed is fully enabled? At some point in that time frame, these circles are going to intersect, because we're now starting to talk about hundreds of thousands of people throughout the world. And they recently included that guy who dressed up like the Joker and shot 12 people to death at a Batman premiere. That was a neuroscience PhD student with an NIH grant. Das war ein Doktorand der Neurowissenschaften mit einem NIH-Stipendium.

OK, plot twist: I think we can actually survive this one if we start focusing on it now. And I say this, having spent countless hours interviewing global leaders in synbio and also researching their work for science podcasts I create. I have come to fear their work, in case I haven't gotten that out there yet --   (Laughter)    but more than that, to revere its potential. Ich fürchte ihre Arbeit, falls ich das noch nicht gesagt habe - (Gelächter), aber mehr noch, ich verehre ihr Potenzial. This stuff will cure cancer, heal our environment and stop our cruel treatment of other creatures. So how do we get all this without, you know, annihilating ourselves?

First thing: like it or not, synbio is here, so let's embrace the technology. If we do a tech ban, that would only hand the wheel to bad actors. Unlike nuclear programs, biology can be practiced invisibly. Massive Soviet cheating on bioweapons treaties made that very clear, as does every illegal drug lab in the world.

Secondly, enlist the experts. Let's sign them up and make more of them. For every million and one bioengineers we have, at least a million of them are going to be on our side. I mean, Al Capone would be on our side in this one. The bar to being a good guy is just so low. Die Hürde, ein guter Kerl zu sein, ist einfach zu niedrig. And massive numerical advantages do matter, even when a single bad guy can inflict grievous harm, because among many other things, they allow us to exploit the hell out of this: we have years and hopefully decades to prepare and prevent. Und massive zahlenmäßige Vorteile spielen eine Rolle, selbst wenn ein einzelner Bösewicht schweren Schaden anrichten kann, denn sie ermöglichen es uns unter anderem, diese Situation bestmöglich auszunutzen: Wir haben Jahre und hoffentlich Jahrzehnte Zeit, uns vorzubereiten und vorzubeugen. The first person to try something awful -- and there will be somebody -- may not even be born yet.

Next, this needs to be an effort that spans society, and all of you need to be a part of it, because we cannot ask a tiny group of experts to be responsible for both containing and exploiting synthetic biology, because we already tried that with the financial system, and our stewards became massively corrupted as they figured out how they could cut corners, inflict massive, massive risks on the rest of us and privatize the gains, becoming repulsively wealthy while they stuck us with the $22 trillion bill.

And more recently --   (Applause)

Are you the ones who have gotten the thank-you letters? ¿Son ustedes los que han recibido las cartas de agradecimiento? I'm still waiting for mine. Todavía estoy esperando el mío. I just figured they were too busy to be grateful. Ich dachte nur, sie seien zu beschäftigt, um dankbar zu sein.

And much more recently, online privacy started looming as a huge issue, and we basically outsourced it. And once again: privatized gains, socialized losses. Und noch einmal: Privatisierte Gewinne, sozialisierte Verluste. Is anybody else sick of this pattern? Ist noch jemand dieses Muster leid? (Applause)

So we need a more inclusive way to safeguard our prosperity, our privacy and soon, our lives. Wir brauchen also einen umfassenderen Weg, um unseren Wohlstand, unsere Privatsphäre und bald auch unser Leben zu schützen. So how do we do all of this?

Well, when bodies fight pathogens, they use ingenious immune systems, which are very complex and multilayered. Nun, wenn der Körper Krankheitserreger bekämpft, setzt er ein ausgeklügeltes Immunsystem ein, das sehr komplex und vielschichtig ist. Why don't we build one of these for the whole damn ecosystem? There's a year of TED Talks that could be given on this first critical layer. So these are just a couple of many great ideas that are out there.

Some R and D muscle could take the very primitive pathogen sensors that we currently have and put them on a very steep price performance curve that would quickly become ingenious and networked and gradually as widespread as smoke detectors and even smartphones. Ein gewisser F&E-Muskel könnte die sehr primitiven Erregersensoren, die wir derzeit haben, auf eine sehr steile Preisleistungskurve bringen, die schnell genial und vernetzt und allmählich so weit verbreitet wie Rauchmelder und sogar Smartphones werden würde. On a very related note: vaccines have all kinds of problems when it comes to manufacturing and distribution, and once they're made, they can't adapt to new threats or mutations. We need an agile biomanufacturing base extending into every single pharmacy and maybe even our homes. Printer technology for vaccines and medicines is within reach if we prioritize it.

Next, mental health. Many people who commit suicidal mass murder suffer from crippling, treatment-resistant depression or PTSD. Viele Menschen, die einen selbstmörderischen Massenmord begehen, leiden unter lähmenden, behandlungsresistenten Depressionen oder PTBS. We need noble researchers like Rick Doblin working on this, but we also need the selfish jerks who are way more numerous to appreciate the fact that acute suffering will soon endanger all of us, not just those afflicted. Those jerks will then join us and Al Capone in fighting this condition. Third, each and every one of us can be and should be a white blood cell in this immune system. Suicidal mass murderers can be despicable, yes, but they're also terribly broken and sad people, and those of us who aren't need to do what we can to make sure nobody goes unloved. Selbstmordgefährdete Massenmörder können verachtenswert sein, ja, aber sie sind auch furchtbar gebrochene und traurige Menschen, und diejenigen von uns, die es nicht sind, müssen tun, was wir können, um sicherzustellen, dass niemand ungeliebt bleibt. (Applause)

Next, we need to make fighting these dangers core to the discipline of synthetic biology. There are companies out there that at least claim they let their engineers spend 20 percent of their time doing whatever they want. What if those who hire bioengineers and become them give 20 percent of their time to building defenses for the common good? Not a bad idea, right? (Applause)

Then, finally: this won't be any fun. But we need to let our minds go to some very, very dark places, and thank you for letting me take you there this evening. We survived the Cold War because every one of us understood and respected the danger, in part, because we had spent decades telling ourselves terrifying ghost stories with names like "Dr. Strangelove" and "War Games. " This is no time to remain calm. This is one of those rare times when it's incredibly productive to freak the hell out --    (Laughter)   to come up with some ghost stories and use our fear as fuel to fight this danger. Dies ist einer der seltenen Momente, in denen es unglaublich produktiv ist, auszuflippen - (Gelächter) sich ein paar Geistergeschichten auszudenken und unsere Angst als Treibstoff zu nutzen, um diese Gefahr zu bekämpfen. Because, all these terrible scenarios I've painted -- they are not destiny. They're optional. Sie sind fakultativ. The danger is still kind of distant. Die Gefahr ist noch ziemlich weit weg. And that means it will only befall us if we allow it to. Let's not. Thank you very much for listening.

(Applause)