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COURSERA: The Modern World, Part Two: Global History since 1910, W5.02 Choosing War in Korea

W5.02 Choosing War in Korea

Hi. Welcome back. This segment focuses on how the Korean War began in 1950. You'll have noticed that in the course we do tend to zoom in from time to time on how wars begin. We don't do this for all these wars in 250 years of world history. [LAUGH] That would be impossible. But we do zoom in on some of these choices. Why? First, because we tend to zoom in on choices about wars that had a large impact on the history of the world. And by the way, I think the Korean War had a large impact on the history of the world, much larger than would be implied just by the fate of Korea itself, though that was important. But second, by zooming in on these particular occasions, we get a little bit of insight into the mindsets of people at the time. We just happen to choose the mindsets of people wearing crowns or holding high office, but in many ways their mindsets and values are typical of many others. It's important not to see the Cold War as just some kind of simplistic linear story of, welp, two sides are in conflict with each other. The character of this confrontation really changed a lot in 1949, 1950, and 1951. That's a pivot point. In 1949, important parts of Europe and Asia are being organized around very different social systems. Okay. That didn't necessarily mean that those two systems had to come into military conflict. From a point of view of the United States, they had to have some readiness for this. But they weren't sending lots of troops to go out to Europe and to defend Europe. They were, in fact, pulling troops out of Europe. They weren't sending lots of troops into East Asia to defend East Asia from communism. They had just declined to intervene in the Chinese Civil War and were getting ready to pull troops out of Korea, and even questioning whether to keep occupation forces in Japan of the same size. So, they thought that they were in a broad political and economic confrontation/ rivalry, but that it didn't necessarily mean that they were on a path to some kind of gigantic war. It's important then to recover the world of 1949. The United States is envisioning probably some kind of multipolar world emerging, in which there will be a group of communist states, but they're hoping that the Soviet Union and China will begin to disagree with each other and that they'll be both friends and rivals. They see an increasingly empowered Western Europe again becoming an important force in its own right, but they hope having good relations with the United States, participating in the world economy, with some American military assistance and economic support but declining. They see a series of new independent states and reconstructed states, like Japan and East Asia, again with the American military role going down, but with America providing some foreign aid, military and economic, to help those new states get on their feet. So, they're envisioning a fairly complex world. Now, the implications for that, in Western Europe, is the United States gives Western Europe a treaty, in '48 and '49, called the North Atlantic Treaty, that promises that if you're attacked, we'll come to your defense. That's meant to reassure the Europeans, a reassurance that they hadn't had in the 1930s. But it�s just a treaty. It doesn't mean that large numbers of American ground troops are now going to be based in Europe. The Americans don't intend that, that will happen in 1949. Their occupation forces in Europe are being drawn down. They don't have serious ground combat forces stationed in Europe in 1949. They're expecting the West Europeans now are on a path of rebuilding, regaining their strength. In Asia, they have this similar concept. They write this down in an agreed presidential decision document, NSC, National Security Council Document, 48/2 that envisions these new independent power centers in Asia that they hope will be friendly with United States, getting some financial support from the United States. And in this document, and in later statements, the Americans are hoping to kind of keep communism on the Asian mainland, to have a defense perimeter that provides reassurances to places like Japan and the Philippine Islands. Now meanwhile, in 1949 and early 1950, there is a big argument going on in the American government about national defense. It's a very revealing argument. On one side are the internationalists, they believe that even these commitments that I've been talking about cannot be supported by the very low levels of defense spending in the American budget. On the other side, the majority of the Congress, and actually President Truman and his budget office, want to cut the defense spending still further and want to push more spending into helping Americans at home. They want to cut defense spending. After all, they have the atomic bomb, and nobody else does, and maybe that'll be good enough to provide the security reassurance they need. There are two major blows in 1949 that shake American complacency. The first is the Soviets detonate their own atomic bomb. This is actually a photograph taken by Soviet officials at the time of their first A-bomb test. The Americans only detected the tests through air samples that picked up the radioactive particles. The other huge blow for the United States is the fall of China to the Communists. Here's Mao Zedong in 1949 announcing the establishment of the new People's Republic of China. So the Soviet A-Bomb test is disturbing because, if both the Soviets and the Americans have A-Bombs and neither side can use atomic bombs against each other, then maybe you're left with a balance of conventional forces. But in Europe, that looks like that balance favors a much larger Red Army. That creates a lot of unease, shall we say. And then in China, you've got a dramatically expanded Communist position with a lot of revolutionary momentum in their favor. What's that going to mean? So the arguments in late �49 and early 1950 get much more intense because, Meanwhile, President Truman is still determined to keep defense spending way down and concentrate his energies on America's domestic development. But now flip your perspective, from the point of view of the Soviet government and the Chinese government, what are they thinking about? The Soviet Union is still recovering from the enormous damage it suffered and losses it took during the Second World War. China is just coming out of a civil war. You could easily make a very plausible argument that their first priority's going to be domestic reconstruction and rebuilding, consolidation of their new republic. But when Stalin and Mao get together, they're already talking about ways in which they can make advances. Mao, for example, is very focused on the desire to chase the Nationalists over the island of Taiwan and wipe out their last bastion. In early 1950, he's planning that invasion. By the way, the Americans fear that Mao plans to invade Taiwan, but actually in early 1950, the American government has kind of philosophically resigned itself to the fact that Taiwan is going to be lost. They are not going to defend the Chinese Nationalists position in Taiwan, even though many people in Congress want them to. And Mao and Stalin are also looking at ways the Chinese can help the insurgents fighting the French in Indo-China. And they're also paying more and more attention to what's going on in Korea. Let's look at the situation in Korea in 1949-1950. Here's the part of the world we're looking at. We've looked at maps covering this part of the world in different settings for something like 100 years now. You could make a pretty good argument that this particular pocket of Northeast Asia, and a fairly small part of Northwestern Europe, seem to be the arenas where an awful lot of world history gets decided. So here's Korea. Korea had been a colony of the Japanese since about 1910. After World War II, that colony was taken away by the victorious powers. It was going to go back to Korean control, all the issues arise, well, which Koreans? Who's going to run it? The United Nations has responsibility for sorting that out. In the meantime, the United Nations recognizes that Korea is under the military administration of occupying powers. Those occupying powers are the Soviet Union and its forces in the North, the Americans and their forces in the South, with the division of the occupation running about along the 38th parallel there. What happens then, though, is that two rival republics are created in these two different zones of occupation as the Cold War intensifies in the late 1940s. A Republic of Korea, here, and a Democratic People's Republic of Korea, up here. Both of these new Korean states, each of which claimed the whole peninsula for themselves, are, in a way, both revolutionary-style governments. The South Korean side, the Republic of Korea, is led by Syngman Rhee, a longtime Korean nationalist who'd been hoping to enlist outside help in getting the Japanese out. Here's a picture of Syngman Rhee. Rhee's ideology might fall in that family of political beliefs that I called National Conservatives: top-down modernizers, very nationalist. On the other side, the Soviet Union and the new People's Republic of China, support the leadership of Kim Il Sung. Kim Il Sung had been part of a group of Chinese and Korean revolutionaries fighting against the Japanese. During World War II, Kim had been in the Soviet Red Army. After World War II, the Soviets nominate him to play a leading role in their zone of occupation, and he ends up becoming the lead figure in the state they sponsor in their zone. Naturally, these two rival governments are in tension with each other, but the critical variable is: What do their superpower patrons think? The Americans, looking at Syngman Rhee, they're actually ambivalent. There are some things they like about his new government, there are a lot of things they don't like about his new government, and above all, they do not want him starting a war with North Korea. The Americans do not want any kind of war in Korea. Indeed, they've decided that they're going to withdraw the last of their occupation forces out of South Korea. They make that decision in 1948 and �49. They pull those forces out, leaving behind a small number of people advising the new South Korean army. On the North Korean side, the Soviets and the North Koreans are also having their discussions. But the outcome is very different. Kim Il Sung repeatedly pleads with Stalin. Give me the authorization, give me the help to launch a decisive invasion that will unify Korea under our control. Finally, Stalin and Kim have a decisive meeting in April 1950 in Moscow. We actually now have the Soviet records of a key part of that conversation. To the extent you can find any documentation of exactly how the Korean war begins, it would be the record of this meeting in April 1950. If you're a note taker for one of Joseph Stalin's meetings, probably the safest thing for you to do is to write really careful and accurate notes of exactly what your man said. These records, long secret, have this really interesting passage. Let's take a close look. Comrade Stalin confirmed to Kim Il Sung that the international environment has sufficiently changed to permit a more active stance on the unification of Korea. Why? He explains his reasoning. Internationally, the Chinese Communist Party's victory over the Guomingdang, that's 1949, previous year, has improved the environment for actions in Korea. China's no longer busy with internal fighting and can devote its attention and energy to the assistance of Korea. Note, if necessary, China has at its disposal troops which can be utilized in Korea without any harm to the other needs of China. It's a pretty significant statement. He adds, the Chinese victory is also important psychologically. It has proved the strength of Asian revolutionaries and shown the weakness of Asian reactionaries and their mentors in the West and America. Americans left China and did not dare to challenge the new Chinese authorities militarily. There is good evidence that both Stalin and Mao had actually expected that the Americans would have intervened massively in the Chinese Civil War. They may have been a bit surprised when the Americans did not do so, and you can see here the kind of conclusion Stalin drew from that. And now, he adds that he and Mao have signed a treaty of alliance with the USSR. Americans will be even more hesitant to challenge the communists in Asia. According to information coming from the United States, it is really so. The prevailing mood is not to interfere. This is an absolutely critical judgment he's making. What's his evidence for making it? What is he referring to here? Answer: We don't know. What we do know is that that NSC document I told you about, in which the Americans have drawn their defense perimeter off the coast and have made the decision to pull their troops out of Korea, Stalin has that document. Some key British officials stationed in Washington who had access to those documents were working as spies for the Soviet Union at this time. So, that may be what he's referring to. In January of 1950, the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, had even alluded publicly to the defense perimeter extending from Japan to the Ryukyu Islands to the Philippines, and so the Soviets may have drawn this conclusion that the Americans are going to adopt a hands-off attitude. Such a mood is reinforced by the fact that the USSR now as the atomic bomb and that our positions are solidified in Pyongyang. That's Kim Il Sung's capital. However, we have to weigh once again all the pros and cons of the liberation. First of all, will Americans interfere or not? Second, the liberation can be started only if the Chinese leadership endorses it. So he's actually being remarkably transparent and analytical about his key judgments. You can see the conclusion he's coming to on the first question. As to the second one, what then follows is an intensive series of discussions with Chinese leader Mao Zedong, especially in May 1950, in which Mao agrees to support the North Korean move. He has some reciprocal requests of assistance he wants from the Soviets in return. At the end of June 1950, the North Koreans launched a massive invasion, supported by Soviet military equipment including tanks, and an operational plan that's been written by the Soviet general staff. What then happens, in the last days of June and first days of July 1950, is that the United States, backed by the United Nations, actually decides to fight to save South Korea and commit American forces to a war there. Now, just pause for a second on this. Stalin had expected that the Americans would not do that. He had good reason for coming to that point of view, because actually the American government had carefully studied this issue and had repeatedly concluded, in writing, that it would not defend South Korea against an attack. Why, then, did Truman and his administration effectively do a 180-degree flip and decide they would defend South Korea? There's a wonderful analysis of just this point that was done long ago by a late, close colleague of mine, named Ernest May, in which he talked about the difference between calculated and axiomatic reasoning. As a matter of cold, analytic calculation, the American government had decided that it should not get involved in a war to save South Korea. It was the wrong place to have a war if a war came. But when the attack actually happened, it seemed so brazen to them. What it instantly evoked was an analogy: This feels like Hitler in 1938. It feels like the kind of aggression we were confronted against back then, and we didn't stand up then. It felt to them, and these were all men who had been profoundly marked by that period in the late 1930s and early 1940s, it felt emotionally, viscerally, to them like they were being tested again. Will you stand up to worldwide aggression? And drawing from that sense of historical analogy, they just instinctively responded: We have to meet the challenge. You constantly see in the contemporary documents these references to the 1930s and to Hitler, and that axiomatic reasoning quickly overrode all the prior careful, cold-blooded calculations as they decide to make their stand. It turns out to be a very tough decision. South Korea is almost entirely overrun. The Americans just barely hold on, as you can see from this map. The North Koreans driving south. By the beginning of August 1950, this perimeter, right here, is the only area still held by the United States Forces, fighting under United Nations authorization, and their South Korean allies. But they were able to hold on. What happened next created a whole new war. Indeed, caused the whole world to think that World War III was about to start. We'll talk about that next time. [BLANK_AUDIO]



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W5.02 Choosing War in Korea

Hi. Welcome back. This segment focuses on how the Korean War began in 1950. You'll have noticed that in the course we do tend to zoom in from time to time on how wars begin. We don't do this for all these wars in 250 years of world history. [LAUGH] That would be impossible. But we do zoom in on some of these choices. Why? First, because we tend to zoom in on choices about wars that had a large impact on the history of the world. And by the way, I think the Korean War had a large impact on the history of the world, much larger than would be implied just by the fate of Korea itself, though that was important. But second, by zooming in on these particular occasions, we get a little bit of insight into the mindsets of people at the time. We just happen to choose the mindsets of people wearing crowns or holding high office, but in many ways their mindsets and values are typical of many others. It's important not to see the Cold War as just some kind of simplistic linear story of, welp, two sides are in conflict with each other. The character of this confrontation really changed a lot in 1949, 1950, and 1951. That's a pivot point. In 1949, important parts of Europe and Asia are being organized around very different social systems. Okay. That didn't necessarily mean that those two systems had to come into military conflict. From a point of view of the United States, they had to have some readiness for this. But they weren't sending lots of troops to go out to Europe and to defend Europe. They were, in fact, pulling troops out of Europe. They weren't sending lots of troops into East Asia to defend East Asia from communism. They had just declined to intervene in the Chinese Civil War and were getting ready to pull troops out of Korea, and even questioning whether to keep occupation forces in Japan of the same size. So, they thought that they were in a broad political and economic confrontation/ rivalry, but that it didn't necessarily mean that they were on a path to some kind of gigantic war. It's important then to recover the world of 1949. The United States is envisioning probably some kind of multipolar world emerging, in which there will be a group of communist states, but they're hoping that the Soviet Union and China will begin to disagree with each other and that they'll be both friends and rivals. They see an increasingly empowered Western Europe again becoming an important force in its own right, but they hope having good relations with the United States, participating in the world economy, with some American military assistance and economic support but declining. They see a series of new independent states and reconstructed states, like Japan and East Asia, again with the American military role going down, but with America providing some foreign aid, military and economic, to help those new states get on their feet. So, they're envisioning a fairly complex world. Now, the implications for that, in Western Europe, is the United States gives Western Europe a treaty, in '48 and '49, called the North Atlantic Treaty, that promises that if you're attacked, we'll come to your defense. That's meant to reassure the Europeans, a reassurance that they hadn't had in the 1930s. But it�s just a treaty. It doesn't mean that large numbers of American ground troops are now going to be based in Europe. The Americans don't intend that, that will happen in 1949. Their occupation forces in Europe are being drawn down. They don't have serious ground combat forces stationed in Europe in 1949. They're expecting the West Europeans now are on a path of rebuilding, regaining their strength. In Asia, they have this similar concept. They write this down in an agreed presidential decision document, NSC, National Security Council Document, 48/2 that envisions these new independent power centers in Asia that they hope will be friendly with United States, getting some financial support from the United States. And in this document, and in later statements, the Americans are hoping to kind of keep communism on the Asian mainland, to have a defense perimeter that provides reassurances to places like Japan and the Philippine Islands. Now meanwhile, in 1949 and early 1950, there is a big argument going on in the American government about national defense. It's a very revealing argument. On one side are the internationalists, they believe that even these commitments that I've been talking about cannot be supported by the very low levels of defense spending in the American budget. On the other side, the majority of the Congress, and actually President Truman and his budget office, want to cut the defense spending still further and want to push more spending into helping Americans at home. They want to cut defense spending. After all, they have the atomic bomb, and nobody else does, and maybe that'll be good enough to provide the security reassurance they need. There are two major blows in 1949 that shake American complacency. The first is the Soviets detonate their own atomic bomb. This is actually a photograph taken by Soviet officials at the time of their first A-bomb test. The Americans only detected the tests through air samples that picked up the radioactive particles. The other huge blow for the United States is the fall of China to the Communists. Here's Mao Zedong in 1949 announcing the establishment of the new People's Republic of China. So the Soviet A-Bomb test is disturbing because, if both the Soviets and the Americans have A-Bombs and neither side can use atomic bombs against each other, then maybe you're left with a balance of conventional forces. But in Europe, that looks like that balance favors a much larger Red Army. That creates a lot of unease, shall we say. And then in China, you've got a dramatically expanded Communist position with a lot of revolutionary momentum in their favor. What's that going to mean? So the arguments in late �49 and early 1950 get much more intense because, Meanwhile, President Truman is still determined to keep defense spending way down and concentrate his energies on America's domestic development. But now flip your perspective, from the point of view of the Soviet government and the Chinese government, what are they thinking about? The Soviet Union is still recovering from the enormous damage it suffered and losses it took during the Second World War. China is just coming out of a civil war. You could easily make a very plausible argument that their first priority's going to be domestic reconstruction and rebuilding, consolidation of their new republic. But when Stalin and Mao get together, they're already talking about ways in which they can make advances. Mao, for example, is very focused on the desire to chase the Nationalists over the island of Taiwan and wipe out their last bastion. In early 1950, he's planning that invasion. By the way, the Americans fear that Mao plans to invade Taiwan, but actually in early 1950, the American government has kind of philosophically resigned itself to the fact that Taiwan is going to be lost. They are not going to defend the Chinese Nationalists position in Taiwan, even though many people in Congress want them to. And Mao and Stalin are also looking at ways the Chinese can help the insurgents fighting the French in Indo-China. And they're also paying more and more attention to what's going on in Korea. Let's look at the situation in Korea in 1949-1950. Here's the part of the world we're looking at. We've looked at maps covering this part of the world in different settings for something like 100 years now. You could make a pretty good argument that this particular pocket of Northeast Asia, and a fairly small part of Northwestern Europe, seem to be the arenas where an awful lot of world history gets decided. So here's Korea. Korea had been a colony of the Japanese since about 1910. After World War II, that colony was taken away by the victorious powers. It was going to go back to Korean control, all the issues arise, well, which Koreans? Who's going to run it? The United Nations has responsibility for sorting that out. In the meantime, the United Nations recognizes that Korea is under the military administration of occupying powers. Those occupying powers are the Soviet Union and its forces in the North, the Americans and their forces in the South, with the division of the occupation running about along the 38th parallel there. What happens then, though, is that two rival republics are created in these two different zones of occupation as the Cold War intensifies in the late 1940s. A Republic of Korea, here, and a Democratic People's Republic of Korea, up here. Both of these new Korean states, each of which claimed the whole peninsula for themselves, are, in a way, both revolutionary-style governments. The South Korean side, the Republic of Korea, is led by Syngman Rhee, a longtime Korean nationalist who'd been hoping to enlist outside help in getting the Japanese out. Here's a picture of Syngman Rhee. Rhee's ideology might fall in that family of political beliefs that I called National Conservatives: top-down modernizers, very nationalist. On the other side, the Soviet Union and the new People's Republic of China, support the leadership of Kim Il Sung. Kim Il Sung had been part of a group of Chinese and Korean revolutionaries fighting against the Japanese. During World War II, Kim had been in the Soviet Red Army. After World War II, the Soviets nominate him to play a leading role in their zone of occupation, and he ends up becoming the lead figure in the state they sponsor in their zone. Naturally, these two rival governments are in tension with each other, but the critical variable is: What do their superpower patrons think? The Americans, looking at Syngman Rhee, they're actually ambivalent. There are some things they like about his new government, there are a lot of things they don't like about his new government, and above all, they do not want him starting a war with North Korea. The Americans do not want any kind of war in Korea. Indeed, they've decided that they're going to withdraw the last of their occupation forces out of South Korea. They make that decision in 1948 and �49. They pull those forces out, leaving behind a small number of people advising the new South Korean army. On the North Korean side, the Soviets and the North Koreans are also having their discussions. But the outcome is very different. Kim Il Sung repeatedly pleads with Stalin. Give me the authorization, give me the help to launch a decisive invasion that will unify Korea under our control. Finally, Stalin and Kim have a decisive meeting in April 1950 in Moscow. We actually now have the Soviet records of a key part of that conversation. To the extent you can find any documentation of exactly how the Korean war begins, it would be the record of this meeting in April 1950. If you're a note taker for one of Joseph Stalin's meetings, probably the safest thing for you to do is to write really careful and accurate notes of exactly what your man said. These records, long secret, have this really interesting passage. Let's take a close look. Comrade Stalin confirmed to Kim Il Sung that the international environment has sufficiently changed to permit a more active stance on the unification of Korea. Why? He explains his reasoning. Internationally, the Chinese Communist Party's victory over the Guomingdang, that's 1949, previous year, has improved the environment for actions in Korea. China's no longer busy with internal fighting and can devote its attention and energy to the assistance of Korea. Note, if necessary, China has at its disposal troops which can be utilized in Korea without any harm to the other needs of China. It's a pretty significant statement. He adds, the Chinese victory is also important psychologically. It has proved the strength of Asian revolutionaries and shown the weakness of Asian reactionaries and their mentors in the West and America. Americans left China and did not dare to challenge the new Chinese authorities militarily. There is good evidence that both Stalin and Mao had actually expected that the Americans would have intervened massively in the Chinese Civil War. They may have been a bit surprised when the Americans did not do so, and you can see here the kind of conclusion Stalin drew from that. And now, he adds that he and Mao have signed a treaty of alliance with the USSR. Americans will be even more hesitant to challenge the communists in Asia. According to information coming from the United States, it is really so. The prevailing mood is not to interfere. This is an absolutely critical judgment he's making. What's his evidence for making it? What is he referring to here? Answer: We don't know. What we do know is that that NSC document I told you about, in which the Americans have drawn their defense perimeter off the coast and have made the decision to pull their troops out of Korea, Stalin has that document. Some key British officials stationed in Washington who had access to those documents were working as spies for the Soviet Union at this time. So, that may be what he's referring to. In January of 1950, the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, had even alluded publicly to the defense perimeter extending from Japan to the Ryukyu Islands to the Philippines, and so the Soviets may have drawn this conclusion that the Americans are going to adopt a hands-off attitude. Such a mood is reinforced by the fact that the USSR now as the atomic bomb and that our positions are solidified in Pyongyang. That's Kim Il Sung's capital. However, we have to weigh once again all the pros and cons of the liberation. First of all, will Americans interfere or not? Second, the liberation can be started only if the Chinese leadership endorses it. So he's actually being remarkably transparent and analytical about his key judgments. You can see the conclusion he's coming to on the first question. As to the second one, what then follows is an intensive series of discussions with Chinese leader Mao Zedong, especially in May 1950, in which Mao agrees to support the North Korean move. He has some reciprocal requests of assistance he wants from the Soviets in return. At the end of June 1950, the North Koreans launched a massive invasion, supported by Soviet military equipment including tanks, and an operational plan that's been written by the Soviet general staff. What then happens, in the last days of June and first days of July 1950, is that the United States, backed by the United Nations, actually decides to fight to save South Korea and commit American forces to a war there. Now, just pause for a second on this. Stalin had expected that the Americans would not do that. He had good reason for coming to that point of view, because actually the American government had carefully studied this issue and had repeatedly concluded, in writing, that it would not defend South Korea against an attack. Why, then, did Truman and his administration effectively do a 180-degree flip and decide they would defend South Korea? There's a wonderful analysis of just this point that was done long ago by a late, close colleague of mine, named Ernest May, in which he talked about the difference between calculated and axiomatic reasoning. As a matter of cold, analytic calculation, the American government had decided that it should not get involved in a war to save South Korea. It was the wrong place to have a war if a war came. But when the attack actually happened, it seemed so brazen to them. What it instantly evoked was an analogy: This feels like Hitler in 1938. It feels like the kind of aggression we were confronted against back then, and we didn't stand up then. It felt to them, and these were all men who had been profoundly marked by that period in the late 1930s and early 1940s, it felt emotionally, viscerally, to them like they were being tested again. Will you stand up to worldwide aggression? And drawing from that sense of historical analogy, they just instinctively responded: We have to meet the challenge. You constantly see in the contemporary documents these references to the 1930s and to Hitler, and that axiomatic reasoning quickly overrode all the prior careful, cold-blooded calculations as they decide to make their stand. It turns out to be a very tough decision. South Korea is almost entirely overrun. The Americans just barely hold on, as you can see from this map. The North Koreans driving south. By the beginning of August 1950, this perimeter, right here, is the only area still held by the United States Forces, fighting under United Nations authorization, and their South Korean allies. But they were able to hold on. What happened next created a whole new war. Indeed, caused the whole world to think that World War III was about to start. We'll talk about that next time. [BLANK_AUDIO]

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